Sutton Process Risk and Reliability Management

2. Auflage 2014
ISBN: 978-0-12-801796-8
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: EPUB
Kopierschutz: 6 - ePub Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 798 Seiten

In the last twenty years considerable progress has been made in process risk and reliability management, particularly in regard to regulatory compliance. Many companies are now looking to go beyond mere compliance; they are expanding their process safety management (PSM) programs to improve performance not just in safety, but also in environmental compliance, quality control and overall profitability. Techniques and principles are illustrated with numerous examples from chemical plants, refineries, transportation, pipelines and offshore oil and gas. This book helps executives, managers and technical professionals achieve not only their current PSM goals, but also to make the transition to a broader operational integrity strategy. The book focuses on the energy and process industries- from refineries, to pipelines, chemical plants, transportation, energy and offshore facilities. The techniques described in the book can also be applied to a wide range of non-process industries. The book is both thorough and practical. It discusses theoretical principles in a wide variety of areas such as management of change, risk analysis and incident investigation, and then goes on to show how these principles work in practice, either in the design office or in an operating facility. The second edition has been expanded, revised and updated and many new sections have been added including: The impact of resource limitations, a review of some recent major incidents, the value of story-telling as a means of conveying process safety values and principles, and the impact of the proposed changes to the OSHA PSM standard. - Learn how to develop a thorough and complete process safety management program. - Go beyond traditional hazards analysis and risk management programs to explore a company's entire range of procedures, processes and management issues. - Understand how to develop a culture of process safety and operational excellence that goes beyond simple rule compliance. - Develop process safety programs for both onshore facilities (EPA, OSHA) and offshore platforms and rigs (BSEE) and to meet Safety Case requirements.

Ian Sutton is a chemical engineer with over thirty years of experience in the process industries. He has worked on the design and operation of chemical plants, offshore platforms, refineries, pipelines and mineral processing facilities. He has extensive experience in the development and implementation of process safety management and operational excellence programs. He has published multiple books including Process Risk and Reliability Management, 2nd Edition and Offshore Safety Management, 2nd Edition, both published by Elsevier.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Sutton, Ian

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Front Cover;1
2;Process Risk and Reliability Management;4
3;Copyright Page;5
