E-Book, Englisch, 459 Seiten, eBook
Beimborn Cooperative Sourcing
2008
ISBN: 978-3-8350-5588-9
Verlag: Betriebswirtschaftlicher Verlag Gabler
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark
Simulation Studies and Empirical Data on Outsourcing Coalitions in the Banking Industry
E-Book, Englisch, 459 Seiten, eBook
ISBN: 978-3-8350-5588-9
Verlag: Betriebswirtschaftlicher Verlag Gabler
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark
Daniel Beimborn develops a formal model in order to explore cooperative sourcing activities in the banking industry. Together with survey data from the German banking industry, the model is used in simulation studies which allow for compound analyses of causes and effects of cooperative sourcing.
Dr. Daniel Beimborn promovierte bei Prof. Dr. Wolfgang König am Institut für Wirtschaftsinformatik an der Universität Frankfurt am Main. Er ist als Wissenschaftlicher Assistent von Prof. Dr. Tim Weitzel an der Universität Bamberg tätig.
Zielgruppe
Research
Weitere Infos & Material
1;Foreword;6
2;Foreword;8
3;Preface;9
4;Table of Contents;11
5;Variables and Symbols ;16
6;Abbreviations;21
7;1 Introduction;26
7.1;1.1 Cooperative Sourcing in the Banking Industry;28
7.2;1.2 Motivation and Research Questions;29
7.3;1.3 Theoretical Foundation and Methodology;33
7.4;1.4 Contribution and Main Findings;36
7.5;1.5 Basic Terms;42
7.5.1;1.5.1 Processes, Activities, Business Functions, and the Value Chain;42
7.5.2;1.5.2 Interorganizational Relationships;43
7.5.3;1.5.3 Outsourcing and Cooperative Sourcing;44
7.5.4;1.5.4 Financial Service Firms;47
7.6;1.6 Thesis Structure;50
8;2 Theoretical Foundation and Related Research;52
8.1;2.1 Theoretical Foundation for Cooperative Sourcing Research;52
8.1.1;2.1.1 Production Cost Economics;54
8.1.2;2.1.2 Transaction Cost Economics;62
8.1.3;2.1.3 Agency Theory;71
8.1.4;2.1.4 Theory of Incomplete Contracts;76
8.1.5;2.1.5 Porter’s Positioning Framework;79
8.1.6;2.1.6 Resource-Based View and Core Competence View;81
8.1.7;2.1.7 Resource Dependency Theory;88
8.1.8;2.1.8 Relationship Theories;90
8.1.9;2.1.9 Network Effect Theory;96
8.1.10;2.1.10 A Multi-Theoretical Perspective on Cooperative Sourcing;98
8.2;2.2 Outsourcing Research;105
8.2.1;2.2.1 Overview;105
8.2.2;2.2.2 Outsourcing Drivers and Inhibitors;107
8.2.3;2.2.3 Formal Models in the Context of Outsourcing;121
8.2.4;2.2.4 Summary;123
9;3 Cooperative Sourcing in the Banking Industry;124
9.1;3.1 Current Situation in the German Banking Industry;125
9.1.1;3.1.1 Structural Deficits in the German Banking Industry;125
9.1.2;3.1.2 Current Tendencies;132
9.2;3.2 Segmentation in the Banking Industry;137
9.2.1;3.2.1 Generic Value Chain of the Banking Industry;137
9.2.2;3.2.2 Segmentation Models;140
9.3;3.3 Credit Process as Application Domain;145
9.3.1;3.3.1 Overview of the Credit Market;146
9.3.2;3.3.2 Reference Processes for Process-Based Empirical Research;149
9.3.3;3.3.3 Credit Business Segmentation Model;156
9.4;3.4 Cooperative Sourcing in the German Banking Industry;162
9.4.1;3.4.1 General Trends;162
9.4.2;3.4.2 Outsourcing of Particular Business Processes;166
9.4.3;3.4.3 Outsourcing of Credit Processes;171
9.5;3.5 Regulatory Issues;177
9.5.1;3.5.1 General Requirements Related to BPO;177
9.5.2;3.5.2 Specific Requirements for Credit Process Outsourcing;183
9.6;3.6 Empirical Evidence in the German Credit Business;185
9.6.1;3.6.1 Demographics;187
9.6.2;3.6.2 Characteristics of the Credit Process;191
9.6.3;3.6.3 BPO Potential of the SME Credit Processes;225
9.7;3.7 Summary;244
10;4 Developing a Formal Model for Cooperative Sourcing;246
10.1;4.1 Justification of Model Development;246
10.2;4.2 Derivation of the Cooperative Sourcing Model ( CSM);248
10.2.1;4.2.1 Actors and Business Functions;248
10.2.2;4.2.2 Business Neighborhood;252
10.2.3;4.2.3 Cooperative Sourcing;255
10.3;4.3 Centralized Model: Global Optimization;268
10.4;4.4 Decentralized Model: Autonomous Actor Decisions;272
10.5;4.5 Extending the Model by Legal and Regulatory Issues;278
10.6;4.6 Summary;280
11;5 Analytical and Simulative Studies;281
11.1;5.1 Game-Theoretical Analysis of Cooperative Sourcing;281
11.1.1;5.1.1 Basic Concepts from Cooperative Game Theory;282
11.1.2;5.1.2 Allocation Mechanisms;284
11.1.3;5.1.3 Model;285
11.1.4;5.1.4 Analysis;287
11.1.5;5.1.5 Experiment;295
11.1.6;5.1.6 Conclusion;299
