Buch, Englisch, 560 Seiten, Format (B × H): 161 mm x 240 mm, Gewicht: 1200 g
Contemporary Readings
Buch, Englisch, 560 Seiten, Format (B × H): 161 mm x 240 mm, Gewicht: 1200 g
Reihe: Routledge Contemporary Readings in Philosophy
ISBN: 978-0-415-48386-5
Verlag: Routledge
Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings is the first anthology to collect essential readings in this important area of philosophy. Featuring the work of leading philosophers in the field such as Carnap, Hájek, Jeffrey, Joyce, Lewis, Loewer, Popper, Ramsey, van Fraassen, von Mises, and many others, the book looks in depth at the following key topics:
- subjective probability and credence
- probability updating: conditionalization and reflection
- Bayesian confirmation theory
- classical, logical, and evidential probability
- frequentism
- physical probability: propensities and objective chances.
The book features a useful primer on the mathematics of probability, and each section includes an introduction by the editor, as well as a guide to further reading. A broad-ranging and highly accessible exploration of the subject, Philosophy of Probability is ideal for any student of formal epistemology, philosophy of science, metaphysics, or philosophy of mathematics.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Weitere Infos & Material
Probability Primer Part 1: Degrees of Belief 1. Introduction 2.Truth and Probability, F. P. Ramsey 3. Subjective Probability: Criticisms, Reflections and Problems, Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. 4. A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism, James Joyce Part 2: Updating Degrees of Belief: Conditionalization and Reflection 5. Introduction 6. Why Conditionalize?, David Lewis 7. Probability Kinematics, Richard C. Jeffrey 8. Belief and the Will, Bas C. van Fraassen 9. Diachronic Rationality, Patrick Maher 10. Self-locating belief and the Sleeping Beauty problem, Adam Elga 11. Some Problems for Conditionalization and Reflection, Frank Arntzenius 12. When Betting Odds and Credences Come Apart: more worries for Dutch book arguments, Darren Bradley & Hannes Leitgeb Part 3: Evidence and Probability: Bayesian Confirmation Theory 13. Introduction 14. Bayesian Versus non-Bayesian Approaches to Confirmation, Colin Howson & Peter Urbach 15. Why I am not a Bayesian, Clark Glymour 16. Symmetries and Asymmetries in Evidential Support, Ellery Eells & Branden Fitelson Part 4: Evidence and Probability: Evidential Probability and Principles of Indifference 17. Introduction 18. Indifference: the Symmetries of Probability, Bas C. van Fraassen 19. Statistical and Inductive Probability, Rudolf Carnap 20. Is The Theory of Logical Probability Groundless?, D. C. Stove Part 5: Physical Probability: The Frequency Theory 21. Introduction 22. The Definition of Probability, Richard von Mises 23. Mises Redux, Richard C. Jeffrey 24. Mises Redux -Redux: Fifteen Arguments Against Finite Frequentism, Alan Hájek 25. Fifteen Arguments Against Hypothetical Frequentism, Alan Hájek Part 6: Physical Probability: Objective Chance and Propensities 26. Introduction 27. A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance, David Lewis 28. A Propensity Interpretation of Probability, Karl Popper 29. Objective Single-Case Probabilities and the Foundations of Statistics, Ronald N. Giere 30. Why Propensities Cannot be Probabilities, Paul W. Humphreys 31. David Lewis’s Humean Theory of Objective Chance, Barry Loewer 32. Resiliency, Propensities, and Causal Necessity, Brian Skyrms Bibliography Index