4;Contents;6
5;Preface;14
6;1 Risk Management;16
6.1;Introduction;16
6.2;Technical, Process, and Occupational Safety;18
6.3;Historical Development;19
6.3.1;1. Safety as a Value;20
6.3.2;2. Codes and Standards;20
6.3.3;3. Workers’ Compensation;20
6.3.4;4. Occupational Safety;20
6.3.5;5. Systems Analysis;21
6.3.6;6. Regulations;21
6.3.7;7. Management Systems;21
6.3.8;8. Behavior-Based Safety;23
6.3.9;9. Safety Culture;24
6.4;Major Events;24
6.5;Health, Safety, and Environmental Programs;25
6.5.1;Environmental/Sustainability;25
6.5.2;Health;26
6.5.3;Safety;26
6.6;Prescriptive/Nonprescriptive;26
6.6.1;Safety Management Programs;28
6.6.2;Regulations;28
6.6.3;The Regulator’s Dilemma;29
6.7;Process Safety Management;29
6.7.1;Definition of PSM;31
6.7.2;Safe Limits;31
6.7.3;Set Point Values;33
6.7.4;Operating, Safe, and Emergency Limits;34
6.7.5;Measurement Strategies;36
6.7.6;Involvement;40
6.7.7;Thoroughness;40
6.7.8;Holistic;40
6.8;Environment;41
6.9;Quality Management;41
6.9.1;Statistical Process Control;41
6.9.2;ISO 9000/14001;42
6.9.3;Six Sigma;42
6.10;Risk;42
6.11;Components of Risk;43
6.11.1;Hazards;44
6.11.2;Consequence;44
6.11.3;Predicted Frequency;45
6.11.4;Safeguards;45
6.11.5;Presence of Persons;46
6.11.6;Single Contingency Events;47
6.11.7;Economies of Scale;47
6.12;Common Cause Events;48
6.12.1;Fukushima–Daiichi;48
6.12.2;Examples;48
6.12.2.1;Utility Failure;48
6.12.2.2;Instruments on Manual;48
6.12.2.3;Instrument Pluggage;49
6.12.2.4;Vibration;49
6.12.2.5;External Events;49
6.12.2.6;Maintenance Availability;49
6.12.2.7;Human Error/Untrained Personnel;49
6.13;Subjective Nature of Risk;49
6.13.1;Degree of Control;50
6.13.2;Familiarity with the Hazard;50
6.13.3;Direct Benefit;51
6.13.4;Personal Impact;51
6.13.5;Natural vs. Man-Made Risks;51
6.13.6;Recency of Events;51
6.13.7;Perception of the Consequence Term;51
6.13.8;Comprehension Time;53
6.13.9;Randomness;53
6.13.10;Regression to the Mean;53
6.13.11;Bias Toward Positive Evidence/Prior Beliefs;53
6.13.12;Availability;54
6.14;Quantification of Risk;54
6.14.1;Mathematical Terms;54
6.14.1.1;Frequency;54
6.14.1.2;Predicted Frequency;55
6.14.1.3;Probability;55
6.14.1.4;Likelihood and Failure Rate;55
6.14.1.5;Error/Statistical Significance Confidence;55
6.14.1.6;Failure/Fault;56
6.14.1.7;Independence and Randomness;56
6.14.2;FN Curves;56
6.14.3;Limitations;56
6.15;Acceptable Risk;58
6.15.1;The Third Law;59
6.15.2;Perfection as a Slogan;59
6.15.3;As Low as Reasonably Practical;60
6.15.4;De minimis Risk;61
6.15.5;Citations/“Case Law”;61
6.15.6;RAGAGEP;62
6.15.7;Indexing Methods;62
6.16;Risk Matrices;62
6.16.1;Consequence Matrix;62
6.16.1.1;Worker Safety;63
6.16.1.2;Public Safety and Health;63
6.16.1.3;Environmental Impact;63
6.16.1.4;Economic Loss;64
6.16.2;Frequency Matrix;64
6.16.3;Risk Matrix;65
6.16.3.1;A—(Red) Very High;66
6.16.3.2;B—(Orange) High;66
6.16.3.3;C—(Yellow) Moderate;66
6.16.3.4;D—(Green) Low;66
6.16.3.5;Other Categories;66
6.16.4;Limitations of Risk Matrices;67
6.16.4.1;Low-Hanging Fruit;68
6.16.4.2;Prepare for the Worst Case;68
6.16.4.3;Expensive Good Ideas;68
