Carlsson / Larsson Problems of the Mixed Economy

Cooperation, Efficiency, and Stability
1. Auflage 2014
ISBN: 978-1-4832-9739-2
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, Band Volume 189, 230 Seiten, Web PDF

Reihe: Contributions to Economic Analysis

The problems of the modern mixed economy are presented in this book, including general theoretical analyses and applications to specific areas. The subject is treated both mathematically and in a non-technical way.This volume consists of four parts. The papers in Part I are mainly related to the micro-foundations of the mixed economy. The papers in Part II address a number of issues concerning the fundamental properties of the mixed economy. The papers in Part III and IV respectively deal with taxation and public policy evaluation and the role of institutional design. The various articles provide new and stimulating insights in the areas of collective action, economic organization and public sector activities. A few articles contain applications to the Swedish economy.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Carlsson, H.

Larsson, B.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Front Cover;1
2;Problems of the Mixed Economy: Cooperation, Efficiency, and Stability;4
3;Copyright Page;5
4;Table of Contents;10
5;INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES;6
6;The Arne Ryde Foundation;8
7;Preface;12
8;Chapter 1. Editors' Introduction and Summary;14
8.1;1. Introduction;14
8.2;2. Summaries of the Contributions;22
8.3;References;32
9;PART I: COOPERATION AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION;34
9.1;Chapter 2. Utility, Duty and Fairness;36
9.1.1;1. Introduction;36
9.1.2;2. The Collective Action Problem;37
9.1.3;3. Rational, Selfish Motivation;45
9.1.4;4. Utility and Altruism;48
9.1.5;5. Everyday Kantianism;51
9.1.6;6. Fairness;54
9.1.7;7. Utility, Duty and Fairness;58
9.1.8;References;63
9.2;Chapter 3. How Common is Common Knowledge?;66
9.2.1;1. Introduction;66
9.2.2;2. The Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma;67
9.2.3;3. The Model;69
9.2.4;4. An Example;73
9.2.5;5. Discussion;75
9.2.6;References;76
9.3;Chapter 4. Rights and Costs in a Model of the Economic System;78
9.3.1;1. Introduction;78
9.3.2;2. Some Characteristics of Rights;80
9.3.3;3. Production, Transaction and Organization Costs;85
9.3.4;4. Major Features of Choice of Contractual Structure and Organizational Procedure;91
9.3.5;5. Externality and Market Failure: An Application of the Framework;95
9.3.6;6. Concluding Remarks;97
9.3.7;References;99
9.4;Chapter 5. Costs of Rivalry and Horizontal Mergers;102
9.4.1;1. Introduction;102
9.4.2;2. An Illustrative Model of Costly Rivalry;103
9.4.3;3. Some Applications;106
9.4.4;4. Conclusion;108
9.4.5;References;108
10;PART II: CONFLICTING OBJECTIVES AND INSTABILITY;110
10.1;Chapter 6. The Welfare State: Problems and Challenges from a Decision–Theoretical Point of View;112
10.1.1;1. Introduction;112
10.1.2;2. Problems of the welfare state;113
10.1.3;3. Democracy;114
10.1.4;4. Local decisions and national interests;117
10.1.5;5. Decentralization and equality;121
10.1.6;6. Efficiency and equality;123
10.1.7;7. Interest groups and the general interest;127
10.1.8;8. Concluding remarks;128
10.1.9;References;129
10.2;Chapter 7. Some Decision Features of a Mixed Economy;132
10.2.1;1. Introduction;132
10.2.2;2. Conceptual Specifications;132
10.2.3;3. Ingredients of the Economy;135
10.2.4;4. The Mixed Economy;138
10.2.5;5. Bargaining on Wages;141
10.2.6;6. The Case of Repeated Games;145
10.2.7;7. Conclusion;146
10.2.8;References;147
11;PART III: TAXATION AND PUBLIC POLICY EVALUATION;148
11.1;Chapter 8. Efficient Income Taxation and Stability;150
11.1.1;1. Introduction;150
11.1.2;2. Equilibrium behavior;151
11.1.3;3. Classification of equilibria;153
11.1.4;4. Disequilibrium behavior and stability;154
11.1.5;5. Efficient and stable taxation;157
11.1.6;References;159
11.1.7;Appendix. Mathematical proofs;160
11.2;Chapter 9. Public Policy Evaluation when Taxes Matter;162
11.2.1;1. Introduction;162
11.2.2;2. Framework;163
11.2.3;3. Applications;166
11.2.4;References;169
11.3;Chapter 10. Analyzing Productivity and Efficiency in the Absence of Output Measures;170
11.3.1;1. Introduction;170
11.3.2;2. The Meaning of Homotheticity;172
11.3.3;3. Technical Change and Total Factor Productivity;176
11.3.4;4. Inefficiency in Production;183
11.3.5;5. Summing up;193
11.3.6;References;195
12;PART IV: THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN;198
12.1;Chapter 11. Demographic Structure and Labor Supply in a Pay-As-You-Go Pension System;200
12.1.1;1. Introduction;200
12.1.2;2. The Dependency Ratio. Its Significance for the Fee and the Benefit Level;203
12.1.3;3. Forecasts of Working Hours and Demographic Structure. Illustrations;205
12.1.4;4. To Increase the Fee or Decrease the Benefit Level?;207
12.1.5;References;208
12.2;Chapter 12. Fiscal Federalism, Revenue Sharing and the Size of Government;210
12.2.1;1. Introduction;210
12.2.2;2. A Closed Economy;212
12.2.3;3. Small Open Economies;217
12.2.4;4. Revenue Sharing;220
12.2.5;5. Concluding Comments;222
12.2.6;References;223
13;Author Index;226
14;Subject Index;230