Braun / Birondo | Virtue's Reasons | Buch | 978-1-138-23173-3 | sack.de

Buch, Englisch, 218 Seiten, Format (B × H): 157 mm x 235 mm, Gewicht: 473 g

Reihe: Routledge Studies in Ethics and Moral Theory

Braun / Birondo

Virtue's Reasons

New Essays on Virtue, Character, and Reasons
1. Auflage 2017
ISBN: 978-1-138-23173-3
Verlag: Routledge

New Essays on Virtue, Character, and Reasons

Buch, Englisch, 218 Seiten, Format (B × H): 157 mm x 235 mm, Gewicht: 473 g

Reihe: Routledge Studies in Ethics and Moral Theory

ISBN: 978-1-138-23173-3
Verlag: Routledge


Virtues and reasons are two of the most fruitful and important concepts in contemporary moral philosophy. Many writers have commented upon the close connection between virtues and reasons, but no one has done full justice to the complexity of this connection. It is generally recognized that the virtues not only depend upon reasons, but also sometimes provide them. The essays in this volume shed light on precisely how virtues and reasons are related to each other and what can be learned by exploring this relationship.



Virtue’s Reasons is divided into three sections, each of them devoted to a general issue regarding the relationship between virtues and reasons. The first section analyzes how the virtues may be related to, or linked with, normative reasons in ways that improve our understanding of what constitutes virtuous character and ethical agency. The second section explores the reasons moral agents have for cultivating the virtues and how the virtues impact moral responsiveness or development. The final section examines how reasons can be employed in understanding the nature of virtue, and how specific virtues, like modesty and practical wisdom, interact with reasons. This book will be of major interest to scholars working on virtue theory, the nature of moral character, and normative ethics.

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Weitere Infos & Material


Introduction: Virtue’s Reasons

Noell Birondo and S. Stewart Braun

Part I: Reasons, Character, and Agency

1. Moral Virtues and Responsiveness for Reasons

Garrett Cullity

2. Remote Scenarios and Warranted Virtue Attributions

Justin Oakley

3. Vice, Reason, and Wrongdoing

Damian Cox

4. Can Virtue Be Codified? An Inquiry on the Basis of Four Conceptions of Virtue

Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu

Part II: Reasons and Virtues in Development

5. Virtue, Reason, and Will

Ramon Das

6. Self-Knowledge and the Development of Virtue

Emer O’Hagan

7. Aretaic Role Modeling, Justificatory Reasons, and the Diversity of the Virtues

Robert Audi

Part III: Specific Virtues for Finite Rational Agents

8. Practical Wisdom: A Virtue for Resolving Conflicts among Practical Reasons

Andrés Luco

9. The Virtue of Modesty and the Egalitarian Ethos

S. Stewart Braun

10. Virtue and Prejudice: Giving and Taking Reasons

Noell Birondo


Noell Birondo is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Wichita State University, USA. His primary interests lie at the intersection of contemporary ethical theory and ancient Greek philosophy. His articles have appeared in The Monist, Ancient Philosophy, Ratio, the Journal of Philosophical Research, the Southwest Philosophy Review, and the International Encyclopedia of Ethics.

S. Stewart Braun is Lecturer in the School of Philosophy and a member of the Institute of Religion and Critical Inquiry at Australian Catholic University. He specializes in social and political philosophy and also in normative and applied ethics. His articles have appeared in the Journal of Applied Philosophy and Law and Philosophy, among others.



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