Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice

Economic Approaches in Political Science
1. Auflage 1991
ISBN: 978-0-7450-0233-0
Verlag: Routledge

Buch, Englisch, 300 Seiten, Format (B × H): 152 mm x 229 mm, Gewicht: 441 g

First published in 1991. This book initially offers a critique of some key rational public choice models, to show that they were internally inconsistent and ideologically slanted. Then due to the authors’ research the ideas are restructured around a particular kind of institutional public choice method, recognizing the value of instrumental models as a mode of thinking clearly about the manifold complexities of political life.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Dunleavy, Patrick

Fachgebiete

• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Volkswirtschaftslehre Öffentliche Finanzwirtschaft, Besteuerung
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Regierungspolitik

Inhaltsverzeichnis

- Introduction: Institutional Public Choice Theory and Political Analysis

DEMOCRACY

- Interest Groups and Collective Action

- Reconstructing the Theory of Groups

- Economic Explanations of Voting Behaviour

- Party Competition - The Preference-Shaping Model

BUREAUCRACY

- Existing Public Choice Models of Bureaucracy

- The Bureau-Shaping Model

- Comparing Budget - Maximizing and Bureau-Shaping Models

- Conclusion - Economic Explanations in Political Science

Über Autor(innen)

Professor Patrick Dunleavy (Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science.)