Grossman / Rogoff Handbook of International Economics

1. Auflage 1997
ISBN: 978-0-08-093345-0
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: EPUB
Kopierschutz: 6 - ePub Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, Band Volume 3, 900 Seiten

Reihe: Handbook of International Economics

Handbook of International Economics

Autoren/Hrsg.

Grossman, G. M.

Rogoff, Kenneth

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Front Cover;1
2;Handbook of International Economics;4
3;Copyright Page;5
4;Table of Contents;20
5;Introduction to the Series;6
6;Contents of the Handbook;8
7;Preface to the Handbook;12
8;PART 1: INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY AND POLICY;30
8.1;Chapter 24. Increasing Returns, Imperfect Competition and the Positive Theory of International Trade;32
8.1.1;O. Introduction;33
8.1.2;1.The integrated-economy approach to international trade;34
8.1.3;2. Market segmentation;50
8.1.4;3. Unresolved issues and future concerns;60
8.1.5;4. Concluding remarks;65
8.1.6;References;65
8.2;Chapter 25. Technology and Trade;68
8.2.1;O. Introduction;70
8.2.2;1. Exogenous technology;72
8.2.3;2. Learning-by-doing;81
8.2.4;3. Innovation;96
8.2.5;4. Further topics;112
8.2.6;References;123
8.3;Chapter 26. International Trade Theory: The Evidence;128
8.3.1;1. Introduction;130
8.3.2;2. Empirical studies of the Ricardian and Ricardo-Viner models;132
8.3.3;3. The Hechscher-Ohlin model;134
8.3.4;4. Models with monopolistic competition;164
8.3.5;5. Demand-side explanations for international trade;171
8.3.6;6. International trade and distance between partners;173
8.3.7;Appendix: Data sources;177
8.3.8;References;179
8.4;Chapter 27. Strategic Trade Policy;184
8.4.1;1. Introduction;186
8.4.2;2. The game theoretic structure of strategic trade policy;188
8.4.3;3. Profit-shifting export subsidies in a "third-market" model ;192
8.4.4;4. Strategic trade policy in the reciprocal-markets model;215
8.4.5;5. Calibration of strategic trade policy models;226
8.4.6;6. Concluding remarks;234
8.4.7;References;239
8.5;Chapter 28. Political Economy of Trade Policy;246
8.5.1;1. Introduction;247
8.5.2;2. General considerations;247
8.5.3;3. A typology of models;252
8.5.4;4. Why is international trade not free?;259
8.5.5;5. Why are trade policies biased against trade?;265
8.5.6;6. Protection across industries, countries, and time;269
8.5.7;7. Consequences of viewing trade policy from political-economy lenses;276
8.5.8;8. Concluding remarks;279
8.5.9;References;279
8.6;Chapter 29. International Rules and Institutions for Cooperative Trade Policy;284
8.6.1;1. Introduction;286
8.6.2;2. The structure of international trade agreements;287
8.6.3;3. Strategic interaction and the benefits from international trade agreements;297
8.6.4;4. Enforcement of international trade rules;308
8.6.5;5. The process of reciprocal trade liberalization;317
8.6.6;6. Safeguards and managed trade;327
8.6.7;7. Antidumping law and countervailing duties;331
8.6.8;8. Conclusion;336
8.6.9;References;336
8.7;Chapter 30. Estimating the Effects of Trade Policy;342
8.7.1;1. Introduction;343
8.7.2;2. General Framework;345
8.7.3;3. Tariffs;348
8.7.4;4. Quotas;359
8.7.5;5. Estimating markups;369
8.7.6;6. Wages and employment;372
8.7.7;7. Conclusions;378
8.7.8;References;379
8.8;Chapter 31. Regional Economic Integration;386
