Benhabib / Bisin Handbook of Social Economics

1. Auflage 2010
ISBN: 978-0-08-093244-6
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: EPUB
Kopierschutz: 6 - ePub Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 940 Seiten

Reihe: Handbooks in Economics

How can economists define social preferences and interactions? Culture, familial beliefs, religion, and other sources contain the origins of social preferences.  Those preferences--the desire for social status, for instance, or the disinclination to receive financial support--often accompany predictable economic outcomes.  Through the use of new economic data and tools, our contributors survey an array of social interactions and decisions that typify homo economicus.  Their work brings order to the sometimes conflicting claims that countries, environments, beliefs, and other influences make on our economic decisions. - Describes recent scholarship on social choice and introduces new evidence about social preferences - Advances our understanding about quantifying social interactions and the effects of culture - Summarizes research on theoretical and applied economic analyses of social preferences

Autoren/Hrsg.

Benhabib, Jess

Bisin, Alberto

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Front Cover;1
2;Handbook of Social Economics;4
3;Copyright;5
4;Contents-Volume 1A;6
5;Contents-Volume 1B;12
6;Contributors;16
7;Chapter: Social Economics: A Brief Introduction to the Handbook;18
7.1;Social Preferences;19
7.2;Social Actions;20
7.3;Peer and Neighborhood Effects;21
7.4;References;22
8;Part One: Social Preferences;24
8.1;Chapter 1: Nature and Nurture Effects On Children´s Outcomes: What Have We Learned From Studies of Twin;25
8.1.1;I. Introduction and Overview;26
8.1.2;II. The Behavioral Genetics Model44Large portions of the text here are copied from Sacerdote [2007].;29
8.1.3;III. Canonical Results from the Behavioral Genetics Literature;32
8.1.4;IV. Critiques and Challenges to Interpretation of the Behavioral Genetics Results on IQ and Schooling;38
8.1.5;V. Treatment Effects and Regression Coefficients;41
8.1.6;VI. Results from Economics on Adoptees;43
8.1.7;VII. Putting It All Together: What Does It Mean?;49
8.1.8;References;50
8.1.9;Further Readings;53
8.2;Chapter 2: Social Norms and Preferences, Chapter for the Handbook for Social Economics;55
8.2.1;1. Introduction11This paper is a discussion of how one can accommodate social aspects of a society in an economic analysis. I;56
8.2.2;2. The Social Determinants of Preferences;59
8.2.3;3. Reduced Form Preferences: Social Concerns;64
8.2.4;4. Why Not Take the Indirect Preferences as the Primitive?3737The material in this section draws heavily on Postlewaite (1998;77
8.2.5;5. Examples Employing Instrumental Concern for Rank;82
8.2.6;6. Concluding Remarks;87
8.2.7;References;89
8.3;Chapter 3: Preferences for Status: Evidence and Economic Implications;93
8.3.1;1. Introduction;94
8.3.2;2. Features of Status;96
8.3.3;3. Evidence;99
8.3.4;4. Some Economic Implications;108
8.3.5;5. Conclusion;112
8.3.6;References;113
8.4;Chapter 4: Preferences for Redistribution;117
8.4.1;1. Introduction;118
8.4.2;2. Preferences for Redistribution: Theory;120
8.4.3;3. Empirical Evidence;127
8.4.4;4. Conclusions;151
8.4.5;References;153
8.5;Chapter 5: Theories of Statistical Discrimination and Affirmative Action: A Survey;157
8.5.1;1. Introduction;158
8.5.2;2. The Use of Group Averages as a Proxy for Relevant Variables: the Exogenous Differences Literature;161
8.5.3;3. Discriminatory Outcomes as a Result of Coordination Failure;164
8.5.4;4. Discriminatory Outcomes Due to Inter-Group Interactions;171
8.5.5;5. Dynamic Models of Discrimination;186
8.5.6;6. Affirmative Action;187
8.5.7;7. Efficiency Implications of Statistical Discrimination;215
8.5.8;8. Conclusion;219
8.5.9;References;221
