E-Book, Englisch, 378 Seiten
An Economic Perspective. Contributions to the XIVth Travemünde Symposium on the Economic Analysis of Law (March 27-29, 2014)
E-Book, Englisch, 378 Seiten
ISBN: 978-3-16-153568-0
Verlag: Mohr Siebeck
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
- Rechtswissenschaften Recht, Rechtswissenschaft Allgemein Beziehungen des Rechts zu anderen Disziplinen
- Rechtswissenschaften Internationales Recht und Europarecht Internationales Recht Internationales Kriegsrecht, Territorialrecht, Humanitäres Recht
- Wirtschaftswissenschaften Wirtschaftswissenschaften Wirtschaftswissenschaften: Allgemeines
Weitere Infos & Material
1;Cover;1
2;Preface;4
3;Table of Contents;14
4;Eli M. Salzberger: The Rule of Law Under Extreme Conditions and International Law: Introductory Notes;18
4.1;A. The Rule of Law in International Law, or the Rule of Law in the International Arena;19
4.1.1;I. The rule of law in the context of the state;19
4.1.2;II. The rule of law in the international arena;22
4.2;B. The Rule of Law and Extreme Conditions: National Law and International Law;25
4.2.1;I. The rule of law under extreme conditions and the theory of the state;25
4.2.2;II. The normative (economic) theory of the state - foundations;26
4.2.3;III. The normative (economic) theory of the state – implementation I: representative democracy;28
4.2.4;IV. The normative (economic) theory of the state – implementation II – the structure of government;31
4.2.5;V. The rule of law under extreme conditions in the international arena or in international law;38
4.3;C. Extreme Conditions as Affecting the Rule of Law;40
4.3.1;I. Characterizing extreme conditions: national law and international law;40
4.3.2;II. A possible concept of the rule of law and extreme conditions;44
4.3.3;III. A Law and Economics approach to the rule of law under extreme conditions: A methodological note;46
4.3.4;IV. Models of the rule of law under extreme conditions in the literature;49
4.4;Ex-ante models;49
4.5;During models;53
4.6;Ex-post models;56
4.7;D. Conclusion;59
4.8;References;61
5;Hans-Joachim Heintze: Sovereignty and the “Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters”;66
5.1;A. Framework of the Codification by the International Law Commission (ILC);68
5.2;B. Challenge of the ‘sovereignty’ concept and politicization;70
5.3;C. Right to humanitarian assistance;74
5.4;D. ILC Draft Articles;77
5.4.1;I. The R2P issue;78
5.4.2;II. Definition;79
5.4.3;III. Cooperation;79
5.4.4;IV. Principles of protection;80
5.4.4.1;1. Responsibility of the affected State;81
5.4.4.2;2. Duty to seek assistance;82
5.4.4.3;3. External assistance;83
5.5;E. Conclusion;83
6;Wolfgang Weigel: Comment on Hans-Joachim Heintze;86
6.1;A. Overview;86
6.2;B. A Critical Appraisal;87
6.3;Bibliography;91
7;Bulbul Khaitan: Discussion on Hans-Joachim Heintze;92
8;Peter Lewisch: International Catastrophes – an Obligation to Cooperate?;94
8.1;A. Introduction;94
8.2;B. Analytical part;96
8.2.1;I. Consent, lack of consent and “assumed consent”;96
8.2.2;II. External effects;99
8.2.3;III. Principal-Agent-Relationship;100
8.2.4;IV. Obligation to actively provide assistance?;101
8.3;C. Duty to cooperate under international law?;102
8.3.1;I. Introduction;102
8.3.2;II. Overview of legal instruments;103
8.3.3;III. Current developments: Issues under International Law;103
8.3.3.1;1. Definition of “Disaster”;103
8.3.3.2;2. The tension between sovereignty rights and the obligation to cooperate with regard to outside assistance;104
8.3.3.2.1;a) Duty to accept assistance in case of disaster?;104
8.3.3.2.2;b) Duty to provide requested assistance?;106
8.3.4;IV. The work by the International Law Commission: Draft Articles on the “Protection of persons in the event of disasters”;107
8.3.4.1;1. Goals, scope, and general framework;107
8.3.4.2;2. Basic principles (international cooperation, rights-based approach);110
8.3.4.3;3. Sovereignty rights and tasks versus responsibility to protect;112
8.3.4.3.1;a) Overview;112
8.3.4.3.2;b) The affected state’s protective task and duties vis-à-vis recourse to external assistance;112
8.3.4.3.3;c) External assistance and the affected state’s (required) consent;116
8.3.4.4;4. Ancillary provisions;118
8.3.4.5;5. Current status and outlook;120
8.4;Bibliography;120
9;Matthias Lemke: Comment on Peter Lewisch;122
9.1;A. What we know;123
9.2;B. Issues still to be addressed;125