8.8.1;1. Introduction;387
8.8.2;2. Allocation effects;391
8.8.3;3. Accumulation effects;403
8.8.4;4. Location effects;405
8.8.5;5. Empirical evaluations;414
8.8.6;6. Regionalism and world trading arrangements;423
8.8.7;7. Concluding comments;427
8.8.8;Appendices;427
8.8.9;References;429
9;PART 2: OPEN ECONOMY MACROECONOMICS AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE;434
9.1;Chapter 32. Perspectives on PPP and Long-Run Real Exchange Rates;436
9.1.1;1. Introduction;437
9.1.2;2. Evolving tests of simple PPP;438
9.1.3;3. Structural models of deviations from PPP;461
9.1.4;4. Conclusions;472
9.1.5;References;473
9.2;Chapter 33. Empirical Research on Nominal Exchange Rates;478
9.2.1;O. Introduction;479
9.2.2;1. Floating exchange rates;479
9.2.3;2. Evidence from across fixed and floating regimes;494
9.2.4;3. Speculative bubbles;496
9.2.5;4. Evidence on the micro-structure of the foreign exchange market;498
9.2.6;5. Conclusion: Endogenous speculative bubbles?;507
9.2.7;References;509
9.3;Chapter 34. The Intertemporal Approach to the Current Account;520
9.3.1;1. Introduction;521
9.3.2;2. The current account: Basic concepts and historical overview;522
9.3.3;3. Intertemporal approaches to the current account ;531
9.3.4;4. Empirical evidence on the intertemporal approach;565
9.3.5;5. How useful is the theory?;581
9.3.6;References;584
9.4;Chapter 35. International Trade and Business Cycles;590
9.4.1;1. Introduction;592
9.4.2;2. Business cycles and the current account in open economies;593
9.4.3;3. The basic model;600
9.4.4;4. Model solution, measurement, and calibration;605
9.4.5;5. Business cycle and current account dynamics in the basic model: Productivity shocks;609
9.4.6;6. Business-cycle implications of the one-good model;626
9.4.7;7. Fiscal shocks;633
9.4.8;8. Multi-good models;642
9.4.9;9. New directions;648
9.4.10;References;650
9.5;Chapter 36. The Operation and Collapse of Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes;654
9.5.1;1. Introduction;655
9.5.2;2. The choice of a fixed exchange rate regime;655
9.5.3;3. Exchange rate target zones;659
9.5.4;4. Speculative attacks on fixed exchange rate regimes;680
9.5.5;5. Suggestions for further reading;694
9.5.6;References;696
9.6;Chapter 37. Puzzles in International Financial Markets ;702
9.6.1;O. Introduction;703
9.6.2;1. The behavior of excess foreign exchange returns;705
9.6.3;2. International portfolio allocation;739
9.6.4;References;755
9.7;Chapter 38. Double-Edged Incentives: Institutions and Policy Coordination;762
9.7.1;1. General introduction;764
9.7.2;Part A. Fiscal policy;766
9.7.3;2. Terms of trade effects;768
9.7.4;3. Cooperation among politically motivated governments;774
9.7.5;4. Tax competition;777
9.7.6;5. Domestic institutions in fiscal policy;782
9.7.7;6. International institutions in fiscal policy;787
9.8;Part B. Monetary policy;791
9.8.1;7. A common framework;791
9.8.2;8. International externalities and domestic incentives;794
9.8.3;9. Domestic institutions in monetary policy;802
9.8.4;10. International institutions in monetary policy;809
9.8.5;References;816
9.9;Chapter 39. Sovereign Debt;820
9.9.1;1. Introduction;821
9.9.2;2. Repayment incentives;822
9.9.3;3. What can go wrong?;837
9.9.4;4. What can be done?;850
9.9.5;5. Conclusion;862
9.9.6;References;863
10;Index;868

