Franks Neurosociology

The Nexus Between Neuroscience and Social Psychology
1. Auflage 2010
ISBN: 978-1-4419-5531-9
Verlag: Springer
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 225 Seiten

As a career sociologist I ?rst became interested in neurosociology around 1987 when a graduate student lent me Michael Gazzaniga's The Social Brain. Ifthe biological human brain was really social, I thought sociologists and their students should be the ?rst, not the last, to know. As I read on I found little of the clumsy reductionism of the earlier biosociologists whom I had learned to see as the arch- emy of our ?eld. Clearly, reductionism does exist among many neuroscientists. But I also found some things that were very social and quite relevant for sociology. After reading Descarte's Error by Antonio Damasio, I learned how some types of emotion were necessary for rational thought - a very radical innovation for the long-honored 'objective rationalist. ' I started inserting some things about split-brain research into my classes, mispronouncing terms like amygdala and being corrected by my s- dents. That instruction helped me realize how much we professors needed to catch up with our students. I also wrote a review of Leslie Brothers' Fridays Footprint: How Society Shapes the Human Mind. I thought if she could write so well about social processes maybe I could attempt to do something similar in connection with my ?eld. For several years I found her an e-mail partner with a wonderful sense of humor. She even retrieved copies of her book for the use of my graduate students when I had assigned it for a seminar.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Franks, David D.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Preface;8
1.1;References;10
2;Contents;12
3;1 Introduction;15
3.1; Split-Brain Research and Symbolic Interactions Theory of Accounts: An Example of Convergence;17
3.2; Neurosociology and the Self;18
3.3; Neuroscience and a Sociological Unit of Analysis;19
3.4; Examples of Mutual Interests;20
3.5; Early Recognitions of Emergents;21
3.6; Mind as Exerting a True Mental Force Over Its Parts;22
3.7; Emotions Involvement in Rational Choice;23
3.8; Sciences Rediscovery of Chicago Pragmatism and Curbs on the Excesses of the Linguistic Turn;23
3.9; Transcending Exclusive Reductionism;24
3.10; Some Generalizations About the Emotional Brain;25
3.11; Examples of Neurosociology;28
3.12; Qualifications of Theories and Methods;29
3.13; Looking Ahead;31
3.14;References;1
4;2 The Evolution of the Human Brain;34
4.1; The Homo Sapiens Family Tree;37
4.2; Suggestions About the Origins of Speech;42
4.3; Conclusion: Thoughts About Evolution and the Brain and the Function of Beliefs;47
4.4; Important Developments in the Evolution of the Human Brain;49
4.5;References;50
5;3 What Is Social About the Human Brain?;51
5.1; Intersubjectivity;52
5.2; The Construction of Persons and Their Subjectivities;54
5.3; Language, the Brain, and the Construction of Ones Self and Others;54
5.4; Misidentification Syndromes;56
5.5; The Brain as Social;56
5.6; The Fusiform Facial Area;60
5.7; The Importance of Eye Gaze in Social Life;63
5.8; Autism as a Partial Loss of Social Connection;65
5.9; When the Social Environment Fails Our Social Brains: an Ugly Story;67
5.10; A Neurosociological Interpretation of Isolation;69
5.11; Conclusion;71
5.12;References;72
6;4 The New Unconscious: Agency and Awareness;74
6.1; Balancing Awareness and Unawareness;75
6.2; Consciousness as Center Stage in Symbolic Interaction;77
6.3; The New Unconscious as Procedure and Content;78
6.4; The Unconscious and Political Manipulation;89
6.5; My In-Group Right or Wrong;92
6.6; Conclusion;93
6.7;References;94
7;5 Mirror Neurons: A Return to Pragmatism and Implications for an Embodied Intersubjectivity;96
7.1; Thinking as Internal Conversation and Motor Process;102
7.2; Mirror Neurons and Emotion;110
7.3; Conclusion;111
7.4;References;114
8;6 The Neuroscience of Emotion and Its Relation to Cognition;116
8.1; Parts of the Brain Related to Emotion;123
8.2; Damasios Somatic-Marker Hypothesis;127
8.3; The Somatic-Marker Hypothesis;129
8.4; The Limbic System Debate;131
8.5; Challenges to Cognitive Appraisals Seen as an Inherent Part of Emotions;133
8.6; Conclusion;137
8.7;References;138
9;7 The Self in Neuroscience and Social Psychology;140
9.1; Different Aspects of Self;140
9.2; The Brain Processes Behind the Social Self;151
9.3; The Recent Search for Dedicated Brain Areas Underlying the Self;153
9.4; Brain Areas Creating Self According to Zimmer;155
9.5; Epilogue About the Fragility of Self;165
9.6;References;165
10;8 Consciousness, Quale, and Subjective Experience;168
10.1; What is Quale?;169
10.2; Thought, Sensations, and Mind;171
10.3; Positions on the Connection Between Consciousness and Qualia;174
10.4; Summary and Conclusions;178
10.5;References;179
11;9 The Place of Imitation in Social Life and Its Anatomical Brain Supports;181
11.1; Imitation and Mirror Neurons Reviewed;182
11.2; The Scope of Imitation;183
11.3; Cognitive Psychology and Imitation;184
11.4; Brain Areas Involved in Imitation;186
11.5; Imitation and Social Theory;187
11.6; Conclusion;188
11.7;References;188
12;10 Determinism and Free Will;190
12.1; Libet: Our Bodies Do What We Want to Do Before We Know We Want It;190
12.2; Initial Evidence from Electrical Stimulation;192
12.3; Daniel Dennetts Defense of Free Will;193
12.4; Daniel Wegner on the Illusion of Free Will;195
12.5; The Controversy of Mind over Matter: A different Avenue for Establishing Agency;198
12.6; G.H. Meads Concept of Emergence;198
12.7; On the Qualitative Difference Between Mind and Matter;199
12.8; Minded Distance as a Lever for Control in Therapeutic Practices;201
12.9; Neuroplasticity and the Power of Mental Force;202
12.10; The Tale of the Silver Springs Monkeys;202
12.11; Nursing the Self Back into the Drivers Seat in Obsessive Compulsive Disorder;204
12.12; Changing the Circuits of the Brain in Depression;207
12.13; Conclusion;208
12.14;References;210
13;11 Conclusion;212
13.1; The Social Nature of the Brain;212
13.2; Neuroscience and Epistemology;213
13.3; The Neurological Supports for the Chicago Pragmatist Priority of Action;214
13.4; A Transactional View of the Brain/Environment Relationship;215
13.5; Emergence as a Way out of Reductionism;215
13.6; The Two Most Challenging Problems for Brain Science;216
13.7; The Seamy Side of Self;216
13.8;References;218
14;Subject Index;220

