Fratianni / Willett / Wihlborg Financial Regulation and Monetary Arrangements after 1992

1. Auflage 2015
ISBN: 978-1-4832-9500-8
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, Band Volume 204, 403 Seiten, Web PDF

Reihe: Contributions to Economic Analysis

Presented in this volume are analytical papers by leading academics on the consequences of regulatory reform in the 1992-process on financial markets and institutions, as well as on macro-economic adjustment and the scope of monetary and fiscal policy after 1992. Also included are policy-oriented papers by economists in academic and policy-making authorities which discuss potential policy conflicts within the EC and between the EC, EFTA, the US, Japan and Eastern Europe as a result of financial liberalization and monetary integration following 1992.The volume focuses on developments in financial markets as crucial for financial and industrial restructuring, as well as for prospects for a monetary union. Analytical papers form the basis for broader policy oriented discussion of potential policy conflicts among industrialized countries, as well as of prospects for currency reform in the Eastern block.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Fratianni, Michele

Willett, T. D.

Wihlborg, C. G.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Front Cover;1
2;Financial Regulation and Monetary Arrangements After 1992;4
3;Copyright Page;5
4;Table of Contents;14
5;INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES;6
6;Preface;8
7;List of Conference Participants;10
8;List of Tables;18
9;List of Figures;22
10;Objectives and Overview;24
10.1;1. 1992: INITIAL FINANCIAL AND MONETARY REFORMS;24
10.2;2. AFTER 1992: OBJECTIVES AND PERSPECTIVES OF THIS VOLUME;25
10.3;3. THE CONTENTS OF THIS VOLUME;27
11;Part One: Implications of 1992 for Regulation, Competition and Structure of the Financial Services Industries;40
11.1;Chapter 1. Consequences of 1992 for Competition in Financial Services: Banking;42
11.1.1;1. INTRODUCTION: 1992 AND ALL THAT;42
11.1.2;2. APPROACH, METHODS AND DATA USED IN THIS STUDY;43
11.1.3;3. ANALYSIS OF BANKS IN EUROPEAN MARKETS;47
11.1.4;4. CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND STRATEGY;49
11.1.5;FOOTNOTES;50
11.1.6;REFERENCES;51
11.2;Comment;62
11.2.1;1992 AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN BANKING INSTITUTIONS;62
11.2.2;COMMENTS ON PAPER;63
11.2.3;CONCERNS AND RESERVATIONS;64
11.2.4;SUMMARY;65
11.2.5;REFERENCES;65
11.3;Chapter 2. Supervision and Regulation of Financial Markets in the New Financial Environment;66
11.3.1;1. INTRODUCTION;66
11.3.2;2. THE SOURCES OF SYSTEMIC RISK IN FINANCIAL SYSTEMS;67
11.3.3;3. THE BANKING SYSTEM AS SUPPLIER OF LIQUIDITY;68
11.3.4;4. THE FINANCIAL POLICY PROBLEM;72
11.3.5;5. IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS FOR CENTRAL BANK FINANCIAL POLICY;75
11.3.6;6. CONCLUSION;77
11.3.7;FOOTNOTES;78
11.3.8;REFERENCES;79
11.4;Comment;81
11.4.1;REFERENCES;82
11.5;Chapter 3. The Bank Capital Issue;84
11.5.1;1. INTRODUCTION;84
11.5.2;2. THE ROLE OF BANKS IN SOCIETY;85
11.5.3;3. PROFIT AND RISK FOR THE BANKING FIRM;87
