The Allocation of Limited Entrepreneurial Attention

Softcover Nachdruck of the original 1. Auflage 1998
ISBN: 978-1-4613-7564-7
Verlag: Springer US

Buch, Englisch, 163 Seiten, Paperback, Format (B × H): 155 mm x 235 mm, Gewicht: 277 g

examines the implications of allocating limited entrepreneurial attention among activities or projects. This book maintains that attention is simultaneously in that a decision maker can pay attention to only one thing at a time, and in that it may be allocated to evaluating a potential new project for possible adoption. However, since the outcome of the allocation of attention is not certain, the number of projects among which attention can be allocated is stochastic and the maximum number of projects is endogenously determined by the optimal allocation of limited entrepreneurial attention and describes the implications of this analysis for a number of economic problems.

Zielgruppe

Research

Autoren/Hrsg.

Gifford, Sharon

Fachgebiete

• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Volkswirtschaftslehre Volkswirtschaftslehre Allgemein Industrielle Organisation
• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Betriebswirtschaft Management Unternehmensführung
• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Volkswirtschaftslehre Volkswirtschaftslehre Allgemein Arbeitsmarkt
• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Volkswirtschaftslehre Volkswirtschaftslehre Allgemein Mikroökonomie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1 The Entrepreneur in Economic Theory.- A Brief History.- Entrepreneurial Limitations.- Implications of Limited Entrepreneurial Attention.- Conclusion.- References.- 2 Limited Attention.- Limited Attention in Organizations.- Limited Attention in Economic Models.- Conclusion.- References.- 3 Allocating Limited Entrepreneurial Attention.- The Basic Model.- The Optimal Policy.- General Results.- Variations on the Basic Model.- Conclusion.- References.- 4 Innovation, Firm Size And Growth.- Related Literature.- The Schumpeterian Hypothesis.- Optimal R&D.- Extensions.- Conclusion.- References.- 5 Career Choice.- The Implications of the Model.- Conclusion.- References.- 6 Optimally Incomplete Contracts.- Related Literature.- Incomplete Contracts.- Conclusion.- References.- 7 The Internalization Of Transactions.- Related Literature.- Internal versus Market Transactions.- Asset Specificity and Opportunism.- Transaction Costs and Firm Size.- Endogenous Transaction Costs.- Evolution to Market Transactions.- Conclusion.- References.- 8 The Role Of The Venture Capitalist.- Related Literature.- The Venture Capitalist’s Optimal Allocation.- Entry of Venture Capitalists.- General Partner and Limited Partners.- Investments in Later Stage Ventures.- Socially Optimal Consultation.- Empirical Evidence.- Alternative Formulations.- Conclusion.- References.- 9 Independent Contractors.- Bilateral P-A and Common Agency Models.- The Entrepreneurial Agent.- Conclusion.- References.- 10 Conclusion.- Further Applications.- Extensions.- References.- References.- Name Index.