6.17;Black Swan Events;68
6.18;Different Industries;69
6.18.1;Oil Refineries;69
6.18.2;Offshore Oil and Gas;70
6.18.2.1;Lack of Escape Routes;71
6.18.2.2;Persons on Board;71
6.18.2.3;Cyclones/Hurricanes;72
6.18.2.4;Downers and Leaners;72
6.18.2.5;Blowouts;73
6.18.2.6;Hydrogen Sulfide;73
6.18.2.7;Dropped Objects;73
6.18.2.8;Helicopters;74
6.18.2.9;Ship Collision/Mooring Failure;74
6.18.2.10;Spill Response;74
6.18.3;Pipelines;74
6.19;Examples;75
6.19.1;Example 1—Facility Design;75
6.19.2;Example 2—Process Flow;76
6.19.3;Example 3—Heat Exchanger;77
6.19.4;Example 4—Risk Management Workflow;77
6.19.4.1;External Standard;78
6.19.4.2;Guidance;78
6.19.4.3;Risk Analysis Plan and Implement;78
6.19.4.4;Audit/Deltas;78
6.19.4.5;Success/Continuous Improvement;78
6.19.5;Example 5: Significant Potential Incident;79
7;2 Compliance and Standards;80
7.1;Introduction;81
7.2;Regulations;81
7.2.1;Rule-Based Approach;82
7.2.2;Goal-Driven Approach;83
7.2.3;Process Safety Regulations;84
7.3;Codes and Standards;85
7.3.1;Development of a Standard;86
7.3.2;Standards Organizations;87
7.3.2.1;American Chemistry Council/Responsible Care®;87
7.3.2.2;American National Standards Institute;89
7.3.2.3;American Petroleum Institute;89
7.3.2.4;American Society of Mechanical Engineers;90
7.3.2.5;International Organization for Standardization;90
7.3.2.6;National Fire Protection Association;92
7.3.3;Other Industry Sources;92
7.3.3.1;Center for Chemical Process Safety;92
7.3.3.2;Center for Offshore Safety;93
7.3.3.3;Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board;93
7.4;Company Standards;93
7.5;Industry Information;94
7.5.1;Regulatory Guidance;94
7.5.2;Open Literature;94
7.6;Commercial Information;95
7.7;Analysis;95
7.8;United States Federal Regulations;95
7.8.1;The Regulatory Process;95
7.8.2;Code of Federal Regulations;96
7.8.3;General Duty Clauses;97
7.8.4;The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution;97
7.8.5;The EPA;98
7.9;The Occupational Safety & Health Administration;98
7.9.1;OSHA Inspections;99
7.9.1.1;Variances;100
7.9.1.2;Enforcement;100
7.9.2;The Entry Process;101
7.9.2.1;Fatality/Catastrophe;101
7.9.2.2;Programmed Inspections;101
7.9.2.3;Complaints;102
7.9.3;Citations;102
7.9.3.1;Willful;102
7.9.3.2;Serious;103
7.9.3.3;Other-than-Serious;103
7.9.3.4;Repeat and Failure-to-Abate;104
7.9.4;OSHA Standards;104
7.9.4.1;Part 29;104
7.9.4.2;Subparts of Part 29;104
7.9.4.3;Sections of Subparts;106
7.9.5;Interpretations and Guidance;106
7.10;The OSHA PSM Standard;108
7.10.1;Covered Processes;108
7.10.2;Other Standards;109
7.10.3;Audit Guidelines;109
7.10.4;National Emphasis Programs;109
7.10.5;Proposed Update;111
7.10.5.1;1. Atmospheric Storage Tanks;112
7.10.5.2;2. Oil and Gas Well Drilling and Servicing;112
7.10.5.3;3. Oil and Gas Production Facilities;112
7.10.5.4;4. Reactivity Hazards;113
7.10.5.5;5. Highly Hazardous Chemicals;113
7.10.5.6;6. Management System Elements;113
7.10.5.7;7. RAGAGEP;113
7.10.5.8;8. Definition of RAGAGEP;113
7.10.5.9;9. Safety Critical Equipment;114
7.10.5.10;10. Organizational Changes;114
7.10.5.11;11. Emergency Planning;114
