Greenberg Real Existence, Ideal Necessity

Kant's Compromise, and the Modalities without the Compromise
1. Auflage 2008
ISBN: 978-3-11-021013-2
Verlag: De Gruyter
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, Band 157, 229 Seiten, Gewicht: 10 g

Reihe: Kantstudien-Ergänzungshefte

Analytic philosophy has leveled many challenges to Kant’s ascription of necessary properties and relations to objects in his . Some of these challenges can be answered, it is argued here, largely in terms of techniques belonging to analytic philosophy itself, in particular, to its philosophy of language. This Kantian response is the primary objective of this book. It takes the form of a compromise between the real existence of the objects that we can intuit and that get our knowledge started – dubbed – and the ideality of the necessary properties and relations that Kant ascribes to our sensible of initiators, which he entitles . Whereas the real existence of initiators is independent of us and our senses, the necessity of these properties and relations of appearances is due to their origins in the mind.
The Kantian compromise between real existence and ideal necessity is formulated in terms of David Kaplan’s interpretation of necessity in his article, “Quantifying In” – his response to Quine’s concern that a commitment to such a necessity leads to an acceptance of an unwanted traditional Aristotelian essentialism.
In addition, the book first abstracts and then departs from its interpretation of Kant to provide a realistic account of the relation between existence and necessity.

Zielgruppe

Academics, Libraries, Institutes

Autoren/Hrsg.

Greenberg, Robert

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Geschichte der Westlichen Philosophie Westliche Philosophie: 19. Jahrhundert

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Frontmatter;1
2;Inhalt;9
3;Preface;11
4;Chapter 1 – General Review;19
5;Chapter 2 – How Our Knowledge Begins;35
6;Chapter 3 – A Criterion of Existence in General;59
7;Chapter 4 – Sensation and Existence;79
8;Chapter 5 – Presupposition and Existence;90
9;Chapter 6 – Kant’s Referential Ambiguity;109
10;Chapter 7 – Kaplan’s Referential Ambiguity;122
11;Chapter 8 – Kaplan’s Interpretation Adapted to Kant;132
12;Chapter 9 – Geometry and Causality;142
13;Chapter 10 – Presupposition and Real Necessity;165
14;Chapter 11 – Derivations of the Real Modalities;191
15;Chapter 12 – Conclusion;210
16;Backmatter;217

Über Autor(innen)

Robert Greenberg, Brandeis University, Waltham, MA, USA.