Logical Pluralism

Erscheinungsjahr 2005
ISBN: 978-0-19-928841-0
Verlag: OUP Oxford

Buch, Englisch, 152 Seiten, Print PDF, Format (B × H): 140 mm x 216 mm, Gewicht: 201 g

Consequence is at the heart of logic; an account of consequence, of what follows from what, offers a vital tool in the evaluation of arguments. Since philosophy itself proceeds by way of argument and inference, a clear view of what logical consequence amounts to is of central importance to the whole discipline.

In this book JC Beall and Greg Restall present and defend what thay call logical pluralism, arguing that the notion of logical consequence doesn't pin down one deductive consequence relation; it allows for many of them. In particular, they argue that broadly classical, intuitionistic, and relevant accounts of deductive logic are genuine logical consequence relations; we should not search for one true logic, since there are many. Their conclusions have profound implications for many linguists as well as for philosophers.

Zielgruppe

Scholars and students of philosophy, logicians

Autoren/Hrsg.

Beall, J. C.

Beall, JC

Restall, Greg

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Sprachphilosophie
• Geisteswissenschaften Sprachwissenschaft Sprachwissenschaften Sprachphilosophie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Philosophische Logik, Argumentationstheorie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

- I. Preliminaries

- 1: Introduction

- 2: Logical Consequence

- 3: Pluralism Defined

- II. Logics

- 4: Classical Logic

- 5: Relevant Logic

- 6: Constructive Logic

- 7: Variations and Loose Ends

- III. Objections, Replies, Other Directions

- 8: General Objections

- 9: Specific Objections

- 10: Other Directions

Über Autor(innen)

JC Beall, University of Connecticut and Greg Restall, University of Melbourne