Girard / Marion / Roy Dynamic Formal Epistemology

1. Auflage 2011
ISBN: 978-94-007-0074-1
Verlag: Springer Netherlands
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, Band 351, 242 Seiten

Reihe: Synthese Library

This volume is a collation of original contributions from the key actors of a new trend in the contemporary theory of knowledge and belief, that we call 'dynamic epistemology'. It brings the works of these researchers under a single umbrella by highlighting the coherence of their current themes, and by establishing connections between topics that, up until now, have been investigated independently. It also illustrates how the new analytical toolbox unveils questions about the theory of knowledge, belief, preference, action, and rationality, in a number of central axes in dynamic epistemology: temporal, social, probabilistic and even deontic dynamics.

P. Girard: PhD. Stanford University, 2009. Publications in Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logic and Journal of Philosophical Logic.O. Roy: PhD. Institute for Logic, Language and Computation, Amsterdam, 2008. Publications in Journal of Philosophical Logic, Synthese, Economics and Philosophy.M. Marion: PhD. Oxford, 1991. Publications in Philosophiques, Synthese, Philosophia Scientiae.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Marion, Mathieu

Roy, Olivier

Girard, Patrick

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Acknowledgements;6
2;Contents;7
3;Contributors;9
4;1 Introduction;11
4.1;Patrick Girard, Mathieu Marion, and Olivier Roy;11
5;2 Logics of Rational Interaction;15
5.1;Barteld Kooi and Eric Pacuit;15
5.1.1;2.1 Introduction;15
5.1.2;2.2 Reasoning About Rational Interaction;16
5.1.2.1;2.2.1 Epistemic Temporal Logic;18
5.1.2.2;2.2.2 Dynamic Epistemic Logic;22
5.1.2.3;2.2.3 Comparing DEL and ETL;25
5.1.3;2.3 Extensions, Connections and Applications;29
5.1.3.1;2.3.1 Propositional Dynamic Logic;30
5.1.3.2;2.3.2 Belief Revision;30
5.1.3.3;2.3.3 Probability Logic;31
5.1.3.4;2.3.4 Situation Calculus;31
5.1.3.5;2.3.5 Factual Change;32
5.1.3.6;2.3.6 Logics of Rational Agency;32
5.1.3.7;2.3.7 Inference Logic;33
5.1.3.8;2.3.8 Justification Logic;33
5.1.3.9;2.3.9 Puzzles and Paradoxes;34
5.1.3.10;2.3.10 Game Theory;35
5.1.3.11;2.3.11 Security;36
5.1.4;2.4 Conclusion: Towards a Unified Account of Rational Interaction;36
5.1.5;References;37
6;3 Dynamic Epistemic Logic and Temporal Modality;43
6.1;Audrey Yap;43
6.1.1;3.1 Dynamic Epistemic Logic;43
6.1.1.1;3.1.1 Language and Models;43
6.1.2;3.2 Dynamic Epistemic Logic with History;45
6.1.2.1;3.2.1 Language and Models;46
6.1.2.2;3.2.2 About the Logic;47
6.1.3;3.3 Expressive Power and Variations;57
6.1.3.1;3.3.1 Bisimulation;57
6.1.3.2;3.3.2 Common Knowledge and Unsuccessful Updates;57
6.1.3.3;3.3.3 Axiom Variants;58
6.1.4;References;60
7;4 Exploring the Power of Converse Events;61
7.1;Guillaume Aucher and Andreas Herzig;61
7.1.1;4.1 Introduction;61
