Arvan Rightness as Fairness

A Moral and Political Theory
1. Auflage 2016
ISBN: 978-1-137-54181-9
Verlag: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 282 Seiten

Moral philosophy today is marked by profound, systematic disagreement. In Rightness as Fairness, Marcus Arvan argues that moral philosophy must adapt scientific principles of theory-selection in order to reliably uncover moral truth. Arvan then argues that our best empirical evidence and naturalistic observation reveal morality to be a type of prudence requiring us to act in ways that our present and future selves can rationally agree upon across time. Arvan shows that this agreement-Rightness as Fairness-requires us to be fair to ourselves and to others, including animals. Further, the Four Principles of Fairness comprising this agreement reconcile a variety of traditionally opposed moral and political frameworks. Finally, provides a uniquely fruitful method for resolving applied moral and political issues: a method of 'principled fair negotiation' that requires merging principled debate with real-world negotiation.

Marcus Arvan is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Tampa, US. He works primarily in ethics and social-political philosophy, as well as metaphysics and philosophy of science. His work has appeared in various journals including Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, Philosophical Psychology, and The Philosophical Forum.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Arvan, Marcus

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Cover;1
2;Half-Title;2
3;Title;3
4;Copyright;4
5;Dedication;5
6;Contents;6
7;Acknowledgments;10
8;Introduction;11
9;1 Ethics for the Twenty-First Century;19
9.1;1 Distinguishing truth from seeming truth;20
9.2;2 Seven principles of theory selection;23
9.2.1;2.1 Firm Foundations;24
9.2.2;2.2 Internal Coherence;27
9.2.3;2.3 External Coherence;28
9.2.4;2.4 Explanatory Power;30
9.2.5;2.5 Unity;31
9.2.6;2.6 Parsimony;31
9.2.7;2.7 Fruitfulness;33
9.3;3 The case for instrumentalism;34
9.3.1;3.1 The firmest foundation;34
9.3.2;3.2 The promise of parsimony, unity, explanatory power, and fruitfulness;37
9.3.3;3.3 Advantages over alternatives;40
9.3.3.1;3.3.1 Advantages over intuitionism;40
9.3.3.2;3.3.2 Advantages over reflective equilibrium;41
9.3.3.3;3.3.3 Advantages over moral language analysis;42
9.3.3.4;3.3.4 Advantages over constitutivism;43
9.3.3.5;3.3.5 Advantages over second- and third-personalism;43
9.3.3.6;3.3.6 Advantages over Sterba’s dialecticalism;44
9.3.3.7;3.3.7 Conclusion;45
9.4;4 Disarming initial concerns;46
9.4.1;4.1 The wrong kinds of reasons?;46
9.4.2;4.2 Not a firm foundation?;46
9.4.3;4.3 Unconvincing and artificial?;47
9.4.4;4.4 Three promissory notes;48
9.4.4.1;4.4.1 Not the wrong kinds of reasons?;48
9.4.4.2;4.4.2 Firm foundations after all?;50
9.4.4.3;4.4.3 Intuitive and convincing?;50
9.5;5 Conclusion;51
10;2 The Problem of Possible Future Selves;52
10.1;1 Our capacities to care about our past and future;54
10.2;2 The problem of possible future selves;57
10.2.1;2.1 Possible futures;61
10.2.2;2.2 Possible psychologies;63
10.2.3;2.3 Possible choices;66
10.2.4;2.4 A very real problem;74
10.3;3 Morality as the solution?;75
10.4;4 Is the problem too contingent?;77
10.5;5 Two nonsolutions;81
10.5.1;5.1 Nonsolution 1: probable futures;81
10.5.2;5.2 Nonsolution 2: diachronic motivational consistency;82
