The Brain in a Vat

Erscheinungsjahr 2016
ISBN: 978-1-107-64338-3
Verlag: Cambridge University Press

Buch, Englisch, 274 Seiten, Format (B × H): 170 mm x 244 mm, Gewicht: 488 g

Reihe: Classic Philosophical Arguments

The scenario of the brain in a vat, first aired thirty-five years ago in Hilary Putnam's classic paper, has been deeply influential in philosophy of mind and language, epistemology, and metaphysics. This collection of new essays examines the scenario and its philosophical ramifications and applications, as well as the challenges which it has faced. The essays review historical applications of the brain-in-a-vat scenario and consider its impact on contemporary debates. They explore a diverse range of philosophical issues, from intentionality, external-world scepticism, and the nature of truth, to the extended mind hypothesis, reference magnetism, and new versions of realism. The volume will be a rich and valuable resource for advanced students in metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of mind and language, as well as anyone interested in the relations between language, thought and the world.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Goldberg, Sanford C.

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Moderne Philosophische Disziplinen Philosophie des Geistes, Neurophilosophie
• Geisteswissenschaften Sprachwissenschaft Sprachwissenschaften Sprachphilosophie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Sprachphilosophie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1. Introduction: Putnam's reflections on the brain in a vat Sanford C. Goldberg; Part I. Intentionality and the Philosophy of Mind and Language: 2. Putnam on brains in a vat Tony Brueckner; 3. How to think about whether we are brains in vats Gary Ebbs; 4. Extended minds in vats Sven Bernecker; 5. Brains in vats, causal constraints on reference and semantic externalism Jesper Kallestrup; Part II. Epistemology: 6. Putnam on BIVs and radical skepticism Duncan Pritchard and Chris Ranalli; 7. BIVs, sensitivity, discrimination, and relevant alternatives Kelly Becker; 8. New lessons from old demons: the case for reliabilism Thomas Grundmann; Part III. Metaphysics: 9. Brains in vats and model theory Tim Button; 10. Realism, skepticism, and the brain in a vat Janet Folina; 11. Rethinking semantic naturalism Igor Douven; 12. Internal to what? Contemporary naturalism and Putnam's model-theoretic argument Patricia Marino; 13. The model-theoretic argument: from skepticism to a new understanding Gila Sher; 14. Eligibility and ideology in the vat Tim Sundell; Bibliography; Index.

Über Autor(innen)

Goldberg, Sanford C.
Sanford C. Goldberg is Professor of Philosophy and Chair of the Department of Philosophy at Northwestern University, Illinois, and Professorial Fellow in the Department of Philosophy and Eidyn Research Centre at the University of Edinburgh, Scotland. He is the author of Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification (Cambridge, 2007), Relying on Others: An Essay in Epistemology (2010) and Assertion: A Philosophical Essay on Assertoric Speech (2015). He is also the editor of Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology (2007) and Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism: New Essays (Cambridge, forthcoming, 2015).