11.5.4;4. LIMITS ON BANK WILLINGNESS TO TAKE RISK;88
11.5.5;5. CAPITAL REGULATION AS A LIMIT TO RISK;89
11.5.6;6. ALTERNATIVES TO EFFICIENT CAPITAL REGULATION;92
11.5.7;7. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS OF REGULATORY COMPETITION;95
11.5.8;FOOTNOTE;96
11.5.9;REFERENCES;96
11.6;Chapter 4. The Structure and Future of the Insurance Market;102
11.6.1;1. INTRODUCTION;102
11.6.2;2. THE INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO BANKING;102
11.6.3;3. SECURITY BY COLLATERAL, GUARANTEES AND INSURANCE;103
11.6.4;4. SPECIALIZATION IN CERTAIN RISKS AND CUSTOMERS;105
11.6.5;5. THE FUTURE;108
11.6.6;6. CONCLUSION;110
11.6.7;FOOTNOTES;110
11.6.8;REFERENCES;111
12;Part Two: Investment Banking and the Industrial Sector;114
12.1;Chapter 5. The European Market for Mergers and Acquisitions;116
12.1.1;1. INTRODUCTION;116
12.1.2;2. PRINCIPLES OF REGIONAL INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING;117
12.1.3;3. EVOLUTION OF THE TAKEOVER PROCESS IN EUROPE;120
12.1.4;4. THE GLOBAL AND EUROPEAN M&A ENVIRONMENT;124
12.1.5;5. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN EC AND U.S. RESTRUCTURING;131
12.1.6;6. PATTERNS OF EUROPEAN M&A ACTIVITY, 1985-89;135
12.1.7;7. CONCLUSION;143
12.1.8;REFERENCES;144
12.2;Chapter 6. Mergers, Concentration, and Antitrust;146
12.2.1;1. INTRODUCTION;146
12.2.2;2. INDUSTRY WEALTH EFFECTS OF U.S. HORIZONTAL MERGERS;148
12.2.3;3. ANTITRUST DETERRENCE AND HORIZONTAL MERGERS IN CANADA;158
12.2.4;4. HORIZONTAL MERGERS IN THE BANKING SECTOR;162
12.2.5;5. CONCLUSION;163
12.2.6;FOOTNOTES;164
12.2.7;REFERENCES;166
12.3;Comment;167
12.3.1;REGULATING PRICING BEHAVIOR OF FOREIGN FIRMS;167
12.3.2;REGULATING MARKET STRUCTURE IN BANKING;168
12.3.3;REFERENCES;170
12.4;Chapter 7. Financial Institutions in a European Market for Executive Competence;172
12.4.1;1. INTRODUCTION;172
12.4.2;2. ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING AS THE SOURCE OF SUSTAINABLE COMPETITIVENESS IN FIRMS;173
12.4.3;3. ECONOMIC LEARNING IN AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE - THE EUROPEAN POLICY CONCERN;174
12.4.4;4. ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING AND TRADE IN COMPETENCE;178
12.4.5;5. FINANCIAL MARKET INSTITUTIONS AND THE ALLOCATION OF COMPETENCE;181
12.4.6;6. CONCLUSION;184
12.4.7;FOOTNOTES;185
12.4.8;REFERENCES;186
12.5;Comment;190
12.5.1;REFERENCES;192
13;Part Three: Barriers to Capital Mobility and Financial Intermediation;194
13.1;Chapter 8. Market Segmentation and 1992: Toward a Theory of Tradein Financial Services;196
13.1.1;1. INTRODUCTION;196
13.1.2;2. THE ECONOMICS OF TRADE IN FINANCIAL SERVICES;197
13.1.3;3. EVIDENCE FROM ITALY;199
13.1.4;4. FINANCIAL SERVICES WITH GEOGRAPHICALLY SEGMENTED MARKETS;213
13.1.5;5. CONCLUSION;217
13.1.6;APPENDIX: MEASUREMENT ERROR AND IMPERFECT DEPOSIT CONTROLS;218
13.1.7;FOOTNOTES;220
13.1.8;REFERENCES;221
13.2;Comment;223
13.2.1;FOOTNOTE;225
13.2.2;REFERENCE;225
13.3;Chapter 9. Currency Substitution and Monetary Policy;226
13.3.1;1. INTRODUCTION;226
13.3.2;2. SOURCES OF CURRENCY SUBSTITUTION;226
13.3.3;3. EFFECTS OF CURRENCY SUBSTITUTION;232