7.10.5.12;12. Third-Party Compliance Audits;114
7.10.5.13;13. Explosives, Blasting Agents, and Pyrotechnics;114
7.10.5.14;14. Flammable Liquids and Spray Finishing;114
7.10.5.15;15. Ammonium Nitrate;114
7.10.5.16;16. Retail Facilities;115
7.10.5.17;17. Concentrations of Highly Hazardous Chemicals;115
7.11;The EPA;115
7.12;The EPA Risk Management Program—40 CFR 68;115
7.12.1;Tiering/Program Levels;116
7.12.2;Covered Chemicals;116
7.12.3;Formal Management System;116
7.12.4;Worst Case Release;116
7.12.5;Emergency Plan;117
7.12.6;Five-Year Accident History;117
7.13;BSEE;117
7.14;State Regulations;118
7.14.1;New Jersey Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act;118
7.14.2;Delaware/Nevada;119
7.15;The Safety Case Regime;119
7.15.1;Elements of a Safety Case;120
7.15.1.1;Duty-Holder Responsibility;120
7.15.1.2;Responsibility of the Auditor/Assessor;120
7.15.1.3;Risk Management System;120
7.15.1.4;Management Systems;120
7.15.1.5;Living Document;121
7.15.2;Structure of a Safety Case;121
7.15.2.1;1. Facility Description;121
7.15.2.2;2. Safety Management System;121
7.15.2.3;3. Formal Safety Assessment;122
7.15.3;Preparation and Implementation;123
7.15.4;Assessment;123
7.15.5;Performance Measurement;124
7.16;International Agencies;125
7.17;Elements of PSM;125
7.17.1;1. Employee Participation;125
7.17.1.1;Written Plan of Action;126
7.17.1.2;Consultation;126
7.17.1.3;Access to Information;126
7.17.2;2. Process Safety Information;127
7.17.3;3. Process Hazards Analysis;129
7.17.3.1;Initial Hazard Analysis;131
7.17.3.2;Methodology;131
7.17.3.3;Issues to Address;131
7.17.3.4;Team;132
7.17.3.5;Revalidation;132
7.17.4;4. Operating Procedures;132
7.17.4.1;Written Down;134
7.17.4.2;Initial Startup;134
7.17.4.3;Temporary and Emergency Operations;134
7.17.4.4;Certification;134
7.17.5;5. Training;135
7.17.6;6. Contractors;137
7.17.6.1;Application;138
7.17.6.2;Employer Responsibilities;138
7.17.7;7. Prestartup Safety Review;139
7.17.7.1;Process Safety Information;139
7.17.7.2;Construction and Equipment;140
7.17.7.3;Procedures;140
7.17.7.4;New/Modified Facilities;140
7.17.8;8. Mechanical Integrity;140
7.17.8.1;Application;142
7.17.8.2;Written Procedures;142
7.17.8.3;Training;142
7.17.8.4;Inspection and Testing;143
7.17.8.5;Deficiencies;143
7.17.8.6;Quality Assurance;143
7.17.9;9. Hot Work;143
7.17.10;10. Management of Change;144
7.17.10.1;Employer Responsibility;145
7.17.10.2;Written Down;145
7.17.10.3;Replacement In-Kind;146
7.17.10.4;Factors that Affect Change;146
7.17.10.5;Training and Participation/Accountability;146
7.17.10.6;Information Base;146
7.17.10.7;Operating Procedures;146
7.17.10.8;Making the Change;147
7.17.10.9;Training/PSI/Operating Procedures;147
7.17.11;11. Incident Investigation;147
7.17.11.1;Investigation;148
7.17.11.2;Timing;148
7.17.11.3;Team;148
7.17.11.4;Report;148
7.17.11.5;Follow up;148
7.17.11.6;Participation;148
7.17.12;12. Emergency Planning and Response;148
7.17.13;13. Compliance Audits;151
7.17.13.1;Certification;153
7.17.13.2;Technical Qualifications;153
7.17.13.3;Report;153
7.17.13.4;Response;153
7.17.13.5;Retention of Reports;153