11.2;5.2 A Genetic Algorithm for Solving the CSP;300
11.2.1;5.2.1 Basics;301
11.2.2;5.2.2 GA Design;302
11.2.3;5.2.3 Configuration;306
11.3;5.3 Simulation Studies;307
11.3.1;5.3.1 Agent-based Simulations as Research Approach;307
11.3.2;5.3.2 Simulation Procedure;310
11.3.3;5.3.3 Parameterization;314
11.3.4;5.3.4 Simulation Results;325
12;6 Conclusion;409
12.1;6.1 Summary of the Findings;409
12.2;6.2 Contributions;422
12.2.1;6.2.1 Implications for Theory;422
12.2.2;6.2.2 Managerial Implications;425
12.3;6.3 Validation of the Research Approach;428
12.4;6.4 Limitations;433
12.5;6.5 Further Research;437
13;References;442
14;Appendix;478
14.1;A1 – Performance Tests of the Genetic Algorithm;478
14.2;A2 – Parameterization of the Simulation Studies;482
Theoretical Foundation and Related Research.- Cooperative Sourcing in the Banking Industry.- Developing a Formal Model for Cooperative Sourcing.- Analytical and Simulative Studies.- Conclusion.
2.1.3.2 Implications for the Sourcing (S. 49-50)
Decision Applying agency theory to the context of outsourcing requires the transformation of the principal/agent relationship to an outsourcer/sourcing provider relationship (Gellrich et al. 2005). From an AT perspective, the principal has to choose between an inter-firm and an intra-firm agency relationship. AT insights regarding the outsourcing relationship can be distinguished by the following perspectives: Ex ante (or: pre-outsourcing): The selection of an unsuitable vendor has to be avoided. Information about the vendor’s capabilities is only partially available to the potential outsourcer (hidden characteristics), provoking adverse selection (Akerlof 1970).
Ex post: After establishing the sourcing partnership, problems of hidden action or moral hazard and hold-up have to be prevented (Schott 1997). As pointed out earlier, the outsourcer has to choose between implementing an information system (monitoring) and outcome-based contracting (including positive and negative benefits) to insure incentive compatibility. Consequently, outsourcing a business function usually raises agency costs because, in most cases, it is easier to control efforts within the firm than to monitor autonomous business partners (Williamson 1990, 134), due to more easily implementable controlling and incentive instruments (Alchian and Demsetz 1972).
By contrast, sometimes measurement problems and opportunistic behavior exist within a firm, which actually leads to outsourcing (Wang 2002). The problem of hidden characteristics is generally insignificant because many specific investments are necessary in most cases and the market of sourcing providers in a wide range of fields is quite clearly set out (Schott 1997, 187). Investments in outsourcing relationships increase specificity and therefore include signal quality. If a service provider did not have the necessary clout and capability, it would be detrimental for him to undertake a too great business risk. Another way the sourcing provider can (help to) reduce the outsourcer’s risks resulting from hidden characteristics and hidden action is by taking over equity of the outsourcer (Cunningham and Fröschl 1995).
Or, often related to outsourcing deals in the banking industry, the sourcing provider places deposits in the customer bank (Schott 1997). Other bonding activities such as implementing one’s own control and logging systems or using standardized resources (to facilitate an exit option for the outsourcer) are also common in order to raise the outsourcer’s trust in the partnership. As already discussed in the section on TCE, the implementation of interorganizational information systems (IOS) leads to a reduction of coordination costs (p. 45). From an AT perspective, these IOS represent (at least partially) the implementation of monitoring capabilities which can reduce the risk of opportunistic behavior.
Furthermore, the problem of hidden action might be significantly less problematic in the context of cooperative sourcing. Since the insourcing firm provides the same services to the outsourcers as well as to itself, an inherent congruence of interests does already exist. Moreover, since the outsourcer in a cooperative sourcing scenario knows a lot about the outsourced business function, the level of uncertainty will be lower. The formal models based on PAT show that the less risk-averse entity has to bear the risk.