13.3.4;4. CONCLUSION;236
13.3.5;FOOTNOTES;237
13.3.6;REFERENCES;238
13.4;Comment;240
13.4.1;REFERENCES;241
14;Part Four: Economics and Politics of the EMS;242
14.1;Chapter 10. Fiscal Constraints and Incentives with Monetary Coordination: Implications for Europe 1992;244
14.1.1;1. INTRODUCTION;244
14.1.2;2. FISCAL DIVERGENCES AND MONETARY FINANCE IN THE EC;246
14.1.3;3. MONETARY AND FISCAL LINKAGES IN A TWO-COUNTRY SETTING;252
14.1.4;4. IMPLICATIONS OF FIXED EXCHANGE RATES AND MONETARY INTEGRATION;258
14.1.5;5. OPTIMAL FISCAL POLICY AND MONETARY INTEGRATION;261
14.1.6;6. CONCLUSION;264
14.1.7;FOOTNOTES;265
14.1.8;APPENDIX;267
14.1.9;REFERENCES;268
14.2;Comment;271
14.2.1;REFERENCES;273
14.3;Comment;274
14.3.1;FOOTNOTES;276
14.3.2;REFERENCES;276
14.4;Chapter 11. Policy Coordination in the EMS with Stochastic Asymmetries;278
14.4.1;1. INTRODUCTION;278
14.4.2;2. A THREE-COUNTRY MODEL OF POLICY-MAKING IN THE EMS;280
14.4.3;3. POLICY SIMULATIONS FOR THE EMS;285
14.4.4;4. POLICY COORDINATION AND THE PROCESS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION;289
14.4.5;5. CONCLUSION;295
14.4.6;Appendix A: Model Solution;296
14.4.7;FOOTNOTES;297
14.4.8;REFERENCES;297
14.5;Comment;299
14.5.1;REFERENCES;301
14.6;Chapter 12. Optimum Currency Areas Revisited on the Transition Path to a Currency Union;302
14.6.1;1. INTRODUCTION;302
14.6.2;2. THE ORIGINAL OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA CRITERIA;303
14.6.3;3. PATTERNS OF SHOCKS AND POLICY PREFERENCES;304
14.6.4;4. THE DISCIPLINE ARGUMENT AND POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS;305
14.6.5;5. PUBLIC FINANCE ASPECTS AND CURRENCY COMPETITION;306
14.6.6;6. RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS AND IMPERFECT INFORMATION;307
14.6.7;7. CAPITAL MOBILITY AND THE TRANSITION TO A CURRENCY UNION;311
14.6.8;8. CONCLUDING REMARKS;314
14.6.9;Appendix: A Model for Analysis of the Output Inflation Trade-Off after Monetary shocks over Different Time Horizons;316
14.6.10;REFERENCES;317
14.7;Comment;321
14.7.1;REFERENCES;323
15;Part Five: Economic Policy Perspectives on Financial Market Regulation and Supervision;326
15.1;Chapter 13. Financial Markets, Regulation and Supervision: The Major Issues;328
15.1.1;1. INTRODUCTION;328
15.1.2;2. GENERAL CONSEQUENCES OF INCREASED CAPITAL MOBILITY;328
15.1.3;3. THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM;329
15.1.4;4. APPROACHES TO CONTROL OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM;330
15.1.5;5. CONCLUSION;332
15.1.6;REFERENCE;333
15.2;Chapter 14. A U.K. View of Financial Market Regulation and Supervision;334
15.2.1;1. INTRODUCTION;334
15.2.2;2. GLOBAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND;334
15.2.3;3. THE U.K. PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT;335
15.2.4;4. THE U.K. REGULATORY SYSTEM: TRADITIONS AND PRINCIPLES;335
15.2.5;5. THE EC DIMENSION;336
15.2.6;6. CHANGES IN COMPETITION IN FINANCIAL MARKETS;337
15.2.7;7. COMPETITIVE PRESSURES ON REGULATORY STANDARDS;338
15.2.8;8. CHANGES IN RISKS: ISSUES FOR REGULATORS;338
15.2.9;9. INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES;339