8;3 Culture and Participation;154
8.1;Introduction;154
8.2;Regulations and Standards;155
8.2.1;BSEE Standard for Culture;155
8.2.2;HSE and Culture;157
8.2.3;National Energy Board;157
8.2.4;Survey;158
8.3;Warning Flags over Your Organization;158
8.3.1;Flag One—Unrealistic Stretch Goals;159
8.3.1.1;Production Creep;159
8.3.1.2;Production Records;159
8.3.1.3;Initiative Overload;160
8.3.2;Flag Two—Excessive Cost Reduction;160
8.3.2.1;Reduction of “Nonessentials”;162
8.3.2.2;Reductions in Workforce;162
8.3.2.3;The “Big Crew Change”;163
8.3.2.4;Flattened Organizations;163
8.3.2.5;Aging Infrastructure;164
8.3.2.6;Outsourcing;164
8.3.2.7;Not Enough Time for Detailed Work;164
8.3.2.8;Project Cutbacks;164
8.3.2.9;Organizational Spread;165
8.3.3;Flag Three—Belief That “It Cannot Happen Here”;165
8.3.3.1;Lack of Direct Experience;165
8.3.3.2;Good Occupational Safety Performance;165
8.3.3.3;Failure to Learn from Near Misses;166
8.3.3.4;Failure to Draw on Experience Elsewhere;166
8.3.4;Flag Four—Overconfidence in Rule Compliance;166
8.3.5;Flag Five—Departmentalized Information Flow;166
8.3.5.1;Critical Safety Information Is Buried, Lost, or Diluted;167
8.3.5.2;Team Player Culture;167
8.3.5.3;Fear of Litigation;168
8.3.5.4;Mergers, Acquisitions, and Divestitures;168
8.3.6;Flag Six—Ineffective Audit Process;168
8.3.6.1;Softened News to Senior Managers;168
8.3.6.2;Failure to Identify Root Causes;169
8.3.6.3;Inadequate Follow-Up;169
8.4;Thinking Backward;169
8.5;Imagination;170
8.6;Culture Matrices;170
8.6.1;Elements of Culture;171
8.6.1.1;Ongoing and Consistent;171
8.6.1.2;Actions and Words;172
8.6.1.3;External Evaluation;172
8.6.1.4;Learning from Incidents;172
8.6.1.5;Attention to Basics/Housekeeping;173
8.6.2;Mergers and Acquisitions;173
8.6.3;Generational Differences;174
8.7;Measurement;174
8.8;Key Performance Indicators;175
8.9;Lagging and Leading Indicators;175
8.9.1;Lagging Indicators;176
8.9.1.1;OSHA Recordable Rate;177
8.9.1.2;Process Safety;177
8.9.2;Leading Indicators;178
8.9.2.1;Near Misses;179
8.9.2.2;Unplanned Maintenance;179
8.9.2.3;Process Safety Incident;179
8.9.3;KPI Limitations;180
8.9.3.1;Activity and Quality;180
8.9.3.2;Quality of Reporting;180
8.9.3.3;Management Elements;181
8.10;API RP 754;181
8.10.1;Tiers;182
8.10.1.1;Tier 1—Process Safety Event;183
8.10.1.2;Tier 2—Process Safety Event;184
8.10.1.3;Tier 3—Challenge to Safety Systems;184
8.10.1.4;Tier 4—Operating Discipline and Management System Performance;184
8.10.2;Data Submission;184
8.11;Selection of KPIs;184
8.12;Surveys;185
8.13;Creating a Strong Culture;186
8.13.1;Mission Statement;186
8.13.2;Guiding Tenets;187
8.13.3;Detailed Program;187
8.14;Behavior-Based Safety;188
8.14.1;Observed Hazard Card;189
8.14.2;Five by Five Policy;189
8.14.3;Off-the-Job Safety;190
8.14.4;Pointless Activities;190
8.15;Employee Participation;190
8.15.1;Developing Employee Participation;191
8.15.1.1;Safety Committees;191
8.15.1.2;Involvement in PSM elements;191
8.15.2;Difficulties with Workforce Involvement;192
8.15.2.1;Inefficiencies;192
8.15.2.2;Unwillingness to Accept Change;192
8.15.2.3;Labor/Management Relations;192
