E-Book, Englisch, 200 Seiten
Reihe: Chandos Asian Studies Series
A Chinese Perspective
E-Book, Englisch, 200 Seiten
Reihe: Chandos Asian Studies Series
ISBN: 978-1-78063-355-8
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: EPUB
Kopierschutz: 6 - ePub Watermark
Wu Shicun is President of the National Institute for the South China Sea Studies, a sole national-level think-tank in China specializing in South China Sea studies and a wellrespected expert in the field of the South China Sea Studies. His research focuses on history and geography on the South China Sea, ocean boundary delimitation, international relations and regional security issues. He has considerable expertise and numerous publications to his credit.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Weitere Infos & Material
1 Introduction
Abstract:
This chapter is an introduction to the whole book. After setting out the reasons why the author chose to write such a book, the chapter gives an overview of the disputes over the South China Sea and their evolution. It then discusses the causes of the South China Sea issues, and concludes with a sketch of the structure of the book. Key words South China Sea disputes Nansha Islands Taiping Dao The South China Sea (SCS) spans 3.5 million square kilometres, and is one of the largest semi-enclosed seas in the world. Rich in living and non-living resources and encompassing vital sea routes linking the Pacific and Indian Oceans (Wu, 2004: 69; Wu and Guo, 2004: 5), the SCS is rife with disputes among littoral states. As it is one of the three potential security flashpoints in the region, the SCS disputes must be handled with prudence.1 International conferences and security dialogues have been held to discuss the potential threats these disputes pose to regional peace and stability, especially the impacts caused by China’s swift rise, which has led to a shift of power balance in the region. Academics have explored many possible approaches. However, this book attempts to look at the problem from a different angle. Purpose and significance
Six parties have laid claims to the SCS, among which China is the strongest in terms of economic power and largest in geographical size. As such, China is considered by many as the key party to the SCS disputes, and ‘any solution has to be minimally acceptable to it’ (Valencia et al., 1999: 1). It is important to understand China’s perspectives with regard to the SCS disputes, and to study how China has approached the disputes visà-vis its neighbouring countries to predict its future moves. This book discusses the SCS disputes from a Chinese perspective by looking at various dimensions, including history, laws, international politics, economics, diplomacy and military affairs. The author hopes not only to demonstrate China’s official position on sovereignty and maritime disputes with regard to the SCS, but also to analyse the factors triggering the emergence and escalation of the SCS disputes. The author believes that the Nansha Islands (Nansha Qundao in Chinese; commonly called the Spratly Islands in English) are the crux of the SCS disputes; hence this book will focus on discussing the disputes relating to these islands. Where maritime claims are considered relevant to the disputes over the Nansha Islands (Nansha disputes), overlapping claims to maritime zones are described and explored. The book aims to expound the history of Nansha disputes between China and other countries to help readers better understand the Chinese perspective on the SCS complexities, including competition over sovereignty of the islets, the islands regime and its impact on maritime delimitation, overlapping maritime claims and how adjacent states may cooperate to exploit SCS resources. Although China and other claimants have tried to address the disputes, as countries have competed for energy resources, diplomatic rows and tensions have hampered a timely solution. Governments must now rely on their best wisdom to manage the disputes and create the climate for regional cooperation. Territorial and maritime disputes in the South China Sea
Geographic area
When referring to the various land formations in the SCS, most literature inevitably mentions three particular groups of islands and one submerged bank: Xisha Qundao, Nansha Qundao, Dongsha Qundao and Zhongsha Qundao (in English, the Paracel Islands, the Spratly Islands, the Pratas Islands and the Macclesfield Bank respectively).2 Another four island groups are situated in the SCS’s southwestern part: the Anambas, Badas, Natuna and Tambelan Islands. These islands have not attracted the same attention as the previous four groups because they are generally recognised as Indonesia’s sovereign territory (Li and Amer, 2012: 82). The Nansha Islands are the largest group in the SCS and consist of more than 230 islands, shoals, reefs and banks3 covering an area of 800,000 sq. km.4 In 1983 the Chinese Toponymy Committee publicised the approved names of 