Bokulich Scientific Structuralism

1. Auflage 2011
ISBN: 978-90-481-9597-8
Verlag: Springer Netherlands
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, Band 281, 182 Seiten

Reihe: Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science

Recently there has been a revival of interest in structuralist approaches to science. Taking their lead from scientific structuralists such as Henri Poincaré, Ernst Cassirer, and Bertrand Russell, some contemporary philosophers and scientists have argued that the most fruitful approach to solving many problems in the philosophy of science lies in focusing on the structural features of our scientific theories. Much of the work in scientific structuralism to date has been focused on the problem of scientific realism, where it has been argued that even in cases of radical theory change the most important structural features of predecessor theories are preserved. These structural realists argue that what our most successful theories get right about the world is these abstract structural features, rather than any particular ontological claims. More recently, philosophers of science have adopted structuralist approaches to many other issues in the philosophy of science, such as scientific explanation and intertheory relations. The nine articles collected in this volume, written by the leading researchers in scientific structuralism, represent some of the most important directions of research in this field. This book will be of particular interest to those philosophers, scientists, and mathematicians who are interested in the foundations of science.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Bokulich, Peter

Bokulich, Alisa

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Scientific Structuralism;3
1.1;Contents;7
1.2;Contributors;9
1.3;Introduction to Scientific Structuralism;11
1.4;References;17
1.5;Chapter 1: Structural Realism: A Neo-Kantian Perspective;19
1.5.1;1.1 Structural Realism: The Status Quo;19
1.5.2;1.2 Structural Realism: An Overview of the Philosophical Sources;21
1.5.2.1;1.2.1 Poincaré’s Structural Realism and the Physics of the Principles;21
1.5.2.2;1.2.2 Cassirer's Structural Realism and the Architectonic of Scientific Knowledge;23
1.5.2.3;1.2.3 Russell’s Structural Realism and the Legacy of Reference;24
1.5.3;1.3 The Newman Problem as a Problem About Reference;25
1.5.4;1.4 A Neo-Kantian Perspective;27
1.5.4.1;1.4.1 Pauli’s Exclusion Principle Between Fermions and Parafermions;29
1.5.4.2;1.4.2 Bohr Versus Einstein on Physical Reality;31
1.5.5;1.5 How Mathematical Structures Cash Out Truth: Revisiting the Fresnel–Maxwell Case;34
1.5.6;1.6 Conclusion;38
1.5.7;References;40
1.6;Chapter 2: In Defence of Ontic Structural Realism;42
1.6.1;2.1 Introduction;42
1.6.2;2.2 ESR Versus OSR;44
1.6.3;2.3 Through Thick and Thin;45
1.6.4;2.4 Theory Change and Representation;48
1.6.5;2.5 OSR and Intrinsic Properties;50
1.6.6;2.6 OSR and Causation;52
1.6.7;2.7 Conclusion;57
1.6.8;References;57
1.7;Chapter 3: Structuralist Approaches to Physics: Objects, Models and Modality;60
1.7.1;3.1 Introduction;60
1.7.2;3.2 The Semantic View of Theories: Three Modifications;61
1.7.3;3.3 Structuralism and the Semantic View of Theories: Presenting Kinds of Objects;65
1.7.4;3.4 Structuralism About Objects;66
1.7.5;3.5 Realism and the Semantic View of Theories;68
1.7.5.1;3.5.1 A Proliferation of Models;69
1.7.5.2;3.5.2 Scientific Realism;70
1.7.5.3;3.5.3 Structural Realism;72
1.7.6;3.6 Realism and Modality;75
1.7.6.1;3.6.1 Particular Models, and the Place of Modality;76
1.7.6.2;3.6.2 Generic Models, and the Place of Modality;79
1.7.7;3.7 Concluding Discussion;80
1.7.8;References;82
1.8;Chapter 4: Mathematical Structural Realism;83
1.8.1;4.1 Varieties of Realism;83
1.8.2;4.2 A Coherent Structural Realism;85
1.8.3;4.3 What Mathematics Contributes;87
1.8.4;4.4 An Objection;89
1.8.5;4.5 An Appeal to Limits;91
1.8.6;4.6 Problems for Limited Realism;93
1.8.7;References;94
1.9;Chapter 5: Structural Empiricism, Again1;96
1.9.1;5.1 What Is Structural Realism?;96
1.9.2;5.2 Problems for Structural Realism;97
1.9.2.1;5.2.1 A Metaphysical Problem: The Nature of Structure;97
1.9.2.2;5.2.2 Structural Realism About What?;104
1.9.2.3;5.2.3 Structural Losses and Scientific Change;109
1.9.2.4;5.2.4 Putnam’s Paradox Revamped;110
1.9.3;5.3 An Alternative: Structural Empiricism;111
1.9.4;5.4 Conclusion;115
1.9.5;References;116
1.10;Chapter 6: Structural Realism: Continuity and Its Limits;119
1.10.1;6.1 Introduction;119
1.10.2;6.2 Not All Structures Are Preserved;121
1.10.3;6.3 Not All Preserved Structures Are Intact;122
1.10.4;6.4 Not All Structures Have Predecessors;125
1.10.5;6.5 Kuhn Loss;125
1.10.6;6.6 Inferences from Preservation;128
1.10.7;6.7 Conclusion;130
1.10.8;References;130
1.11;Chapter 7: Structuralism About Scientific Representation*;132
1.11.1;7.1 Introduction;132
1.11.2;7.2 Structuralisms;133
1.11.3;7.3 Structure;134
1.11.3.1;7.3.1 Three Notions of Structure;135
1.11.3.2;7.3.2 Formal Notions of Structure;138
1.11.4;7.4 Explicating Vehicle Structuralism;141
1.11.4.1;7.4.1 Representation Via Structured Objects;141
1.11.4.2;7.4.2 Structure Without a Structured Object;145
1.11.5;7.5 Vehicle Structuralism and Content Structuralism;148
1.11.6;7.6 Structural Realism, and the Semantic View;151
1.11.7;References;154
1.12;Chapter 8: Ontic Structural Realism as a Metaphysics of Objects*;155
1.12.1;8.1 Introduction;155
1.12.2;8.2 Ontological Primacy and Ontological Dependence;157
1.12.3;8.3 A Conceptual in Contrast to an Ontological Distinction;162
1.12.4;8.4 OSR and Intrinsic Properties;166
1.12.5;8.5 OSR and Modality;167
1.12.6;References;169
1.13;Chapter 9: Scientific Explanation and Scientific Structuralism;172
1.13.1;9.1 Introduction;172
1.13.2;9.2 Structural Explanations and Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Relations;173
1.13.3;9.3 A Crucial Objection: Are Structural Explanations Genuine Explanations?;176
1.13.4;9.4 Entangled States and Non-locality;179
1.13.5;9.5 Structural Explanations, the D-N Model, and Explanations by Unification;183
1.13.6;9.6 Structural Explanations and Structural Realism;185
1.13.7;References;187
1.14;Index;188