8.16;Stakeholder Outreach;192
9;4 Technical Information;194
9.1;Introduction;194
9.2;Table of Contents;195
9.3;Process Description;197
9.4;Flowsheets;197
9.4.1;Block Flow Diagrams;197
9.4.2;Process Flow Diagrams;198
9.4.3;Piping & Instrument Diagrams;199
9.4.3.1;Design Phases;200
9.4.3.2;Equipment and Line Designations;200
9.4.3.3;Instrument Designations;201
9.4.3.4;Updating P&IDs;201
9.4.4;Editing Engineering Information;201
9.5;Materials of Construction Table;202
9.6;MSDS or Safety Data Sheet;202
9.7;Global Harmonization System;205
9.8;The Safety Diamond;205
10;5 Hazard Identification;208
10.1;Introduction;208
10.2;Hazards Management Process;210
10.2.1;Step 1. Identify the Hazards;211
10.2.1.1;Creative/Imaginative Techniques;212
10.2.1.2;Experience Based;213
10.2.1.3;Logical/Rational;214
10.2.2;Step 2. Risk Rank;214
10.2.3;Step 3. Eliminate or Substitute the Hazard;214
10.2.4;Step 4. Remove the People;214
10.2.5;Step 5. Reduce the Consequence;215
10.2.6;Step 6. Reduce the Likelihood;215
10.2.7;Step 7. Install Safeguards;215
10.3;Organization of a Hazards Analysis;215
10.3.1;Charge/Scope Letter;217
10.3.1.1;Objective;217
10.3.1.2;Physical Scope;217
10.3.1.3;Method(s) To Be Used;217
10.3.1.4;Assigned Personnel;217
10.3.1.5;Risk Management Guidance;217
10.3.1.6;Schedule and Reporting;218
10.3.2;Abandoned Equipment;218
10.3.3;Preparations;218
10.3.4;Logistics;218
10.3.5;Meeting Protocol;219
10.3.6;Location of the Meeting;219
10.3.7;Projection of Notes;219
10.3.8;Documentation Requirements;220
10.3.9;Security of the Information;220
10.3.10;Time Required;220
10.3.11;Kick-Off and Close-Out Meetings;221
10.4;The Team;222
10.4.1;Leader/Facilitator;223
10.4.1.1;Process Knowledge;223
10.4.1.2;Stimulate Thinking;224
10.4.1.3;Creative Thinking;224
10.4.1.4;Casual Remarks;224
10.4.1.5;“If We had Unlimited Money”;225
10.4.1.6;Generalizations;225
10.4.1.7;Team Management;225
10.4.1.8;Knowledge of Actual Incidents;226
10.4.1.9;Lawyer-like Behavior;227
10.4.1.10;Persona;227
10.4.1.11;Personal Preparation;227
10.4.1.12;Engineering Standards;227
10.4.2;The Scribe;228
10.4.3;Operations/Maintenance Expert;228
10.4.4;Process and Instrument Experts;228
10.4.5;Specialists;228
10.4.6;Use of Sophisticated Language;229
10.4.7;The One-Minute Engineering Department;229
10.5;Results of the Analysis;230
10.5.1;Findings;230
10.5.2;Recommendations;230
10.5.3;Action Items;231
10.5.4;Risk Register;232
10.5.4.1;Finding Number and Date;232
10.5.4.2;Hazard;232
10.5.4.3;Source;233
10.5.4.4;Consequence(s)/Likelihood/Risk;233
10.5.4.5;Follow-up;233
10.6;The Hazards Analysis Report;233
10.6.1;Completeness of the Notes;234
10.6.2;Cross-Reference;235
10.6.3;Anonymity;235
10.6.3.1;Findings Terminology;235
10.6.3.2;Completeness;236
10.6.3.3;Nonfindings;236
10.6.3.4;Appearance;236
10.6.3.5;Pictures;236
10.6.4;Report Distribution;236
10.6.5;Communication with the Public;237
10.6.6;Table of Contents;237
10.6.6.1;1. Disclaimer;237
10.6.6.2;2. Executive Summary;238
10.6.6.3;3. Objectives of the Analysis;238
10.6.6.4;4. Summary of Findings;238
10.6.6.5;5. Method Used;239