7.1.1.1;4.1.1 Aim: Reason About Perception of Events;61
7.1.1.2;4.1.2 Semantics of Events: Products vs. Accessibility Relations;62
7.1.1.3;4.1.3 Translating BMS into EDL;62
7.1.1.4;4.1.4 Organization of the Chapter;63
7.1.2;4.2 EDL: Epistemic Dynamic Logic with Converse;63
7.1.2.1;4.2.1 The Language LEDL of EDL;63
7.1.2.2;4.2.2 Semantics of EDL;64
7.1.2.3;4.2.3 Completeness;67
7.1.3;4.3 BMS: Static Models, Event Models, and Their Products ;67
7.1.3.1;4.3.1 Semantics;68
7.1.3.2;4.3.2 Completeness;69
7.1.4;4.4 From BMS to EDL;69
7.1.4.1;4.4.1 A ``Semantic'' Embedding;70
7.1.4.2;4.4.2 A ``Syntactic'' Embedding;73
7.1.4.3;4.4.3 A Representation Theorem;76
7.1.5;4.5 Comparison with ETL and Other Related Work;77
7.1.5.1;4.5.1 Basics of ETL;77
7.1.5.2;4.5.2 ETL and EDL;78
7.1.5.3;4.5.3 Other Related Work;81
7.1.6;4.6 Conclusion;82
7.1.7;References;82
8;5 Modal Logic for Qualitative Dynamics;85
8.1;Darko Sarenac;85
8.1.1;5.1 Introduction;85
8.1.1.1;5.1.1 Modal View of Dynamics;86
8.1.2;5.2 Iterated Function Systems and Some General Notes on Dynamical Systems;87
8.1.2.1;5.2.1 Time and Space as Dynamical Control Variables;88
8.1.2.2;5.2.2 Time, Change, and Dynamics;91
8.1.2.3;5.2.3 CFS: Time as Continuum;92
8.1.2.4;5.2.4 Dynamic Topological Logic, DTL;94
8.1.2.5;5.2.5 Modalities and Their Semantics;95
8.1.2.6;5.2.6 Some Computational Properties of DTL and Its Fragments;95
8.1.2.7;5.2.7 Poincare and Topology of Dynamical Systems;96
8.1.3;5.3 A Case Study: IFS=(R*, x3) via Some Qualitative Modal Languages;99
8.1.3.1;5.3.1 RC and the Local Language of DTL;100
8.1.3.2;5.3.2 Qualitative Modal Operators;102
8.1.3.3;5.3.3 Modal Languages for Higher Dimensional Dynamical Systems;104
8.1.3.4;5.3.4 Dynamic Epistemic Logic and the IFS Perspective;106
8.1.3.5;5.3.5 DEL vs. IFS;107
8.1.4;5.4 Conclusion;110
8.1.5;References;111
9;6 Knowing One's Limits: An Analysis in Centered Dynamic Epistemic Logic;112
9.1;Denis Bonnay and Paul Égré;112
9.1.1;6.1 Dynamic Logic and Epistemic Paradoxes;112
9.1.2;6.2 Centered Semantics with an Update Operator;114
9.1.2.1;6.2.1 Centered Semantics;115
9.1.2.2;6.2.2 Centered Dynamic Epistemic Logic;116
9.1.3;6.3 The Margin of Error Paradox;117
9.1.3.1;6.3.1 The Paradox;117
9.1.3.2;6.3.2 Knowing and Realizing;119
9.1.3.3;6.3.3 Reanalyzing the Paradox with Epistemic Updates;120
9.1.3.4;6.3.4 CDEL does it better;123
9.1.4;6.4 Keeping on Reflecting;125
9.1.4.1;6.4.1 Once Versus More Than Once;125
9.1.4.2;6.4.2 Discounted Margins;128
9.1.4.3;6.4.3 The Surprise Examination;130
9.1.5;6.5 Conclusion;131
9.1.6;References;135
10;7 Simple Evidence Elimination in Justification Logic;136
10.1;Bryan Renne;136
10.1.1;7.1 Introduction;136
10.1.2;7.2 Syntax;137
10.1.3;7.3 Semantics;139
10.1.4;7.4 Axiomatics;145
10.1.5;7.5 The Courtroom Evidence Example Formalized;156
10.1.6;7.6 Conclusion;157
10.1.7;References;158
11;8 Belief Update as Social Choice;159
11.1;Johan van Benthem;159
11.1.1;8.1 Introduction;159