10.6;6 Conclusion: an unsolved problem;84
11;3 The Categorical-Instrumental Imperative;85
11.1;1 Interests in diachronic cooperation;89
11.2;2 Three types of interests;95
11.2.1;2.1 Involuntary interests;96
11.2.2;2.2 Semivoluntary interests;98
11.2.3;2.3 Voluntary interests;100
11.3;3 The Categorical-Instrumental Imperative;101
11.4;4 Just conscience?;120
11.5;5 An intuitive solution to the problem of possible future selves?;121
11.6;6 Conclusion;125
12;4 Three Unified Formulations;126
12.1;1 The Humanity and Sentience Formulation;128
12.1.1;1.1 Possible other-human-regarding interests;131
12.1.2;1.2 Possible nonhuman-animal-regarding interests;134
12.1.3;1.3 Possible sentient-being-regarding interests;136
12.1.4;1.4 Derivation of the Humanity and Sentience Formulation;137
12.2;2 The Kingdom of Human and Sentient Ends Formulation;138
12.3;3 Advantages over Kantian ethics;140
12.3.1;3.1 Firmer foundations;141
12.3.2;3.2 Greater internal coherence;143
12.3.3;3.3 Greater external coherence;143
12.3.4;3.4 Greater explanatory power, unity, and parsimony;147
12.3.5;3.5 Greater fruitfulness;147
12.4;4 Conclusion;148
13;5 The Moral Original Position;150
13.1;1 Rawls’ Original Position;151
13.1.1;1.1 Rawls’ Kantian rationale;152
13.1.2;1.2 Rawls’ reflective equilibrium rationale;153
13.1.3;1.3 Rawls’ public reason rationale;154
13.2;2 Some common critiques;154
13.2.1;2.1 Kantian critiques;154
13.2.2;2.2 Reflective equilibrium critiques;155
13.2.3;2.3 Public reason critiques;155
13.3;3 The case for a Moral Original Position;156
13.4;4 Corroborating the critiques;159
13.4.1;4.1 Corroborating Kantian critiques;159
13.4.2;4.2 Corroborating reflective equilibrium critiques;160
13.4.3;4.3 Corroborating public reason critiques;161
13.5;5 Conclusion;161
14;6 Rightness as Fairness;163
14.1;1 Derivation of Four Principles of Fairness;165
14.1.1;1.1 The Principle of Negative Fairness;165
14.1.2;1.2 The Principle of Positive Fairness;176
14.1.3;1.3 The Principle of Fair Negotiation;178
14.1.4;1.4 The Principle of Virtues of Fairness;186
14.2;2 Rightness as Fairness: a unified standard of right and wrong;188
14.3;3 Rightness as Fairness in practice: principled fair negotiation;194
14.3.1;3.1 Kant’s four cases;196
14.3.2;3.2 How numbers should count: trolleys, torture, and organ donors;198
14.3.3;3.3 World poverty;204
14.3.4;3.4 Distribution of scarce medical resources;206
14.3.5;3.5 The ethical treatment of animals;208
14.4;4 Conclusion;210
15;7 Libertarian Egalitarian Communitarianism;212
15.1;1 Libertarianism, Egalitarianism, and Communitarianism;213
15.1.1;1.1 Libertarianism: attractions and critiques;213
15.1.2;1.2 Egalitarianism: attractions and critiques;214
15.1.3;1.3 Communitarianism: attractions and critiques;215
15.2;2 The case for Libertarian Egalitarian Communitarianism;216
15.3;3 Additional advantages;222
15.3.1;3.1 (Qualified) fair negotiation over divisiveness;222
15.3.2;3.2 Resolving the scope and requirements of justice;224
15.3.3;3.3 Resolving the ideal-nonideal theory distinction;226
15.4;4 Conclusion;227
16;8 Evaluating Rightness as Fairness;228
16.1;1 Firmer foundations;228
16.2;2 Greater internal coherence;230
16.3;3 Greater external coherence;232
16.4;4 Greater explanatory power;234
16.5;5 Greater unity;236
16.6;6 Greater parsimony;236
16.7;7 Greater fruitfulness;237
16.8;8 Conclusion;239
17;E1;240
18;Notes;241
19;Bibliography;254
20;Index;270