Leseproben

Chapter 24 Increasing Returns, Imperfect Competition and the Positive Theory of International Trade
Paul Krugman*    MIT, Cambridge
* I would like to thank Don Davis and Gene Grossman for extremely helpful comments. Don Davis, in addition to providing invaluable help in revising an early draft, did the yeoman service of presenting that draft in my absence. Contents 0. Introduction     1244 1. The integrated-economy approach to international trade     1245 1.1. Samuelson's angel     1245 1.2. Differential products     1248 1.3. External economies     1251 1.4. Intermediate goods, traded and nontraded     1255 1.5. Multinational enterprise     1257 1.6. The integrated-economy approach: Concluding remarks     1260 2. Market segmentation     1261 2.1. The home market effect     1261 2.2. The “new economic geography”     1263 2.3. Multinational enterprise, again     1265 2.4. Price discrimination     1268 2.5. Concluding remarks     1271 3. Unresolved issues and future concerns     1271 3.1. Trade issues per se     1272 3.2. Deeper issues     1274 4. Concluding remarks     1276 References     1276 0 Introduction
This chapter is an awkward one to write, because it is in effect squeezed between an illustrious predecessor and the topics covered in other chapters. On one side, I need not retrace the ground covered by Elhanan Helpman's ground-breaking survey in the original Handbook of International Economics (written in 1982). On the other side, it is probably fair to say that most of the innovative work on increasing returns and imperfect competition in international trade theory since the late 1980s has focussed on dynamic issues, especially technological change – and these issues are covered in Chapter 2 and other chapters in this volume. Why, then, write this chapter? For three reasons. First, Helpman's survey turns out to have come a few years too soon. Perhaps inevitably given the state of the field at that time, the general impression conveyed in that chapter was of a collection of highly disparate and messy approaches, standing both in contrast and in opposition to the impressive unity and clarity of constant-returns, perfect-competition trade theory. And yet within only a few years after Helpman's survey, it had become clear (largely due to his own work) that the new ideas were not such a grab-bag after all. On the contrary, many of the insights of increasing returns trade theory could be understood in terms of a quite simple common framework, in which trade has the effect of moving the world economy toward the “integrated economy” that would exist if national boundaries could be eliminated. The integrated-economy approach also suggested considerable continuity between the new elements in trade theory and the older tradition. Furthermore, the framework provided a “grammar” that could be used to discuss topics that went well beyond the standard analysis of trade in final goods, such as the effects of trade in intermediate goods and the role of multinational firms in the world economy. One purpose of this chapter, then, is to present a compact restatement of this integrated economy approach. In effect, the first part of the chapter is a Reader's Digest version of Helpman and Krugman (1985). At the same time, since Helpman wrote his survey there have been a number of developments in the theory of trade (and direct investment) under imperfect competition that cannot be represented using the integrated economy approach, typically because they rely on some kind of persistent market segmentation that trade does not fully eliminate. These developments include, most notably, analyses of the effects of the size of the domestic market, and of price discrimination; they also have a bearing on recent thinking about multinational enterprise. So a second purpose of this chapter is to summarize some of these post-1982 developments. Finally, the years that have passed since the original Helpman survey offer us a chance to gain some perspective. Now that the “new trade theory” has grown middle-aged along with its founders, we can try to ask what it accomplished and what it left undone. This chapter, then, is in three parts: a restatement of the integrated-economy approach to trade theory, a survey of other developments that cannot be treated within that approach, and a brief reconsideration of the achievements and limits of the now not-so-new “new trade theory”. 1 The integrated-economy approach to international trade
1.1 Samuelson's angel
It is common in expositions of international trade theory to start by imagining two isolated countries, which then are allowed to begin trade with each other. The integrated economy approach goes in the reverse direction, starting from a unified economy, then breaking it up. Perhaps the first suggestion of using this approach to think about international trade came in a parable used by Paul Samuelson to explain the concept of factor price equalization. Here's the parable: Once upon a time, all the factors of production in the world were part of a single economy, able to work freely with each other. This integrated world economy had reached an equilibrium, with all the things that go with such an equilibrium: goods prices, factor prices, resource allocations, and so on. And then down came an angel. (Although Samuelson does not say so, this is obviously the angel from the Tower of Babel story; presumably the factors of production had dared to challenge heaven, and were being punished for their presumption.) The angel smote each unit of each factor of production on the forehead, labelling it as belonging to a particular nation; and thenceforth factors could only work with other factors from the same country. But how much damage had the angel done? Well, perhaps none. Provided that the angel had not divided the factors of production too unevenly between the nations, it might still be possible through specialization and trade to achieve exactly the same global output and consumption as before. In that case, trade would have the effect of “reproducing the international economy”; and one could indeed describe such a restoration of the integrated economy (which would involve, among other things, equalization of factor prices) as the purpose of international trade. Samuelson's angel story can be given a very convenient representation in a two-factor, two-good, two-country, constant returns world. Consider Figure 1.1, which was originally suggested by several authors in the 1960s but whose dissemination is due to Dixit and Norman (1980). The box in Figure 1.1 represents the resources of the world economy as a whole, with the height of the box representing the world supply of capital, the width the world supply of labor. In the pre-angel, integrated economy there will be full employment of both factors; we represent the resources devoted to the capital-intensive industry by OX, those devoted to the labor-intensive industry by OY. The two vectors must, of course, sum to the world factor endowment – that is, the completed parallelogram just fits into the box. Figure 1.1 Now let the angel come down, and divide the factors of production into two nationalities, Home and Foreign. Let us measure Home endowments from the southwest corner of the box, O, and Foreign endowments from the northeast corner, O*. Then the angel's punishment can be represented by a single point which, measured from O, shows the Home endowment, and which shows the Foreign endowment measured from O*. Point E is one example of a world endowment point; E'E'is another. Did the angel do any harm? In order to reproduce the integrated-economy outcome, it must be possible to use the same production techniques (i.e. capital–labor ratios) that were used in the integrated economy to produce the same outputs, while fully employing the resources of each country. It is immediately obvious that this is possible if the endowment point is, like point E, within the parallelogram OXO*Y. Indeed, we can determine the required resource allocation simply by completing parallelograms. Let Home devote resources OQx to production of...