Corradetti Relativism and Human Rights

A Theory of Pluralistic Universalism
1. Auflage 2009
ISBN: 978-1-4020-9986-1
Verlag: Springer Netherlands
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 170 Seiten

When he nished writing, he raised his eyes and looked at me. From that day I have thought about Doktor Pannwitz many times and in many ways. I have asked myself how he really functioned as a man; how he lled his time, outside of the Polymerization and the Indo- Germanic conscience; above all when I was once more a free man, I wanted to meet him again, not from a spirit of revenge, but merely from a personal curiosity about the human soul. Because that look was not one between two men; and if I had known how completely to explain the nature of that look, which came as if across the glass window of an aquarium between two beings who live in different worlds, I would also have explained the essence of the great insanity of the third Germany. PRIMO LEVI [If this is a man, pp. 111-112, in, If this is a man and The truce, trans. S. Woolf, Abacus, London, 1987] If all propositions, even the contingent ones, are resolved into identical propositions, are they not all necessary? My answer is: certainly not. For even if it is certain that what is more perfect is what will exist, the less perfect is nevertheless still possible. In propositions of fact, existence is involved. LEIBNIZ [Samtlic ¨ he schriften und briefe vol VI pt 4 Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1449A VI 4] We live in a rule-constrained world.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Corradetti, Claudio

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Contents;6
2;Introduction;8
3;Part I;16
3.1;Cognitive Relativism and Experiential Rationality;17
3.1.1;1.1 Beyond Cognitive and Linguistic Relativism;19
3.1.2;1.2 Epistemic Relativism Refuted;26
3.1.3;1.3 The Experiential Validity of the Cognitive System;33
3.2;Beyond Moral Relativism and Objectivism;48
3.2.1;2.1 Forms of Moral Relativism;49
3.2.2;2.2 The Two Horns of the Dilemma: Relativism versus Objectivism;60
3.2.3;2.3 Wong’s Mixed Position: the Idea of Pluralistic Relativism;72
3.2.4;2.4 Discursive Dialectic of Recognition: for a Post-Metaphysical Justification of the Domain of the Ethical Life;75
4;Part II;83
4.1;Human Rights and Pluralisitc Universalism;84
4.1.1;3.1 From Purposive Action to Communicative Action;86
4.1.2;3.2 The Priority of Recognition and the Formal System of Basic Liberties;101
4.1.3;3.3 The Exemplar Validity of Human Rights;110
4.1.4;3.4 Deliberative Constraints and Pluralistic Universalism;117
4.2;The Legal Dimensions of Human Rights;122
4.2.1;4.1 The Source and the Content Validity of Law;123
4.2.2;4.2 The Structure and Function of Human Rights;141
4.2.3;4.3 Transplantability and Legal Commensurability;148
4.2.4;4.4 What is Wrong in the Democratic Peace Theory? A Defence of International Legal Pluralism;154
5;Bibliography;164
6;Author Index;176
7;Subject Index;178