9.3;C. Concluding remark;128
9.4;Bibliography;128
10;Katharina Pfaff: Discussion on Peter Lewisch;130
11;Hans-Heinrich Trute: How to Deal with Pandemics;132
11.1;A. Pandemics: A global governance problem;132
11.1.1;I. International health law: A long tradition;132
11.1.2;II. What is a pandemic?;134
11.1.3;III. The importance of knowledge, institutions and international cooperation;135
11.1.3.1;1. The importance of knowledge;135
11.1.3.2;2. The institutionalization of a surveillance scheme;137
11.1.3.3;3. Uncertainty as part of the scheme;138
11.1.3.4;4. Inequalities: The gap between developing and developed countries and between rich and poor;139
11.2;B. The legal design of the administrative network: the international dimension;140
11.2.1;1. The constitution of the WHO;142
11.2.2;2. The International Health Regulations (2005): The basic legal frame;142
11.2.3;3. The establishment of a public health network;144
11.2.4;4. National IHR Focal Points;144
11.2.5;5. Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC);145
11.2.6;6. Notification, assessment and information;146
11.2.7;7. Using other sources of knowledge;147
11.2.8;8. Temporary recommendations;148
11.2.9;I. Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework (PIP): A new approach;148
11.2.9.1;1. GISRS;150
11.2.9.2;2. The benefit sharing system;151
11.2.9.3;3. Inclusion of third parties;153
11.2.9.4;4. Governance aspects;154
11.2.10;II. Non-pharmaceutical and pharmaceutical measures;154
11.3;C. The European dimension: surveillance, assistance and advice;159
11.3.1;I. Networks of surveillance, alert and response;160
11.3.2;II. European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC);161
11.3.3;III. Adaption of the frame;162
11.4;D. The national system: Germany as an example;163
11.4.1;I. The legislative and administrative design in Germany;163
11.4.1.1;1. The Robert Koch Institute (RKI);164
11.4.1.2;2. The responsibility of the federal states;164
11.4.1.3;3. Coordination by emergency plans;165
11.4.2;II. The architecture according to the IfSG;166
11.4.2.1;1. Emphasis on cooperation;166
11.4.2.2;2. Surveillance and notification;167
11.4.2.3;3. Possible measures to be taken;167
11.4.2.3.1;a) Measures of prevention;167
11.4.2.3.2;b) The importance of vaccination;169
11.4.2.3.3;c) Protective measures;170
11.5;E. Conclusions;171
11.6;Bibliography;172
12;Andreas Nicklisch: Comment on Hans-Heinrich Trute;178
12.1;A. Social Dilemma;178
12.2;B. Stimulating Cooperation;179
12.3;C. Sanctions;179
12.4;D. Conclusions;180
12.5;Bibliography;180
13;Felix Hadwiger / Ines Reith: Discussion on Hans-Heinrich Trute;182
14;Thilo Marauhn: An Analysis of International Law Applicable to the Use of Drones;184
14.1;A. Introduction: Debates and Terminology;185
14.1.1;I. Public Debates and Their Challenges;185
14.1.2;II. Drones – their Terminological Setting in Public International Law;187
14.2;B. Situations;189
14.2.1;I. Situations of Public Emergency – Derogating From Human Rights;189
14.2.2;II. Non-International Armed Conflicts;191
14.2.3;III. International Armed Conflicts;193
14.3;C. Rules;194
14.3.1;I. Drones in International Armed Conflict Situations;194
14.3.2;II. The Use of Drones in Non-International Armed Conflict;197
14.3.3;III. The Use of Drones Outside Armed Conflicts;199
14.4;D. Compliance;200
14.5;E. Conclusion;201
15;Amnon Reichman: Comment on Thilo Marauhn;202
16;Agnes Strauß: Discussion on Thilo Marauhn;208
17;Heike Krieger: Conceptualizing Cyberwar: Changing the Law by Imagining Extreme Conditions?;212
17.1;A. Introduction;212
17.2;B. The Paradigm Change in Security Policy and the Need to “Hype Cyberwar”;214
17.3;C. Impact on the Legal Discourse on the Use of Force;216
17.3.1;I. Increasing Interpretative Insecurities;217
17.3.2;II. Legitimizing the Use of Force;219
17.3.2.1;1. The Problem of Countermeasures;219
17.3.2.2;2. The Problem of Attribution;221
17.4;D. Impact on the Human Rights Discourse;223
17.5;E. The Way Ahead;226
17.6;Bibliography;227
18;Jerg Gutmann: Comment on Heike Krieger;230
18.1;A. Introduction;230
18.2;B. Is Cyberwar Different?;231
18.3;C. The Economic Point of View;232
18.4;D. Conclusion;233
18.5;Bibliography;233
19;Mariia Parubets / Junjie Zheng: Discussion on Heike Krieger;236
20;Tim Krieger / Daniel Meierrieks: How to Deal with International Terrorism;240
20.1;A. The Terrorist Challenge to the Rule of Law and to International Law;240
