Buch, Englisch, 280 Seiten, Format (B × H): 145 mm x 222 mm, Gewicht: 529 g
Buch, Englisch, 280 Seiten, Format (B × H): 145 mm x 222 mm, Gewicht: 529 g
Reihe: Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
ISBN: 978-0-521-19265-1
Verlag: Cambridge University Press
This book investigates the effects of electoral systems on the relative legislative and, hence, regulatory influence of competing interests in society. Building on Ronald Rogowski and Mark Andreas Kayser's extension of the classic Stigler–Peltzman model of regulation, the authors demonstrate that majoritarian electoral arrangements should empower consumers relative to producers. Employing real price levels as a proxy for consumer power, the book rigorously establishes this proposition over time, within the OECD, and across a large sample of developing countries. Majoritarian electoral arrangements depress real prices by approximately ten percent, all else equal. The authors carefully construct and test their argument and broaden it to consider the overall welfare effects of electoral system design and the incentives of actors in the choice of electoral institutions.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
- Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Regierungspolitik Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik
- Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politische Systeme Wahlen und Volksabstimmungen
- Wirtschaftswissenschaften Volkswirtschaftslehre Wirtschaftspolitik, politische Ökonomie
- Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politische Systeme Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft
Weitere Infos & Material
1. Introduction; 2. Electoral systems and consumer power: theoretical considerations; 3. Electoral systems and real prices: panel evidence for the OECD countries; 4. Electoral systems and real prices around the world; 5. A closer look: case studies and mechanisms; 6. Socio-economic origins of electoral systems; 7. Discussion and conclusion.