E-Book, Englisch, 316 Seiten
Tucker / Bock / Rose Two States for Two Peoples?
1. Auflage 2023
ISBN: 978-94-92697-36-3
Verlag: Sallux Publishing
Format: EPUB
Kopierschutz: 6 - ePub Watermark
The Palestinian-Israeli conflict, international law and European Union policy
E-Book, Englisch, 316 Seiten
ISBN: 978-94-92697-36-3
Verlag: Sallux Publishing
Format: EPUB
Kopierschutz: 6 - ePub Watermark
The EU two-state policy concerning the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is failing, despite a half-century of strenuous EU efforts expending tens of billions of euros to implement it. The reality of policy failure is discomforting but must be acknowledged.Failure should provoke reflection: reasons need to be understood to avoid repeated mistakes and to construct a more successful policy for the future. The reasons for failure of the EU Two State Policy are serious but surprisingly obvious. At the base of the EU two-state policy lie 3 false assumptions of wishful thinking: the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is territorial and not existential; East Jerusalem and the West Bank legally belong to the Palestinians; and the establishment of a democratic Palestinian state at peace beside Israel is realistic and feasible.This report challenges these assumptions and makes recommendations for a new approach to enabling Palestinian autonomy, Israeli security and regional stability.Palestinian rights to self-determination must be respected, but they may not be allowed to conflict with the fair and non-discriminatory application of international law, nor be allowed to undermine Israeli sovereignty or regional stability. Peace will never be achieved through agendas aimed at destruction.The EU should focus on ensuring rejection of extremism and mutual acceptance; the fair and equal application of international law to all actors in the region; and strengthening institutions of government based on the rule of law. The authors of this report seek to stimulate vigorous debate on the EU approach to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and a better way forward for Europes engagement in the Middle East.
About the authorsProfessor Wolfgang Bock studied Law and Political Science at the Universities of Geneva, Giessen and Frankfurt/Main. He has worked as judge at the Frankfurt/Main regional Court, as lecturer at the Centre for Near and Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Marburg and as associate professor at the Justus Liebig University Giessen.Andrew Tucker is a graduate of the Universities of Melbourne (BA, LLB) and Oxford (BCL). He has over 20 years experience as an attorney in Australia, UK and Netherlands, advising governments and corporations mainly in the energy, transport and telecom sectors.He is co-founder of thinc.Gregory Rose is a Professor of Law at the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS) at the University of Wollongong, Australia. His expertise is in international law and his areas of research include international law relating to marine environmental governance and transnational environmental crime.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Weitere Infos & Material
PART III EU EFFORTS TO FOSTER INSTITUTIONS FOR STATEHOOD
95) EU interventions on the ground in the West Bank to foster Palestinian self-determination assume that the establishment of a peaceful and secure Palestinian state there is a feasible project. The EU assumes that Palestinians long for a democratic, freedom-based state along Western lines, and no doubt some do. The veracity of that generalization needs to be reviewed in light of the regional patterns of statehood, the political culture and structures in Palestinian society, and the continuing failure in Palestinian state-building despite extraordinary global funds expended and efforts exerted over many decades. Statehood in the Middle East based on force and struggle for mastership
96) Statehood in the MENA region is regularly based on (a) tribal cultures - individuals enjoying protection of their rights through the power of groups and families; (b) the reign of force - lacking the rule of law in legal culture, the strongest group becomes the most powerful and governs the political institutions; and (c) conservative religious ideologies. This kind of statehood neither guarantees an equal status of citizenship for everybody, nor is it based on separation of state and religion, nor does it protect the rule of law, equal basic rights and freedoms for everybody. 97) Except for Israel, no state in the Middle East has developed a legal culture based on the rule of law, equal rights of all citizens, and the political responsibility of governments. 98) The dynamics and forces structuring the Middle East political system may be best recognized by looking at the divisions of the Middle East along four large political camps: (1) Iran and its allies (in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Gaza); (2) Turkey (sometimes) and Qatar (permanently) in alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood (variously organized in most states in the Middle East); (3) Islamic State, Al Qaida and other Sunni Jihadist groups; and (4) Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states (except Qatar), Morocco and Tunisia. 99) The first three groups are based on extremist ideologies of mostly religious cultural, or totalitarian origin, where political ideas aim at supremacy, often connected with corrupt or criminal economic activities. These states and groups have a far-reaching negative impact on prospects for peace, as they fight the states of the fourth group and try to destroy every Western political influence. Not only do they reinforce Palestinian rejection of Israel, but they pose ongoing threats of destabilization and takeover by radical armed fighting groups of several other countries in the region. 100) In many states of the MENA region struggles for power between state institutions and extreme Muslim groups lead to elliptical foci of powers. Thus, groups propagating basic freedoms, rule of law, liberal values and democracy are caught between two mill stones. 