The Matter of Consciousness

From the Knowledge Argument to Russellian Monism
Erscheinungsjahr 2023
ISBN: 978-0-19-884045-9
Verlag: Oxford University Press

Buch, Englisch, 280 Seiten, Format (B × H): 162 mm x 239 mm, Gewicht: 596 g

Torin Alter presents a compelling defence of the 'knowledge argument' against physicalism, pioneered by Frank Jackson. According to physicalism, consciousness is a physical phenomenon. The knowledge argument stars Mary, who learns all objective, physical information through black-and-white media and yet acquires new information when she first sees colors for herself: information about what it is like to see in color. Based partly on that case, Jackson concludes that not all information is physical. Alter argues that the knowledge argument succeeds in refuting all standard versions of physicalism: versions on which consciousness is grounded by what objective science reveals. Alter also argues that given further, plausible assumptions, the knowledge argument leads to Russellian monism, according to which there are intrinsic properties that both constitute consciousness and underlie properties described by physics, such as mass and charge. Alter explains how the knowledge argument establishes those two conclusions and defend it against numerous objections.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Alter, Torin

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Metaphysik, Ontologie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Moderne Philosophische Disziplinen Philosophie des Geistes, Neurophilosophie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

- Part I: The case for the epistemic gap

- 1: Introduction

- 2: The significance of structure

- 3: Structure, physical knowledge, and ignorance

- 4: Phenomenal knowledge without experience

- 5: Non-propositional phenomenal knowledge

- 6: Phenomenal representation

- Part II: The case for the modal gap

- 7: Deduction and necessity

- 8: Epistemic-modal bridge principles

- 9: The phenomenal concept strategy and Chalmers's dilemma

- 10: Consequences of social externalism

- 11: The conditional analysis of phenomenal concepts

- Part III: The case for the ontological gap

- 12: The supervenience requirement on physicalism

- 13: Two final objections

- 14: Two final objections

- 15: The knowledge argument, Russellian monism, and causal integration

- Conclusion

Über Autor(innen)

Torin Alter is Professor of Philosophy at The University of Alabama, USA. He is author of articles in Mind, Philosophical Studies, and elsewhere; co-author of A Dialogue on Consciousness and The God Dialogues: A Philosophical Journey (both OUP); and co-editor of Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem: A Reader and Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism (both OUP).