10.6.6.6;6. Risk Ranking;239
10.6.6.7;7. The Team;239
10.6.6.8;8. Regulations and Standards;240
10.6.6.9;9. Attachments;240
10.6.6.10;10. Meeting Notes;240
10.6.7;Development of the Report;240
10.6.7.1;Step 1. Notes Cleanup;241
10.6.7.2;Step 2. Team Review;241
10.6.7.3;Step 3. Draft Report;242
10.6.7.4;Step 4. Client Review;243
10.6.7.5;Step 5. Final Report;244
10.6.7.6;Step 6. Risk Register;244
10.6.8;Legal Issues;244
10.6.8.1;Need to Act on Findings;246
10.6.8.2;Informal Notes;246
10.6.8.3;Internal Communication;246
10.6.8.4;PHA Leadership;247
10.7;Special Types of Hazards Analysis;247
10.7.1;Temporary and Transient Operations;248
10.7.2;Nonprocess Applications;248
10.7.3;Decommissioning/Demolition;248
10.8;Revalidation Hazards Analyses;249
10.9;Benefits and Limitations of Hazard Analyses;250
10.9.1;Strengths;250
10.9.1.1;Providing Time to Think;251
10.9.1.2;Challenging Conventional Thinking;251
10.9.1.3;Cross-discipline Communication;251
10.9.1.4;Education;251
10.9.1.5;Development of Technical Information;251
10.9.1.6;Economic Payoff;251
10.9.2;Limitations and Concerns;252
10.9.2.1;Imprecision in Defining Terms;253
10.9.2.2;Multiple Contingencies;253
10.9.2.3;Complexities and Subtle Interactions;253
10.9.2.4;Dynamic Conditions;254
10.9.2.5;Knowledge of Safe Operating Limits;254
10.9.2.6;Lack of Quantification;254
10.9.2.7;Team Quality;254
10.9.2.8;Personal Experience;255
10.9.2.9;Boredom;255
10.9.2.10;TRIZ;255
10.9.2.11;Confusion with Design Reviews;256
10.9.2.12;False Confidence;256
10.9.2.13;Equipment Orientation;257
10.9.2.14;Interfaces;257
10.9.2.15;Human Error;257
10.10;HAZID/MHS;258
10.11;The HAZOP Method;259
10.11.1;Step 1. Node Selection and Purpose;260
10.11.1.1;Selection of Nodes;261
10.11.1.2;Pressure/Spec Breaks;262
10.11.2;Step 2. Process Guideword/Safe Limits;262
10.11.3;Step 3. Identification of Hazards and their Causes;263
10.11.4;Step 4. “Announcement” of the Hazard;265
10.11.5;Step 5. Consequences;265
10.11.6;Step 6. Identification of Safeguards;266
10.11.7;Step 7. Predicted Frequency of Occurrence of the Hazard;267
10.11.8;Step 8. Risk Rank;268
10.11.9;Step 9. Findings;268
10.11.10;Step 10. Next Process Guideword/Node;268
10.11.11;Effectiveness of HAZOPs;268
10.12;Checklists;269
10.12.1;Checklist Categories and Guidewords;269
10.12.2;Structure of a Checklist;269
10.13;The What-If Method;270
10.13.1;Node/Functional Area Review;274
10.13.2;Equipment and Function Review;275
10.13.3;Ignition Source Controls;275
10.13.4;Instrumentation and Control Systems;275
10.13.5;Human Factors;276
10.13.6;Process Upsets;276
10.13.7;Siting;276
10.13.8;Structured What-If;276
10.13.9;Utility Systems;277
10.13.10;Batch Processes;277
10.13.11;Operating Procedures;278
10.13.12;Layout Reviews;278
10.14;What-If/Checklist Method;278
10.15;Failure Modes And Effects Analysis;279
10.16;Bow Tie Analysis;280
10.17;Indexing Methods;282
10.18;Interface Hazards Analysis;284
11;6 Operating Procedures;287
11.1;Introduction;288
11.2;Definition of Operating Procedures;292
11.2.1;Operations;292
11.2.2;Written Instructions;293
11.2.3;Design or Operating Intent;293
