Warlords and Coalition Politics in Post-Soviet States

Erscheinungsjahr 2015
ISBN: 978-1-107-06335-8
Verlag: Cambridge University Press

Buch, Englisch, 246 Seiten, Format (B × H): 157 mm x 235 mm, Gewicht: 584 g

Reihe: Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics

The break-up of the USSR was unexpected and unexpectedly peaceful. Though a third of the new states fell prey to violent civil conflict, anarchy on the post-Soviet periphery, when it occurred, was quickly cauterized. This book argues that this outcome had nothing to do with security guarantees by Russia or the United Nations and everything to do with local innovation by ruthless warlords, who competed and colluded in a high-risk coalition formation game. Drawing on a structured comparison of Georgian and Tajik militia members, the book combines rich comparative data with formal modeling, treating the post-Soviet space as an extraordinary laboratory to observe the limits of great powers' efforts to shape domestic institutions in weak states.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Driscoll, Jesse

Fachgebiete

• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politische Systeme Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1. Revisionist history; 2. Predator collusion: a high-stakes game; 3. Kto kogo?; 4. Warlord coalitions and militia politics; 5. Coup-proofing; 6. Implications; Case selection and external validity; Mathematical proofs; Anonymous warlords.

Über Autor(innen)

Driscoll, Jesse
Jesse Driscoll is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego. He was an OCV fellow at Yale University and a GAGE fellow at the University of Virginia, and most recently a member of the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies from 2009–13. His work has been published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution, Research and Politics, and the Journal of Survey Statistics and Methodology.