Buch, Englisch, 75 Seiten, Format (B × H): 148 mm x 226 mm, Gewicht: 154 g
Buch, Englisch, 75 Seiten, Format (B × H): 148 mm x 226 mm, Gewicht: 154 g
Reihe: Elements in Philosophy of Law
ISBN: 978-1-009-28830-9
Verlag: Cambridge University Press
This Element defends and clarifies the thesis that the legality of a system of rules depends on its moral features. Positivists who deny this dependence struggle to explain: (1) the traditional classification of moral norms as a form of a priori law; (2) judicial reliance on moral norms in legal discovery; (3) persistent theoretical disagreement about intra-systemic, law-determining facts; (4) why radically arbitrary or immoral schemes of social organization represent borderline cases of law; and (5) why law, like other artifacts, can be evaluated in a kind-relative sense (“as law”). Meanwhile, traditional versions of non-positivism overstate the dependence going further than the desiderata warrant. A moderate theory is formulated: law is an artifact whose existence depends on adequately performing an essentially normative function. The theory's justification lies in its explanatory power: a comparison with other “value-driven” artifacts, such as artworks, proves vital for understanding legal language, reasoning, and practice.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Weitere Infos & Material
1. Introduction: subject matter and methodology; 2. The argument against positivism; 3. How to be a legal non-positivist; 4. Outstanding questions; References.
