Carsetti Causality, Meaningful Complexity and Embodied Cognition

2010
ISBN: 978-90-481-3529-5
Verlag: Springer Netherlands
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, Band 46, 360 Seiten

Reihe: Theory and Decision Library A:

Arturo Carsetti According to molecular Biology, true invariance (life) can exist only within the framework of ongoing autonomous morphogenesis and vice versa. With respect to this secret dialectics, life and cognition appear as indissolubly interlinked. In this sense, for instance, the inner articulation of conceptual spaces appears to be linked to an inner functional development based on a continuous activity of selection and “anchorage” realised on semantic grounds. It is the work of “invention” and g- eration (in invariance), linked with the “rooting” of meaning, which determines the evolution, the leaps and punctuated equilibria, the conditions related to the unfo- ing of new modalities of invariance, an invariance which is never simple repetition and which springs on each occasion through deep-level processes of renewal and recovery. The selection perpetrated by meaning reveals its autonomy aboveall in its underpinning, in an objective way, the ongoing choice of these new modalities. As such it is not, then, concerned only with the game of “possibles”, offering itself as a simple channel for pure chance, but with providing a channel for the articulation of the “ le” in the humus of a semantic (and embodied) net in order to prepare the necessary conditionsfor a continuousrenewal and recoveryof original creativity. In effect, it is this autonomy in inventing new possible modules of incompressibility whichdeterminestheactualemergenceofnew(andtrue)creativity,whichalsotakes place through the “narration” of the effected construction.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Carsetti, A.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Acknowledgements;6
2;Introduction;7
3;Part I Consciousness, Intentionality and Self-Organization;48
3.1;1 The Link Between Brain Learning, Attention, and Consciousness;49
3.1.1;1.1 How Do We Continue to Learn Throughout Life?;49
3.1.2;1.2 The Theoretical Method;51
3.1.3;1.3 How Do We Perceive Illusory Contours and Brightness?;54
3.1.4;1.4 How Do We Learn to Recognize Visually Perceived Objects?;55
3.1.5;1.5 How Do We Solve the Cocktail Party Problem?;55
3.1.6;1.6 How Do We Consciously Perceive Speech?;57
3.1.7;1.7 ART Matching and Resonance: the Link Between Attention, Intention, and Consciousness;59
3.1.8;1.8 Resonant Dynamics During Speech Categorization;61
3.1.9;1.9 Resonant Dynamics During Auditory Streaming;63
3.1.10;1.10 A Circuit for ART Matching;65
3.1.11;1.11 Resonant Dynamics During Brightness Perception;66
3.1.12;1.12 How Early Does Attention Act in the Brain?;70
3.1.13;1.13 Attention at All Stages of Sensory and Cognitive Neocortex?;70
3.1.14;1.14 Self-Organizing Feature Maps for Learned Object Recognition;71
3.1.15;1.15 How Does ART Stabilize Learning of a Self-Organizing Feature Map?;75
3.1.16;1.16 How Is the Generality of Knowledge Controlled?;76
3.1.17;1.17 Corticohippocampal Interactions and Medial Temporal Amnesia;78
3.1.18;1.18 How Universal Are ART Processes in the Brain?;80