15.2.10;10. SYSTEMIC RISK;339
15.2.11;11. REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS;339
15.2.12;12. CONCLUSION;340
15.2.13;FOOTNOTES;340
15.3;Chapter 15. An EFTA View of Financial Market Regulation and Supervision;342
15.3.1;1. INTRODUCTION;342
15.3.2;2. STRUCTURAL CONSEQUENCES OF FINANCIAL INTEGRATION;342
15.3.3;3. POLICY ISSUES;344
15.3.4;4. WELFARE EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL INTEGRATION;346
15.3.5;5. CONCLUSION;348
15.3.6;FOOTNOTE;348
15.3.7;REFERENCES;349
15.4;Chapter 16. Economic Reforms in the USSR and 1992;350
15.4.1;1. MARKET-ORIENTED REFORMS IN EASTERN AND WESTERN EUROPE;350
15.4.2;2. EC REFORMS AND CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE USSR;352
15.4.3;3. THE EC AS A MODEL;352
15.4.4;4. REFORMS IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR IN THE USSR;353
15.4.5;5. REQUIREMENTS FOR REFORMS;354
16;Part Six: Economic Policy Perspectives on Monetary Arrangements;356
16.1;Chapter 17. A Japanese Central Banker's View of the EMS;358
16.1.1;1. INTRODUCTION;358
16.1.2;2. REASONS FOR THE FAVORABLE REACTION TO A EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION;358
16.1.3;3. REFORM OF THE JAPANESE FINANCIAL SYSTEM;359
16.1.4;4. JAPANESE PERSPECTIVES ON A EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION;360
16.1.5;FOOTNOTE;360
16.2;Chapter 18. A Large Outsider's View of the EMS;362
16.2.1;1. INTRODUCTION;362
16.2.2;2. THE NATURE OF SHOCKS;363
16.2.3;3. THE TRANSITION PERIOD;364
16.2.4;4. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS;365
16.3;Chapter 19. Current Account and Fiscal Policy Adjustment in the EMS;366
16.3.1;FOOTNOTES;369
16.3.2;REFERENCES;369
16.4;Chapter 20. A Swedish Central Banker's View of the EMS;370
16.4.1;1. INTRODUCTION;370
16.4.2;2. THE EMS - CONVERGING ON STABILITY;370
16.4.3;3. THE EMU;372
16.4.4;4. SWEDEN AND THE EMS;373
16.5;Chapter 21. A U.K. View of the EMS;376
16.5.1;1. THE COST OF EMS;376
16.5.2;2. THE EMU;377
16.5.3;3. A PARALLEL COMMODITY CURRENCY;378
16.5.4;REFERENCE;378
16.6;Chapter 22. ERM: A Way Station to One Currency?;380
16.6.1;1. COSTS OF THE REALIGNMENT OPTION;381
16.6.2;2. GOVERNMENTS AND MARKETS;382
17;Part Seven: The Transition to a Convertible Currency for a Centrally Planned Economy;384
17.1;Chapter 23. Germany and a Single Deutsche Mark;386
17.1.1;1. THE REFORM;386
17.1.2;2. EFFECTS OF CONVERSION RATES AND MARKET REFORM;387
17.1.3;3. RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES;388
17.1.4;4. INTEREST RATES AND INFLATION;389
17.1.5;5. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EC;390
17.1.6;6. LESSONS FOR AN EMU;390
17.2;Chapter 24. German Monetary Union;392
17.2.1;1. MONETARY STABILIZATION AND PRICE LIBERALIZATION;392
17.2.2;2. LABOR MARKETS, INFLATIONARY PRESSURES AND MIGRATION IN A MONETARY UNION;394
17.3;Chapter 25. Some Reflections on the Convertibility of the Rouble;396
17.3.1;1. INTRODUCTION;396
17.3.2;2. DEFINING CONVERTIBILITY AND ITS RELEVANCE FOR THE ROUBLE;396
17.3.3;3. IS A NEW ROUBLE REQUIRED?;398
17.3.4;4. ACHIEVING CONVERTIBILITY;399
17.3.5;5. CONCLUSION;401
17.3.6;REFERENCES;401
18;Subject Index;402