101) In such political cultures democratic elections may be doubted as they can become a one-way street in the quest for power, allowing the victor to take everything. 102) Statehood per se should not be evaluated as positive simply because it achieves stability and seems to legitimize order. Rather, it is necessary to assess whether the internal structures of statehood in the long run are likely to promote or produce equal freedom and security for their citizens. Fundamental conditions of democracy need to be developed: a legal community self-organized by means of equal rights for everybody. 103) It should be noted that, throughout the Middle East, there are changes in economic and cultural conditions and orientations, related inter alia to a growing number of well-educated young people, changing perspectives on religion, changing relations between the sexes, the introduction of communications via the internet, and communication through arts. Also, there have been some fragile developments in the establishment of self-governing territories based on respect for ethnic and religious identity, such as the Autonomous Administration of North-East Syria and the autonomous province in Northern Iraq. 104) It is difficult to predict whether these cultural changes will lead to the development of political communities based on rule of law, equal rights and responsibility. They have not yet led to a Palestinian political culture aspiring to the rule of law and equal human rights for everybody. Palestinian political and legal culture
105) The Palestinian way of life in the West Bank never included state-building in the sense of a state along Western lines based on freedom and the rule of law. Strong families and clans, mostly bound to a traditional religious Islamic and Arabic culture of honor on local and regional level, generate patronage as a general model of authority. Leadership is constructed from the top down without republican or democratic elements, through politically centralized organizations. 106) The heartbeat of Palestinian politics throbs with the wish to destroy Israel. This is stimulated by the UNRWA system’s promise of a ‘right of return’ and the ongoing insistence of international anti-Zionist actors that Israel is illegitimate. The common core element of the various groups constituting the PLO (Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and others), Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and similar groups, is their declared political program to annihilate the State of Israel. This is evidenced by their political charters, deliberately ambiguous and conflicting territorial claims, education of children, TV programs, newspapers, military organizations, and political declarations in Arabic language. Hamas, governing the Gaza Strip since 2006, attacked Israel in 2008/2009, in 2012, in 2014, in 2021 and in 2022. The Palestine National Charter (as amended in 1968) denies the existence of the State of Israel and calls on ‘armed Palestinian revolution’ to liberate the whole of Palestine. For more than 30 years, polls have shown that Palestinian majorities believe the destruction of Israel will be achieved in the future and even within a matter of years. A common thread runs through the anti-Jewish massacres one hundred years ago, the antisemitic actions of the Mufti of Jerusalem cooperating closely with German National Socialism, the 1948/9, 1967 and 1973 wars against Israel, and thousands of terrorist attacks against Israel since the 1950s, to the present-day attacks on Israeli citizens by young radicalized Palestinian terrorists. 107) The EU supposes that economic advantages will overcome extremist political mindsets. However, this neglects the fact that the Palestinian political culture is driven by a heroic ideal of fighting against real or imagined humiliation, is rooted in the accusation of injustice and dispossession, and holds close to extremist religious traditions. 108) However, it must also be noted that there is a body of opinion within Palestinian and Arab society that rejects extremism, acknowledges the need for compromise, and seeks a peaceful path forward. Unfortunately, very few people plead for normalization with Israel or criticize the PA for not granting basic freedoms. These people are often imprisoned or threatened. Nevertheless, Jewish-Arab cooperation within Israel and the integration of Arabs within Israeli society, while not without difficulties resulting from extremism, prove that Jews and Arabs can live in harmony. The effects of EU state-building measures in the West Bank
109) Since 1973 the European states and the EEC/EU, in ever-growing economic support to the Palestinian Authority and other Palestinian organizations, have produced a standard of living in the West Bank higher than in many Arab states. The EU Commission has spent at least US$0.5 billion per annum from 2012-16. More than double this amount was provided cumulatively across that period by EU Member States themselves (and then double again by the USA). 110) Yet there are meager state-building achievements, despite extraordinary EU and global support for Palestinian proto-state institutions of approximately US$4 billion per annum. One analysis notes that “notwithstanding ardent declaratory policies, massive financial support, dialogue and deployment of other instruments, EU cooperation has had little demonstrable impact” (European Centre for Development Policy Management). A global study observes that “the Oslo development-for-peace aid programme appears after 25 years of spending to have been a catastrophic failure of epic proportions” (Palestine Aid Watch). 111) Three examples illustrate how EU funding fails to build a state or to prevent corruption and violence within the general structures of the Palestinian political culture. 112) First, the EU finances Palestinian recipients with at least €1 billion annually. But the billions spent have been largely ineffective in constructing institutions oriented towards democracy, accountability, rule of law and peace. Instead, Palestinian government tends to corruption, an authoritarian dictatorial reign of force, lack of accountability, transparency and governance by...