From Value to Rightness

Consequentialism, Action-Guidance, and the Perspective-Dependence of Moral Duties
1. Auflage 2024
ISBN: 978-0-367-70384-4
Verlag: Routledge

Buch, Englisch, 186 Seiten, Format (B × H): 152 mm x 229 mm, Gewicht: 282 g

Reihe: Routledge Studies in Ethics and Moral Theory

This book develops an original version of act-consequentialism. It argues that act-consequentialists should adopt a subjective criterion of rightness.

The book develops new arguments which strongly suggest that, according to the best version of act-consequentialism, the rightness of actions depends on expected rather than actual value. Its findings go beyond the debate about consequentialism and touch on important debates in normative ethics and metaethics. The distinction between criterion of rightness and decision procedures addresses how, why, and in which sense moral theories must be implemented by ordinary persons. The discussion of the rationales of "ought" implies "can" leads to the discovery of a hitherto overlooked moral principle, "ought" implies "evidence", which can be used to show that most prominent moral theories are false. Finally, in the context of discussing cases that are supposed to reveal intuitions that favour either objective or subjective consequentialism, the book argues that which cases are relevant for the discussion of objectivism and subjectivism depends on the type of moral theory we are concerned with (consequentialism, Kantianism, virtue ethics, etc.).

From Value to Rightness will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in normative ethics and metaethics.

Zielgruppe

Postgraduate and Undergraduate Advanced

Autoren/Hrsg.

Andri¿, Vuko

Andric, Vuko

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Ethik, Moralphilosophie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Philosophie: Allgemeines, Methoden
• Interdisziplinäres Wissenschaften Wissenschaften: Allgemeines Enzyklopädien, Nachschlagewerke, Wörterbücher
• Sozialwissenschaften Pädagogik Lehrerausbildung, Unterricht & Didaktik Allgemeine Didaktik

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Introduction

Part I. Decision-Guidance

1 The Problem of Decision-Guidance

2 DP and Objective Consequentialism’s Travesty of Decision-Guidance

Part II: "Ought" Implies "Can"

3 In Defence of "Ought" Implies "Can"

4 Objective Consequentialism and Ignorance-Induced Inability

5 Four Arguments Against Objective Consequentialism Related to "Ought" Implies "Can"

6 "Ought" Implies "Evidence"

7 Is Subjective Consequentialism Compatible with "Ought" Implies "Can"?

Part III: Intuitions about Perspective-Dependence

8 A New Perspective on the Perspective-Dependence of Moral Duties

9 Objective Consequentialism’s Licensing Dilemma

Conclusion

Über Autor(innen)

Vuko Andric is Lecturer at Bayreuth University, a researcher at the Institute for Futures Studies in Stockholm, and Feodor Lynen Research Fellow of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. His research focuses on consequentialism and has been published in international peer-reviewed journals such as Acta Analytica, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Erkenntnis, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, Journal of Global Ethics, Philosophical Studies, Philosophia, Ratio, Religious Studies, Thought, and Utilitas.