189 land formations, comprising 14 islands, six shoals, 113 submerged reefs, 35 underwater sandy beaches and 21 hidden shoals. All the formations are developed from corals, and, based on elevation above sea level, may be classified into five categories: banks, shoals, reefs, cays and sandy islands (Wu, 2005: 4–5). The location of the Nansha Islands was depicted in a reference book published by China’s Xinhua News Agency in 1991 and quoted by Dzurek (1996: 3): The Nansha Archipelago (in ancient times called Wanli Shitang) is located from 3°37’ to 11°55’ north latitude and 109°43´ to 117°47´ east longitude, stretching south to north approximately 550 nautical miles, and spreading east to west more than 650 nautical miles; its water-territory area exceeds 800,000 square kilometers. Also important is the SCS water body in which the island group is situated, for the eventual resolution of sovereignty of the land features will affect maritime delimitation among the countries surrounding the SCS. Two issues are likely to increase the tension between the disputants: first, resources in the waters and the seabed; and second, the importance of the SCS to security and trade in Asia, and even around the world. For the purpose of this book, any reference to the SCS includes the SCS proper and the adjacent water areas, which may be seen as natural extensions of the SCS. The SCS proper is bordered by China to the north, Vietnam to the west, peninsular Malaysia to the southwest, Brunei Darussalam and the two Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak to the south, and the Philippines to the east. The four areas of adjacent waters are the Gulf of Tonkin, located between Vietnam and China, the southern end of which connects to the SCS proper; the Gulf of Thailand, which lies between Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam, where the SCS proper flanks its east; the Sulu Sea, which lies between the island of Palawan, Sabah, the Sulu archipelago and the Visayas; and the Straits of Malacca. Disputes and their evolution
Disputes over the SCS involve many parties, as mentioned earlier, and the crux of the disputes is mainly sovereignty claims over the Nansha features by countries around the SCS. Before the late 1960s there was no apparent tension over the Nansha Islands, although their ownership was claimed by different dynasties and governments of both China and Vietnam. However, such claims often occurred without the knowledge of the other claimant and seldom did any party resort to force (Chao, 1989/1990: 152). Between the 1930s and 1950s ownership was frequently asserted by other claimants, such as France, Japan and occasionally a private Filipino. Since the 1970s the Philippines and Malaysia have joined the race (ibid.: 152–3). Disputes between the various countries were further complicated by the entitlement to a 200 nautical mile (nm) exclusive economic zone (EEZ) under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Brunei published a map of its continental shelf in 1988 to claim 200 nm of EEZ from its coast, from which it laid its claim over Louisa Reef (Nantong Jiao) and Rifleman Bank (Nanwei Tan) of the Nansha Islands as being located within its EEZ (Valencia et al., 1999: 38). Disputes over the political jurisdiction of the Nansha Islands escalated, as China, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Taiwan established continuous human presence on different small islands and some major reefs. Their military outposts and other facilities demonstrated their seriousness over their sovereignty claims (ibid.: 5). Competitive occupation of key features has increased, occurring sporadically since the 1950s as countries took turns to stake out their territorial claims to the Nansha Islands. So far, it is estimated that Vietnam has occupied 29 features in the islands, the Philippines eight and Malaysia five (Zhang et al., 2003: 5). Brunei claims sovereignty to Louisa Reef and Rifleman Bank, but has not established any physical presence there. China controls only eight features, with Taiwan occupying Taiping Dao (Itu Aba), the largest feature in the Nansha Islands. China’s sovereignty claim over the Nansha Islands involves a bilateral dispute with Vietnam for areas that are not claimed by other Southeast Asian countries and a multilateral dispute for areas that are claimed by Brunei, Malaysia and the Philippines (Nguyen and Amer, 2007: 310; Valencia et al., 1999: 8). Under the UNCLOS regime of the EEZ and the continental shelf, it is strategically important to gain sovereignty over any tiny land features of the Nansha Islands. If these features are proven legitimate under the regime of islands, they will generate their own EEZs and continental shelves. Therefore, even before the land features of the Nansha Islands are proven to be qualified to generate EEZs and continental shelves, potential overlapping claims over the waters around the Nansha Islands have become an issue, which certainly...
