Buch, Englisch, 302 Seiten, Format (B × H): 156 mm x 234 mm, Gewicht: 462 g
Buch, Englisch, 302 Seiten, Format (B × H): 156 mm x 234 mm, Gewicht: 462 g
ISBN: 978-0-19-922608-5
Verlag: OUP UK
Specially written essays on a hot topic in philosophy
Excellent line-up of contributors
Disagreement is common: even informed, intelligent, and generally reasonable people often come to different conclusions when confronted with what seems to be the same evidence. Can the competing conclusions be reasonable? If not, what can we reasonably think about the situation? This volume examines the epistemology of disagreement. Philosophical questions about disagreement arise in various areas, notably politics, ethics, aesthetics, and the philosophy of religion: but this will be the first book focusing on the general epistemic issues arising from informed disagreement. Ten leading philosophers offer specially written essays which together will offer a starting-point for future work on this topic.
Zielgruppe
Advanced students and scholars in the central areas of philosophy
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
Weitere Infos & Material
Introduction
1: Peter van Inwagen: We're Right. They're Wrong.
2: Hilary Kornblith: Belief in the Face of Controversy
3: Catherine Z. Elgin: Persistent Disagreement
4: Earl Conee: Rational Disagreement Defended
5: Richard Fumerton: You Can't Trust a Philosopher
6: Thomas Kelly: Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence
7: Adam Elga: How to Disagree About How to Disagree
8: Alvin I. Goldman: Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement
9: Ralph Wedgwood: The Moral Evil Demons
10: Andy Egan: Disputing about Taste