Federalism, Fiscal Authority, and Centralization in Latin America

Erscheinungsjahr 2006
ISBN: 978-0-521-86163-2
Verlag: Cambridge University Press

Buch, Englisch, 302 Seiten, Format (B × H): 157 mm x 235 mm, Gewicht: 644 g

Reihe: Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics

This book explores the politics of fiscal authority, focusing on the centralization of taxation in Latin America during the twentieth century. The book studies this issue in great detail for the case of Mexico. The political (and fiscal) fragmentation associated with civil war at the beginning of the century was eventually transformed into a highly centralized regime. The analysis shows that fiscal centralization can best be studied as the consequence of a bargain struck between self-interested regional and national politicians. Fiscal centralization was more extreme in Mexico than in most other places in the world, but the challenges and problems tackled by Mexican politicians were not unique. The book thus analyzes fiscal centralization and the origins of intergovernmental financial transfers in the other Latin American federal regimes, Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela. The analysis sheds light on the factors that explain the consolidation of tax authority in developing countries.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Diaz-Cayeros, Alberto

Fachgebiete

• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politische Systeme
• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Volkswirtschaftslehre Wirtschaftspolitik, politische Ökonomie
• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Wirtschaftswissenschaften Wirtschaftsgeschichte
• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Volkswirtschaftslehre Volkswirtschaftslehre Allgemein Geschichte der VWL
• Geisteswissenschaften Geschichtswissenschaft Geschichtliche Themen Wirtschaftsgeschichte
• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Volkswirtschaftslehre Volkswirtschaftslehre Allgemein Arbeitsmarkt
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Regierungspolitik Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1. Federalism, party hegemony and the centralization of fiscal authority; Part I. Fiscal Centralization in Mexico: 2. Regional fragmentation and failed commitment; 3. The official party as a regional compromise; 4. Nominations, veto players and gubernatorial stability; 5. Transfers and redistribution in the Mexican States; Part II. Centralization and Revenue-sharing in the Latin American Federations: 6. Venezuela: unitarianism in disguise; 7. Argentina: regime change and fragile credibility; 8. Brazil: the retention of fiscal authority; 9. State building, political institutions, and fiscal authority.

Über Autor(innen)

Diaz-Cayeros, Alberto
Alberto Diaz-Cayeros is an assistant professor of political science at Stanford University, California. He previously taught at the University of California, Los Angeles. He received his MA and PhD in political science from Duke University, North Carolina. His dissertation won the award for best dissertation granted by the political economy section of the American Political Science Association. Diaz-Cayeros has published articles in the Journal of Theoretical Politics, Comparative Political Studies, Politica y Gobierno and several edited volumes.