Buch, Englisch, Band 2, 664 Seiten, Format (B × H): 155 mm x 235 mm, Gewicht: 1025 g
Performance Evaluation
Buch, Englisch, Band 2, 664 Seiten, Format (B × H): 155 mm x 235 mm, Gewicht: 1025 g
Reihe: Springer Series in Accounting Scholarship
ISBN: 978-0-387-74577-0
Verlag: Springer US
This book provides an integrated, technical exposition of key concepts in agency theory, with particular emphasis on analyses of the economic consequences of the characteristics of contractible performance measures, such as accounting reports. It is not a survey of the literature, but provides a succinct source for learning the fundamentals of the economics of incentives. While there is an emphasis on information issues of interest to accounting researchers, it is also relevant to researchers in economics, finance, management science, and other disciplines who are interested in the economics of management incentives.
Zielgruppe
Research
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
Weitere Infos & Material
to Performance Evaluation.- Performance Evaluation in Single-Period/Single-Agent Settings.- Optimal Contracts.- Ex Post Performance Measures.- Linear Contracts.- Multiple Tasks and Multiple Performance Measures.- Stock Prices and Accounting Numbers as Performance Measures.- Private Agent Information and Renegotiation in Single-Period/Single-Agent Settings.- Post-Contract, Pre-Decision Information.- Pre-Contract Information — Uninformed Principal Moves First.- Intra-Period Contract Renegotiation.- Contracting in Multi-period/Single-agent Settings.- Multi-Period Contracts with Full Commitment and Independent Periods.- Timing and Correlation of Reports in a Multi-Period LEN Model.- Full Commitment Contracts with Interdependent Periods.- Inter-Period Contract Renegotiation.- Contracting with Multiple Agents in Single-period Settings.- Contracting with Multiple Productive Agents.- Contracting with a Productive Agent and a Monitor.