de Jong / Aarts Economic Aspects of Disability Behavior

1. Auflage 2016
ISBN: 978-1-4832-9486-5
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, Band Volume 207, 404 Seiten, Web PDF

Reihe: Contributions to Economic Analysis

One of the more striking aspects of the Dutch Welfare State is its apparent difficulty in controlling the number of transfer recipients. A prime example of this management problem is the Disability Insurance program. This monograph presents a thorough investigation of the behavioral responses of employees and firms to this generous disability scheme. The heart of the study is the empirical part based on a rich data set of persons who apply for benefits and those who do not. The data derive both from self-reports as well as medical and vocational expert evaluations. Combining facets of health economics, medical sociology and econometric technique, the authors are able to reveal the intricate causalities that underlie the disability process.

Autoren/Hrsg.

de Jong, P. R.

Aarts, J. M.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Front Cover;1
2;Economic Aspects of Disability Behavior;4
3;Copyright Page;5
4;Table of Contents;12
5;Acknowledgements;8
6;List of Tables, Schemes, and Figures;16
7;Chapter 1. Economic Aspects of Disability Behavior; Introduction;20
7.1;1.1 Introduction;20
7.2;1.2 Social Disability Insurance;22
7.3;1.3 Efficiency and Equity Aspects of Social Disability Insurance;25
7.4;1.4 Outline of the Book;28
8;Chapter 2. The Dutch Disability Program in National and International Perspective;32
8.1;2.1 Introduction;32
8.2;2.2 Dutch Social Security in International Perspective;32
8.3;2.3 Outline of the Dutch Social Security System;43
8.4;2.4 The Dl-Program in National and International Perspective;52
8.5;2.5 The 1987 System Reform;65
8.6;2.6 Summary and Conclusions;67
9;Chapter 3. The Disability Process;72
9.1;3.1 Introduction;72
9.2;3.2 The Medical-Sociological Approach to Disability Behavior;75
9.3;3.3 The Micro-Economics of Disability Behavior;84
9.4;3.4 Summary, Discussion, and Introduction to the Following Chapters;115
10;Chapter 4. History, Data and Design of the Study;122
10.1;4.1 Introduction;122
10.2;4.2 Previous History;122
10.3;4.3 Sampling Procedures;125
10.4;4.4 Nonresponse;129
10.5;4.5 Limitations of the Database;133
10.6;4.6 A Preliminary Picture of the Samples;135
10.7;4.7 Design of the Study;145
10.8;Appendix to 4;148
11;Chapter 5. Residual Work Capacity in the Dl-Program;150
11.1;5.1 Introduction;150
11.2;5.2 Disability and Unemployment;151
11.3;5.3 The Administrative Practice of Disability Determination;154
11.4;5.4 The Determination of Work Capacity in the SB-Sample;155
11.5;5.5 Expected Future Work Capacity;159
11.6;5.6 Expected Future Work Capacity and Actual Work Resumption;163
11.7;5.7 Work Capacity at DI-Entry;165
11.8;5.S Discussion;169
11.9;5.9 Work Capacity of the Disabled after the 1987 System Reform;171
11.10;5.10 Conclusions;176
11.11;Appendix to 5;178
12;Chapter 6. On the Problem of Endogenous Measurement Error;186
12.1;6.1 Introduction;186
12.2;6.2 Model and Estimation Procedure;188
12.3;6.3 Empirical Specifications;191
12.4;6.4 Further Estimation Results;196
12.5;6.5 Summary and Discussion;204
12.6;Appendix to 6;205
13;Chapter 7. Labor Market Opportunities;208
13.1;7.1 Introduction;208
13.2;7.2 Theoretical Modelling of Individual Labor Market Histories;209
13.3;7.3 A Statistical Model of Individual Labor Market Histories;219
13.4;7.4 Data and Further Specification of the Model;222
13.5;7.5 Estimation Results;229
13.6;7.6 Unemployment and Re-employment Probabilities; Dl-Insured and DI-Entrants;240
13.7;7.7 Conclusions;242
14;Chapter 8. Firm Specific Disability Incidence Rates;246
15;8.1 Introduction;246
15.1;8.2 The Dl-Program and the Firm;247
15.2;8.3 A Model of the Firm Specific Disability Incidence;252
15.3;8.4 Measuring the Firm Specific Disability Risk;267
15.4;8.5 Summary and Discussion;268
15.5;Appendix to 8;270
16;Chapter 9. Expected Earnings and DI-Benefit Streams;274
16.1;9.1 Introduction;274
16.2;9.2 Wages and Benefits; A Description;276
16.3;9.3 The Wage Profiles;278
16.4;9.4 Expected Earnings and DI-Benefit Streams;285
16.5;9.5 Summary and Conclusions;291
16.6;Appendix to 9;293
17;Chapter 10. Determinants of Entering the Dl-Program; Unconditional and Conditional Probability Models;296
17.1;10.1 Introduction;296
17.2;10.2 Unconditional Probability Models;298
17.3;10.3 The Conditional DI-Probability;309
17.4;10.4 Simulation of the 1980-85 Changes;318
17.5;10.5 Summary and Conclusions;322
17.6;Appendix to 10;326
18;Chapter 11. Forecasting the Size of the Disabled Population;330
18.1;11.1 Introduction;330
18.2;11.2 The Calculation Model;332
18.3;11.3 Definitions and Input Data;339
18.4;11.4 DIS-Population Forecasts;345
18.5;11.5 Summary and Conclusions;355
18.6;Appendix to 11;358
19;Chapter 12. Economic Aspects of Disability Behavior; Summary and Conclusions;362
19.1;12.1 Introduction;362
19.2;12.2 Summary of the Main Findings by Chapter;363
19.3;12.3 Some Policy Implications;373
20;References;376
21;Author Index;388
22;Subject Index;390