11.1.2;8.2 Dynamic-Doxastic Belief Change;159
11.1.3;8.3 ``Social Choice'' as Preference Merge for Groups;161
11.1.4;8.4 Belief Change as Social Choice: The Motivating Analogy;161
11.1.5;8.5 Finding Intuitive Conditions on Plausibility Update;162
11.1.6;8.6 Characterizing Priority Update;164
11.1.7;8.7 Weaker Conditions: Additional Update Rules;165
11.1.8;8.8 Further Questions, and Conclusion;166
11.1.9;References;167
12;9 Revision with Conditional Probability Functions: Two Impossibility Results;169
12.1;François Lepage and Charles Morgan;169
12.1.1;9.1 Context and Background;169
12.1.1.1;9.1.1 Conditional Probability Functions;170
12.1.2;9.2 First Result;171
12.1.3;9.3 Second Result;173
12.1.4;9.4 Closing Remarks;174
12.1.5;References;179
13;10 Indeterminacy and Belief Change;181
13.1;Horacio Arló-Costa;181
13.1.1;10.1 Introduction;181
13.1.1.1;10.1.1 The Received View and Why It Does Not Work;182
13.1.2;10.2 Technical Preliminaries;184
13.1.3;10.3 Some Results from the Theory of Choice;185
13.1.3.1;10.3.1 Pseudo-rationality;188
13.1.4;10.4 Belief Revision;189
13.1.4.1;10.4.1 Postulates for Belief Revision;189
13.1.4.2;10.4.2 Selection Functions in Belief Revision;190
13.1.5;10.5 Rott's Correspondence Results;191
13.1.6;10.6 Choosing What to Believe;195
13.1.7;10.7 Admissibility;195
13.1.7.1;10.7.1 Admissibility by a Two-Tier Rule;196
13.1.8;10.8 Applications: Philosophy of Science;197
13.1.8.1;10.8.1 An Interesting Challenge: Theories-of and Theories-for;201
13.1.9;References;203
14;11 Perspectival Act Utilitarianism;204
14.1;John F. Horty;204
14.1.1;11.1 Introduction;204
14.1.2;11.2 Background;205
14.1.2.1;11.2.1 Individual Actions;205
14.1.2.2;11.2.2 Group Actions;207
14.1.3;11.3 The Dominance Account;209
14.1.3.1;11.3.1 Our Question;209
14.1.3.2;11.3.2 Dominance Act Utilitarianism;211
14.1.4;11.4 The Orthodox Account;214
14.1.4.1;11.4.1 An Example;214
14.1.4.2;11.4.2 Orthodox Act Utilitarianism;216
14.1.5;11.5 The Perspectival Account;219
14.1.5.1;11.5.1 A Problem;219
14.1.5.2;11.5.2 Perspectival Act Utilitarianism;221
14.1.6;11.6 Conclusion;223
14.1.7;References;227
15;12 Real Change, Deontic Action;229
15.1;Krister Segerberg;229
15.1.1;12.1 Real Change;229
15.1.2;12.2 Pure Deontic Actions;230
15.1.3;12.3 Mixed Deontic Actions;231
15.1.4;References;232
16;13 Neither Logically Omniscient nor Completely Irrational Agents: Principles for a Fine-Grained Analysis of Propositional Attitudes and Attitude Revision;233
16.1;Daniel Vanderveken;233
16.1.1;13.1 Introduction;233
16.1.2;13.2 Compositional Analysis of Propositional Attitudes;234
16.1.3;13.3 Neither Logically Omniscient nor Completely Irrational Agents;236
16.1.4;13.4 Agency, Time and Indeterminism;237
16.1.5;13.5 Satisfaction as a Generalization of Truth;238
16.1.6;13.6 A Closer Look at the Basic Categories of Cognition and Volition;240
16.1.7;13.7 Attitudes Revisions;241
16.1.8;13.8 Conclusion;242
16.1.9;References;243
17;Index;244