3.1.19;1.19 Internal Fantasy, Planned Movement, and Volitional Gating;81
3.1.20;1.20 What vs Where: Why Are Procedural Memories Unconscious?;82
3.1.21;1.21 Some Comments About Amodal and Modal Visual Percepts;84
3.2;2 Emergence of Intentional Procedures in Self-Organizing Neural Networks;92
3.2.1;2.1 Minimal Necessary Requirements;93
3.2.2;2.2 Externally Versus Internally Defined Goals;94
3.2.2.1;2.2.1 At the Beginning;95
3.2.3;2.3 Neurophysiology of Voluntary Movements;96
3.2.4;2.4 Philosophical Interpretation;97
3.3;3 Action Goal Representation and Action Understanding in the Cerebral Cortex;102
3.3.1;3.1 Introductory Remarks;102
3.3.2;3.2 Perception and Action Are Strictly Inter-Related;102
3.3.3;3.3 A Vocabulary of Actions in Ventral Premotor Area F5;103
3.3.4;3.4 Goal Representation in the Inferior Parietal Cortex;104
3.3.5;3.5 Motor Organization in the Inferior Parietal Lobule;105
3.3.6;3.6 Mirror Neurons;106
3.3.6.1;3.6.1 Mouth Mirror Neurons;106
3.3.6.2;3.6.2 Motor Properties of F5 Mirror Neurons;107
3.3.7;3.7 Mirror Neurons and Action Understanding;107
3.3.8;3.8 The Mirror Neuron Circuit;109
3.3.9;3.9 The Mirror System in Humans;110
3.3.10;3.10 Possible Functions Derived from the Mirror Neuron System: Imitation, Language, Intention Understanding;110
3.3.11;3.11 Imitation;111
3.3.12;3.12 A Pathway from Monkey F5 to Human Broca's for Language Evolution;112
3.3.13;3.13 Intention Understanding;113
3.3.14;3.14 Conclusions;114
4;Part II Truth, Randomness and Impredicativity;119
4.1;4 The Genesis of Mathematical Objects, Following Weyl and Brouwer;120
4.2;5 Randomness, Determinism and Programs in Turing's Test;129
4.2.1;5.1 Introduction;129
4.2.2;5.2 The Game, the Machine and the Continuum;130
4.2.3;5.3 Between Randomness and Deterministic Chaos;135
4.2.3.1;5.3.1 INTERMEZZO I (Determinism and Knowledge);136
4.2.4;5.4 Logical, Physical and Biological Machines;140
4.2.4.1;5.4.1 INTERMEZZO II (Machines and Deductions);142
4.2.5;5.5 Predictability and Decidability;145
4.2.6;5.6 Conclusion: Irreversible vs Unrepeatable;148
4.3;6 -Incompleteness, Truth, Intentionality;154
4.3.1;6.1 Irreducible Distinction Between Truth and Provability Within T;155
4.3.2;6.2 External Point of View and Non-finitist Evidence;158
4.3.2.1;6.2.1 Platonism versus Constructivism;158
4.3.2.2;6.2.2 Non-finitary Evidence and Prototypical Proofs;161
4.3.3;6.3 Concluding Remarks on Intentionality;164
5;Part III Complexity, Incomputability and Emergence;166
5.1;7 Leibniz, Complexity and Incompleteness;167
5.2;8 Incomputability, Emergence and the Turing Universe;174
5.2.1;8.1 The Laplacian Model Becomes More of a Model;175
5.2.2;8.2 Some Uncomfortable Consequences;177
5.2.3;8.3 What Is Emergence? – Definability, Nonlocality;180
5.2.4;8.4 Is That All There Is? – Turing and the Human Brain;183
5.2.5;8.5 The Extended Turing Model;185
5.2.6;8.6 And a Physics Road Test;187
5.3;9 Computational Models of Measurement and Hempel's Axiomatization;193
5.3.1;9.1 Introduction;193
5.3.2;9.2 Theory of Measurement;196
5.3.2.1;9.2.1 The Three Concepts of Measurement;196
5.3.2.2;9.2.2 The Axiomatization of Measurement;197
5.3.3;9.3 The Collider Experiment;199
5.3.3.1;9.3.1 Theory;199
5.3.3.2;9.3.2 Experiment;200
5.3.3.3;9.3.3 CME as Oracle;201