8.6;Chapter 6: Social Construction of Preferences: Advertising;225
8.6.1;1. Introduction;226
8.6.2;2. The Benchmark Economy;228
8.6.3;3. The Equilibrium Effects of Advertising;230
8.6.4;4. The Effects of Advertising in Empirical Work;235
8.6.5;5. Conclusions;242
8.6.6;References;243
8.7;Chapter 7: The Evolutionary Foundations of Preferences;245
8.7.1;1. Introduction;246
8.7.2;2. Evolutionary Foundations;249
8.7.3;3. What Sort of Preferences?;259
8.7.4;4. Preferences over What?;287
8.7.5;5. Concluding Remark;321
8.7.6;6. Proofs;322
8.7.7;References;329
8.8;Chapter 8: Social Norms;335
8.8.1;1. Background;336
8.8.2;2. Norms, Customs, and Conventions;337
8.8.3;3. Characteristic Features of Norm Dynamics;338
8.8.4;4. Social Interactions and Social Norms;341
8.8.5;5. A Model of Norm Dynamics;342
8.8.6;6. Contractual Norms in Agriculture;345
8.8.7;7. Medical Treatment Norms;351
8.8.8;8. Body Weight Norms;355
8.8.9;9. Concluding Discussion;358
8.8.10;References;360
8.8.11;Further Reading;362
8.9;Chapter 9: The Economics of Cultural Transmission and Socialization;363
8.9.1;1. Introduction;364
8.9.2;2. Theoretical Studies;366
8.9.3;3. Empirical Studies;395
8.9.4;4. Conclusions;431
8.9.5;References;431
8.10;Chapter 10: Civic Capital as the Missing Link;441
8.10.1;Introduction;442
8.10.2;1. Definitions of Social Capital;444
8.10.3;2. Accumulation and Depreciation of Civic Capital;447
8.10.4;3. Measuring Civic Capital;453
8.10.5;4. The Origins of Civic Capital;483
8.10.6;5. The Economic Effects of Civic Capital;491
8.10.7;6. Conclusions;500
8.10.8;References;501
8.11;Chapter 11: Does Culture Matter?;505
8.11.1;1. Introduction;506
8.11.2;2. Some Preliminaries;507
8.11.3;3. The Epidemiological Approach;513
8.11.4;4. The Epidemiological Literature in Economics;521
8.11.5;5. Concluding Questions and Remarks;530
8.11.6;Acknowledgement;532
8.11.7;References;532
9;Part Two: Social Actions;535
9.1;Chapter 12: An Overview of Social Networks and Economic Applications;536
9.1.1;1. Introduction;537
9.1.2;2. Social Networks and Networked Markets;539
9.1.3;3. The Structure of Social Networks;546
9.1.4;4. Network Formation;557
9.1.5;5. Modeling the Impact of Networks;575
9.1.6;6. Concluding Remarks;599
9.1.7;References;599
9.1.8;Further Readings;607
9.2;Chapter 13: Local Interactions;612
9.2.1;1. Introduction;613
9.2.2;2. Static Models;614
9.2.3;3. Dynamic Models;643
9.2.4;4. Concluding Remarks;663
9.2.5;References;664
9.2.6;Further Readings;669
9.3;Chapter 14: Diffusion, Strategic Interaction, and Social Structure;670
9.3.1;1. Introduction;671
9.3.2;2. Empirical Background: Social Networks and Diffusion;672
9.3.3;3. Models of Diffusion and Strategic Interaction Absent Network Structure;678
9.3.4;4. Models of Diffusion and Strategic Interaction in Network Settings;682
9.3.5;5. Closing Notes;699
9.3.6;References;700
9.4;Chapter 15: Learning in Networks;704
9.4.1;1. Introduction;705
9.4.2;2. Nonstrategic Interaction;709
9.4.3;3. Strategic Interaction;729
9.4.4;4. Concluding Remarks;746
9.4.5;5. Appendix;748
9.4.6;References;749
9.4.7;Further Readings;752
9.5;Chapter 16: Formation of Networks and Coalitions;754
9.5.1;1. Introduction;755
9.5.2;2. One-Stage Models of Coalition and Network Formation;756
9.5.3;3. Sequential Models of Coalition and Network Formation;771
9.5.4;4. Farsightedness;779
9.5.5;5. Group Formation in Real Time;787
9.5.6;6. The Tension between Efficiency and Stability;796
9.5.7;7. Conclusions and Open Problems;799
9.5.8;References;801
9.5.9;Further Reading;804
9.6;Chapter 17: Matching, Allocation, and Exchange of Discrete Resources;806
9.6.1;Introduction;808
9.6.2;2. House Allocation and Exchange Models;811
9.6.3;3. Kidney Exchange;826
9.6.4;4. School Admissions;846
9.6.5;5. Axiomatic Mechanisms and Market Design;862
9.6.6;6. Concluding Remarks;869
9.6.7;References;873
10;Index-Volume 1A;878
11;Index-Volume 1B;918