Gelauff / Graafland Modelling Welfare State Reform

1. Auflage 2014
ISBN: 978-1-4832-9555-8
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, Band Volume 225, 308 Seiten, Web PDF

Reihe: Contributions to Economic Analysis

In order to analyze the economic effects of various policy proposals for reforming the welfare state a model has been developed called MIMIC. The structure of this model is presented in the first part of this book. The model combines various modern labour market theories with a detailed description of relevant labour market institutions in an applied general equilibrium context. The second part of the volume contains an elaborate presentation of the simulation results of MIMIC, such as various tax policies, a reduction in benefits or the official minimum wage, individualization of the tax and social security system and the introduction of negative income tax. The model has proved to be a unique instrument for policy evaluation for the Netherlands.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Gelauff, G. M. M.

Graafland, J. J.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Front Cover;1
2;Modelling Welfare State Reform;4
3;Copyright Page;5
4;Table of Contents;10
5;INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES;6
6;Dedication;7
7;Preface;8
8;List of figures;16
9;List of tables;18
10;Chapter 1. Purpose and method;22
10.1;1.1 Introduction;22
10.2;1.2 Applied general equilibrium models;26
10.3;1.3 Methodological aspects of MIMIC;30
10.4;1.4 An overview of the model structure of MIMIC;39
10.5;1.5 Comparison of MIMIC with other applied general equilibrium models;49
10.6;1.6 Outline of the study;54
11;PART I:
THE STRUCTURE OF MIMIC;58
11.1;Chapter 2. The model of the firm;60
11.1.1;2.1 Output market environment;60
11.1.2;2.2 Input market environment;67
11.1.3;2.3 Production structure of individual firm;73
11.1.4;2.4 Firm behaviour;77
11.1.5;2.5 Calibration of the model of the firm;81
11.1.6;Appendix 2.A Cumulated production structure matrix, imports and indirect taxes;90
11.2;Chapter 3. The model of household behaviour;94
11.2.1;3.1 The household sector;94
11.2.2;3.2 Labour supply;98
11.2.3;3.3 Calibration of the household model;114
11.3;Chapter 4. Matchings, search strategy of unemployed and contractual wage formation;128
11.3.1;4.1 Search behaviour of unemployed persons;130
11.3.2;4.2 The matching process;135
11.3.3;4.3 Contractual wage formation;137
11.3.4;4.4 Calibration;147
11.4;Chapter 5. The public sector;154
11.4.1;5.1 Modelling of the public sector;154
11.4.2;5.2 The 1992 system of income taxes and social security premiums;159
11.5;Chapter 6. Links between model blocks;166
11.5.1;6.1 The model of the firm;166
11.5.2;6.2 The household model;167
11.5.3;6.3 The matching model;171
11.5.4;6.4 The wage model;172
11.5.5;6.5 The public sector model;173
12;PART II:
POLICY SIMULATIONS;176
12.1;Chapter 7. The base projection;178
12.1.1;7.1 Projected development of exogenous variables;180
12.1.2;7.2 Selected outcomes of base projection;181
12.2;Chapter 8. Income tax instruments;186
12.2.1;8.1 Simulations on single tax parameters;187
12.2.2;8.2 Replacing the basic allowance by a tax credit;198
12.2.3;8.3 The 'Laffer' curve;202
12.3;Chapter 9. Reform of the income tax system;208
12.3.1;9.1 Income tax reform in OECD countries;208
12.3.2;9.2 The 1990 income tax reform in The Netherlands;210
12.3.3;9.3 Further income tax reform: the Stevens proposals;215
12.4;Chapter 10. Cutting back the welfare state;222
12.4.1;10.1 International comparison of social security systems;223
12.4.2;10.2 Minimum wages;226
12.4.3;10.3 Unemployment benefits;232
12.4.4;10.4 Disability benefits;236
12.4.5;10.5 Combined effects of reduction of labour market related social benefits and minimum wage;239
12.5;Chapter 11. Individualizing the income tax and social security system;242
12.5.1;11.1 Marriage relief and unemployment benefits in the OECD;242
12.5.2;11.2 Individualizing the tax system by cancelling the marriage relief;245
12.5.3;11.3 Individualizing government assistance;252
12.6;Chapter 12. Introduction of a negative income tax;260
12.6.1;12.1 Possible advantages and disadvantages of a negative income tax;261
12.6.2;12.2 Results of NIT experiments in the USA;264
12.6.3;12.3 The effects of a negative income tax in MIMIC;268
12.6.4;12.4 A negative income tax in a mini welfare state;273
12.7;Chapter 13. Evaluation;282
12.7.1;13.1 Policy simulations: relevance;282
12.7.2;13.2 Model structure: consistency and adequacy;287
13;References;294
14;Name index;306