Georgalis Mind, Language and Subjectivity

Minimal Content and the Theory of Thought
Erscheinungsjahr 2014
ISBN: 978-1-317-63520-8
Verlag: CRC Press
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

E-Book, Englisch, 270 Seiten

Reihe: Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy

In this monograph Nicholas Georgalis further develops his important work on minimal content, recasting and providing novel solutions to several of the fundamental problems faced by philosophers of language. His theory defends and explicates the importance of ‘thought-tokens’ and minimal content and their many-to-one relation to linguistic meaning, challenging both ‘externalist’ accounts of thought and the solutions to philosophical problems of language they inspire. The concepts of idiolect, use, and statement made are critically discussed, and a classification of kinds of utterances is developed to facilitate the latter. This is an important text for those interested in current theories and debates on philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and their points of intersection.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Georgalis, Nicholas

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Philosophie: Allgemeines, Methoden
• Geisteswissenschaften Sprachwissenschaft Sprachwissenschaften

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1. Minimal Content and Intentionality 2. More on Minimal Content and Related Issues 3. Thinking Differently about Thought and Language 4. The Superiority of the New Theory to Frege’s 5. Kripke’s Puzzle about Belief Solved 6. Use, Idiolect, and Statement Made 7. Speaker’s Referent 8. Speaker’s Referent and the Referential/Attributive Distinction 9. Proper Names 10. Solutions to Classic Problems 11. Securing Determinate Meaning—Part I: Against Kripkenstein 12. Securing Determinate Meaning—Part II: Against Quine

Über Autor(innen)

Nicholas Georgalis is Distinguished Research Professor of Philosophy at East Carolina University. His publications include: The Primacy of the Subjective: Foundations for a Unified Theory of Mind and Language, "Representation and the First-Person Perspective" in Synthese, "The Fiction of Phenomenal Intentionality" in Consciousness and Emotion, and "Rethinking Burge’s Thought Experiment" in Synthese.