Buch, Englisch, 310 Seiten, Format (B × H): 152 mm x 229 mm, Gewicht: 509 g
Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power
Buch, Englisch, 310 Seiten, Format (B × H): 152 mm x 229 mm, Gewicht: 509 g
Reihe: Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
ISBN: 978-0-521-62550-0
Verlag: Cambridge University Press
The late-twentieth century has given rise to the most concentrated period of divided party government in American history. With one party controlling the presidency and the opposing party controlling Congress, the veto has inevitably become a critical tool of presidential power. Combining sophisticated game theory with unprecedented data, this book analyzes how divided party presidents use threats and vetoes to wrest policy concessions from a hostile Congress. Case studies of the most important vetoes in recent history add texture to the analysis, detailing how President Clinton altered the course of Newt Gingrich's Republican Revolution. Offering the first book-length analysis to bring rational choice theory to bear on the presidency, Veto Bargaining offers a major contribution to our understanding of American politics in an age of divided party government.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
- Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politische Systeme Zentralregierung
- Sozialwissenschaften Soziologie | Soziale Arbeit Spezielle Soziologie Politische Soziologie
- Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politikwissenschaft Allgemein Politische Globalisierung
- Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politische Kultur Politische Soziologie und Psychologie
Weitere Infos & Material
1. Divided government and interbranch bargaining; 2. A natural history of veto bargaining, 1945-1992; 3. Rational choice and the presidency; 4. Models of veto bargaining; 5. Explaining the patterns; 6. Testing the models; 7. Veto threats; 8. Interpreting history; 9. Conclusions.