20.2;B. Defining and Modeling International Terrorism: The Rational-Choice Approach;242
20.3;C. Implications of the Rational-Choice Model for Counter-Terrorism Policies;249
20.4;D. International Policy Coordination;253
20.5;E. Learning from 9/11: An Evaluation of Cost-Raising Counter-Terrorism Policies;255
20.6;F. Improving the Environment in Terrorism-Exporting Countries;261
20.7;G. Conclusions;262
20.8;Bibliography;263
21;Stefan Oeter: Comment on Tim Krieger and Daniel Meierrieks;266
21.1;A. General Frame;266
21.2;B. Definition of Terrorism and the Challenge of Modeling the ‘Rationality’ of Terrorist Actors;268
21.3;C. Modes of Reaction;271
21.4;D. Criminal Justice and International Cooperation in Police and Justice Matters as the Primary Level of Response;273
21.5;E. The Temptation of Revenge: Military Reactions to Transnational Terrorism and the Risks of the ‘War on Terror’;275
21.6;F. Conclusions;278
21.7;Bibliography;280
22;Marek Endrich: Discussion on Tim Krieger and Daniel Meierrieks;282
23;Martina Caroni: Legitimate, but Illegal? From Humanitarian Intervention to Responsibility to Protect and Beyond;284
23.1;A. Introduction;284
23.2;B. The Era of Classical International Law;285
23.3;C. Transition to Modern International Law;285
23.4;D. Humanitarian Intervention;285
23.5;E. Development of Responsibility to Protect;287
23.6;F. Further Development and Current Status of Responsibility to Protect;291
23.7;G. All’s Well that Ends Well?;295
23.7.1;I. SC Resolution 1973 did not break new ground;295
23.7.2;II. Third Pillar of R2P not acknowledged in SC Resolution 1973;295
23.7.3;III. Abuse of Power by the Allied Forces in Libya?;296
23.7.4;IV. Veto power vs. R2P’s Third Pillar: The Case of Syria;296
23.8;H. Conclusion: How to Make the Third Pillar Operational?;296
23.9;Bibliography;297
24;Gad Barzilai: Comment on Martina Caroni;300
25;Bulbul Khaitan: Discussion on Martina Caroni;306
26;Roland Vaubel: The Breakdown of the Rule of Law in the Euro-Crisis: Implications for the Reform of the Court of Justice of the European Union;308
26.1;A. Introduction;308
26.2;B. The breakdown of the rule of law in the wake of the European sovereign debt crisis;308
26.2.1;I. The bailout;308
26.2.2;II. Conditionality;310
26.2.3;III. Macroeconomic policy co-ordination;311
26.2.4;IV. The purchase of government bonds by the European Central Bank;312
26.2.5;V. The supervision of Euro area banks by the ECB;315
26.2.6;VI. Transparency at the ECB;316
26.2.7;VII. Explaining the breakdown of the rule of law;316
26.3;C. Reforming the Court of Justice of the European Union;317
26.3.1;I. The status quo;317
26.3.2;II. Explaining the Court’s centralizing bias;318
26.3.3;III. Reforming the CJEU;320
26.4;Bibliography;322
27;Martin Nettesheim: Comment on Roland Vaubel;326
27.1;I.;327
27.2;II.;328
27.3;III.;329
28;Michael Fehling: Comment on Roland Vaubel;332
28.1;A. Introduction;332
28.2;B. Rule of law and law interpretation on European level;332
28.2.1;I. The rule of law as a cornerstone of the European legal architecture;333
28.2.2;II. A more complex view on law interpretation;333
28.2.3;III. Changing law interpretation in the light of a severe (economic) crisis?;335
28.3;C. Reform of the European Court of Justice;336
28.3.1;I. The problem of centralization bias in historic perspective;336
28.3.2;II. Convincing and less convincing reform proposals;337
28.4;D. Concluding remarks;339
28.5;Bibliography;340
29;Kevin Dünisch: Discussion on Roland Vaubel;342
30;August Reinisch: Rules for an Orderly Insolvency of States?;344
30.1;A. Introduction;344
30.2;B. Ignoring the Problem;345
30.3;C. Triggering Enforcement Action;345
30.4;D. Seeking Negotiated Solutions;350
30.5;E. New Rules for an Orderly Insolvency of Sovereign States;353
30.5.1;I. The Preferred Treaty Solution;356
30.5.1.1;1. Protection of the fulfilment of core governmental tasks of the sovereigndebtor;356
30.5.1.2;2. Reduction of the total outstanding debt burden;357
30.5.1.3;3. Equal treatment of creditors;357
30.5.2;II. The Binding Effect of the Treaty Solution;358
30.6;F. Conclusions;362
31;Hans-Bernd Schäfer: Comment on August Reinisch;364
31.1;A. Can collective action clauses substitute for a sovereign insolvency procedure under public international law?;365
31.2;B. The emergence of a bankruptcy procedure in the Euro-zone;366
32;Felix Hadwiger / Ines Reith: Discussion on August Reinisch;368
33;Short Biographies;372
34;Index;378