Leseproben

"Chapter 6 The Neuroscience of Emotion and Its Relation to Cognition (p. 105-106)

Thought by itself moves nothing (Socrates as quoted by Irwin 2007:161)

In recent years an appreciation for the emotional dimension of life has asserted itself in all of the major disciplines of the liberal arts. There is a good reason for this. While the dangers of passion are well known to all, this chapter will demonstrate neuroscience’s contributions toward making the case for the necessity of emotion for effective cognition.

As Socrates implies above, cognition alone and by itself lacks the capacity to move us to action or to grant a critical component to understandings and “realizations” that only experience can give. While an emotionally distanced attitude may be essential to science, as Scheffler (1982) observed, even the notion of the un-emotional scientist is incomplete. One can be passionately devoted to objectivity. If the “unexamined life is not worth living” certainly experience without emotion is pathologically empty.

One of the mnoost important contributions of neuroscience established in this chapter is that the brain can know the emotional quality of an object or an event before cognition and consciousness enter the scene. I will present the neurological pathways which contribute to this because the finding is so counterintuitive. Although this emotional appraisal may be outside of our awareness and lived experience, it has an enormous impact on the cognitive course of that experience.

We shall see that perspectives as different as philosophy, and artificial intelligence and neuroscience converge in recognizing the necessity of emotion for rational decision-making, bringing together two processes once viewed as diametrically opposed. This is only one of the fascinating examples of the capacity of neuroscience to penetrate the boundaries of academic divisions. This chapter will also address one of the most contentious problems in neuroscience – that of clearly articulating the senses in which cognition and emotion emerge from separate pathways of the brain and the senses in which they are intertwined and inseparable.

Evaluating this issue is still a challenge to the field of neuroscience and it is especially difficult for sociologists who are looking from the outside in. It is important nonetheless, for sociologists to become acquainted with the complexities of the issue and its various positions. There are many examples which suggest the ways in which the varied fields can be compatible. For example, many involved in genetics have come to appreciate the importance of the environment even as sociologists have recognized the importance of genes, although their effect on social activity is highly qualified. Neuroscientists have recognized the importance of self and the social nature of the brain, while sociologists have become interested inmirror neurons and their place in the development of language.

The Distinction between Unconscious Emotion and Conscious Feeling. In neuroscience this is evident in the reversal of the common sense notion of emotion. The traditional view put forward independently by William James and Carl Lange starts with something happening to trigger emotion. For example, losing someone we love or being insulted produces emotions like sorrow or simple anger, respectively, and these emotions lead us to weep or take steps to avenge the insult."