5.3.3.4;9.3.4 Bisection Algorithm;202
5.3.3.5;9.3.5 Notions of Measurable;203
5.3.3.6;9.3.6 Notions of Computation;204
5.3.4;9.4 Geroch–Hartle on Computability and Measurement;205
5.3.5;9.5 The Laws of Dynamics;207
5.3.6;9.6 Refinement of the Theory of Measurement;210
5.3.6.1;9.6.1 Measuring Quantities;210
5.3.6.2;9.6.2 Measurement Axioms with Time;211
5.3.6.3;9.6.3 The Collider as an Example;214
5.3.6.4;9.6.4 Complexity;216
5.3.7;9.7 The Non-measurable Character of a Physical Concept;217
5.3.8;9.8 Conclusions;220
5.4;10 Impredicativity of Continuum in Phenomenology and in Non-Cantorian Theories;222
5.4.1;10.1 Introduction;222
5.4.2;10.2 Continuity in the Constituting Flux of Consciousness;224
5.4.3;10.3 Impredicativity of Phenomenological and Mathematical Continuum;226
5.4.3.1;10.3.1 Phenomenological Recurrence to Absolute Subjectivity;226
5.4.3.2;10.3.2 The Continuum in Alternative and Internal Set Theories;228
5.4.3.3;10.3.3 The Intuitionistic Approach to Continuum;232
5.4.4;10.4 Conclusion: A Reflection on the Impredicative Character of Continuum;234
6;Part IV Epistemic Complexity and Causality;237
6.1;11 Reasons Against Naturalizing Epistemic Reasons: Normativity, Objectivity, Non-computability;238
6.1.1;11.1 Naturalism;238
6.1.2;11.2 Epistemic Reasons;239
6.1.3;11.3 The Argument from Normativity;241
6.1.4;11.4 The Argument from Objectivity;242
6.1.5;11.5 The Argument from Non-computability;244
6.2;12 Some Remarks on Causality and Invariance ;246
6.2.1;12.1 Woodward's Interventionist Theory;246
6.2.2;12.2 Invariance and Stability in Biology;250
6.2.3;12.3 Social Norms and Invariance;252
6.2.4;12.4 Invariance and Intervention in Reasoning and Learning;254
6.2.5;12.5 Causality, Invariance and Statistics;256
6.2.6;12.6 Invariance and Causality Within Suppes' Pluralistic Epistemology;260
6.2.7;12.7 Towards a Characterization of Context;261
6.3;13 Epistemic Complexity from an Objective Bayesian Perspective;265
6.3.1;13.1 Introduction;265
6.3.2;13.2 Objective Bayesian Epistemology;265
6.3.3;13.3 Objective Bayesian Nets;267
6.3.4;13.4 Causal Structure;269
6.3.5;13.5 Hierarchical Structure;270
6.3.6;13.6 Logical Structure;272
6.3.7;13.7 Varied Evidence;275
6.3.8;13.8 Conclusion;277
7;Part V Embodied Cognition and Knowledge Construction;281
7.1;14 The Role of Creativity and Randomizers in Human Cognition and Problem Solving;282
7.1.1;14.1 Practical Reasoning, Default Rules, and Genetic Algorithms as New Inductive and Non-linear Evolutive Mental Processes;282
7.1.2;14.2 The Statistico-Causal Nature of Cognitive Thinking, the Evaluative and the Memory Function of Our Neuronal Brain and Its Protosemantics;284
7.1.3;14.3 Creativity, Lotteries, and the Combinatorial Role of Evolutionary Randomizers and Bayesian Learning;288
7.1.4;14.4 The Heuristic Scheme of Human Evolutive Creativity as Inductive Gambling with Randomizers;291
7.1.5;14.5 Examples of Creativity;294
7.2;15 The Emergence of Mind: A Dualistic Understanding;298
7.2.1;15.1 Emergentism as Monism and Its Critics;298
7.2.2;15.2 Emergentism as Dualism;301
7.3;16 Doing Metaphysics with Robots;307
7.4;17 Knowledge Construction, Non-Standard Semantics and the Genesis of the Mind's Eyes;315
8;Author Index;333
9;Subject Index;338