A Problem-Centered Introduction to Modeling Strategic Interaction - Second Edition
Buch, Englisch, 408 Seiten, Format (B × H): 179 mm x 253 mm, Gewicht: 854 g
ISBN: 978-0-691-14051-3
Verlag: Princeton University Press
Since its original publication in 2000, Game Theory Evolving has been considered the best textbook on evolutionary game theory. This completely revised and updated second edition of Game Theory Evolving contains new material and shows students how to apply game theory to model human behavior in ways that reflect the special nature of sociality and individuality. The textbook continues its in-depth look at cooperation in teams, agent-based simulations, experimental economics, the evolution and diffusion of preferences, and the connection between biology and economics. Recognizing that students learn by doing, the textbook introduces principles through practice. Herbert Gintis exposes students to the techniques and applications of game theory through a wealth of sophisticated and surprisingly fun-to-solve problems involving human and animal behavior. The second edition includes solutions to the problems presented and information related to agent-based modeling. In addition, the textbook incorporates instruction in using mathematical software to solve complex problems. Game Theory Evolving is perfect for graduate and upper-level undergraduate economics students, and is a terrific introduction for ambitious do-it-yourselfers throughout the behavioral sciences.Revised and updated edition relevant for courses across disciplines Perfect for graduate and upper-level undergraduate economics courses Solutions to problems presented throughout Incorporates instruction in using computational software for complex problem solving Includes in-depth discussions of agent-based modeling
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Weitere Infos & Material
Preface xv
Chapter 1: Probability Theory 1
1.1 Basic Set Theory and Mathematical Notation 1
1.2 Probability Spaces 2
1.3 De Morgan's Laws 3
1.4 Interocitors 3
1.5 The Direct Evaluation of Probabilities 3
1.6 Probability as Frequency 4
1.7 Craps 5
1.8 A Marksman Contest 5
1.9 Sampling 5
1.10 Aces Up 6
1.11 Permutations 6
1.12 Combinations and Sampling 7
1.13 Mechanical Defects 7
1.14 Mass Defection 7
1.15 House Rules 7
1.16 The Addition Rule for Probabilities 8
1.17 A Guessing Game 8
1.18 North Island, South Island 8
1.19 Conditional Probability 9
1.20 Bayes' Rule 9
1.21 Extrasensory Perception 10
1.22 Les Cinq Tiroirs 10
1.23 Drug Testing 10
1.24 Color Blindness 11
1.25 Urns 11
1.26 The Monty Hall Game 11
1.27 The Logic of Murder and Abuse 11
1.28 The Principle of Insufficient Reason 12
1.29 The Greens and the Blacks 12
1.30 The Brain and Kidney Problem 12
1.31 The Value of Eyewitness Testimony 13
1.32 When Weakness Is Strength 13
1.33 The Uniform Distribution 16
1.34 Laplace's Law of Succession 17
1.35 From Uniform to Exponential 17
Chapter 2: Bayesian Decision Theory 18
2.1 The Rational Actor Model 18
2.2 Time Consistency and Exponential Discounting 20
2.3 The Expected Utility Principle 22
2.4 Risk and the Shape of the Utility Function 26
2.5 The Scientific Status of the Rational Actor Model 30
Chapter 3: Game Theory: Basic Concepts 32
3.1 Big John and Little John 32
3.2 The Extensive Form 38
3.3 The Normal Form 41
3.4 Mixed Strategies 42
3.5 Nash Equilibrium 43
3.6 The Fundamental Theorem of Game Theory 44
3.7 Solving for Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria 44
3.8 Throwing Fingers 46
3.9 Battle of the Sexes 46
3.10 The Hawk-Dove Game 48
3.11 The Prisoner's Dilemma 50
Chapter 4: Eliminating Dominated Strategies 52
4.1 Dominated Strategies 52
4.2 Backward Induction 54
4.3 Exercises in Eliminating Dominated Strategies 55
4.4 Subgame Perfection 57
4.5 Stackelberg Leadership 59
4.6 The Second-Price Auction 59
4.7 The Mystery of Kidnapping 60
4.8 The Eviction Notice 62
4.9 Hagar's Battles 62
4.10 Military Strategy 63
4.11 The Dr. Strangelove Game 64
4.12 Strategic Voting 64
4.13 Nuisance Suits 65
4.14 An Armaments Game 67
4.15 Football Strategy 67
4.16 Poker with Bluffing 68
4.17 The Little Miss Muffet Game 69
4.18 Cooperation with Overlapping Generations 70
4.19 Dominance-Solvable Games 71
4.20 Agent-based Modeling 72
4.21 Why Play a Nash Equilibrium? 75
4.22 Modeling the Finitely-Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma 77
4.23 Review of Basic Concepts 79
Chapter 5: Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria 80
5.1 Price Matching as Tacit Collusion 80
5.2 Competition on Main Street 81
5.3 Markets as Disciplining Devices: Allied Widgets 81
5.4 The Tobacco Market 87
5.5 The Klingons and the Snarks 87
5.6 Chess: The Trivial Pastime 88
5.7 No-Draw, High-Low Poker 89
5.8 An Agent-based Model of No-Draw, High-Low Poker 91
5.9 The Truth Game 92
5.10 The Rubinstein Bargaining Model 94
5.11 Bargaining with Heterogeneous Impatience 96
5.12 Bargaining with One Outside Option 97
5.13 Bargaining with Dual Outside Options 98
5.14 Huey, Dewey, and Louie Split a Dollar 102
5.15 Twin Sisters 104
5.16 The Samaritan's Dilemma 104
5.17 The Rotten Kid Theorem 106
5.18 The Shopper and the Fish Merchant 107
5.19 Pure Coordination Games 109
5.20 Pick Any Number 109
5.21 Pure Coordination Games: Experimental Evidence 110
5.22 Introductory Offers 111
5.23 Web Sites (for Spiders) 112
Chapter 6: Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria 116
6.1 The Algebra of Mixed Strategies 116
6.2 Lions and Antelope 117
6.3 A Patent Race 118
6.4 Tennis Strategy 119
6.5 Preservation of Ecology Game 119
6.6 Hard Love 120
6.7 Advertising Game 120
6.8 Robin Hood and Little John 122
6.9 The Motorist's Dilemma 122
6.10 Family Politics 123
6.11 Frankie and Johnny 123
6.12 A Card