11.3;Definition of Maintenance Procedures;294
11.4;Terminology;294
11.5;Engineering the Solution;294
11.6;Quick Assessment of Operating Procedures;298
11.7;The Users;300
11.7.1;Experienced Technicians;300
11.7.2;Less Experienced Technicians;300
11.7.3;Engineering/Management;300
11.7.4;DCS/SCADA Programmers;300
11.7.5;Auditors, Regulators, and Inspectors;300
11.7.6;Translators;300
11.8;Elements of Operational Integrity Management;301
11.8.1;Workforce Involvement;301
11.8.2;Knowledge Management;301
11.8.3;Hazard Identification and Risk Management;303
11.8.4;Management of Change;303
11.8.5;Operational Readiness;303
11.8.6;Emergency Management;303
11.8.7;Technical Information;304
11.9;Types of Operating Procedure;304
11.10;Steady-State Operating Procedures;304
11.10.1;Types of Steady-State Procedure;304
11.10.2;Shift Change;305
11.11;Start-Up Procedures;305
11.12;Shutdown Procedures;307
11.12.1;Levels of Shutdown;308
11.12.1.1;Standby;308
11.12.1.2;Unit Shutdown;308
11.12.1.3;Facility Shutdown;308
11.12.1.4;Emergency Shutdown;308
11.12.1.5;Turnaround;309
11.13;Troubleshooting Procedures;309
11.13.1;Elements of Troubleshooting Procedures;310
11.13.2;Structure of Troubleshooting Procedures;311
11.14;Temporary Operating Procedures;311
11.15;Batch Procedures;312
11.16;Standard Operating Procedures;313
11.17;Maintenance Procedures;317
11.18;Job Safe Practices;317
11.19;Software Analogy;317
11.19.1;Modular Design;319
11.19.1.1;Connecting the Modules;320
11.19.1.2;If/Then/Else Instructions;321
11.19.1.3;Modular operating manual;321
11.19.2;Database Structure;322
11.19.3;Top-Down Development;323
11.19.4;Prototyping;326
11.19.5;Limitations of Modularity;328
11.20;Design of an Operating Manual;328
11.20.1;Adding and Removing Modules;331
11.20.2;Numbering the Modules;332
11.21;Module Design;332
11.21.1;The Title Block;333
11.21.1.1;Procedure name;334
11.21.1.2;Module number;335
11.21.1.3;Purpose of the procedure;335
11.21.1.4;Revision number;335
11.21.1.5;Date of revision;335
11.21.1.6;Covered persons;335
11.21.1.7;Company/Facility;336
11.21.1.8;Safe upper and lower limits;336
11.21.1.9;Special safety items;336
11.21.1.10;Equipment information;336
11.21.1.11;Training;336
11.21.2;The Operating Task Instructions;336
11.21.2.1;Step number column;337
11.21.2.2;Person;337
11.21.2.3;Action;338
11.21.2.4;Discussion/Illustration;338
11.21.3;The Authorization Block;338
11.21.3.1;Written by;339
11.21.3.2;Approval—superintendent;339
11.21.3.3;Approval—manager;339
11.21.3.4;Authorization sheet;340
11.21.4;Overall Module;340
11.21.5;Links to Other Procedures and Manuals;340
11.21.6;Links to Technical Information;340
11.21.7;Training;342
11.21.8;Two-Page Modules;342
11.22;Content Development;344
11.22.1;Level of Detail;344
11.22.1.1;Level 1—overview/checklists;344
11.22.1.2;Level 2—equipment description;345
11.22.1.3;Level 3—valve detail;345
11.22.2;Sources of Information;346
11.22.2.1;Existing procedures;346
11.22.2.2;Technician interviews;346
11.22.2.3;Engineering information;346
11.22.2.4;Vendor manuals;346
11.22.2.5;Process hazards analyses;347
11.23;The Procedures-Writing Team;347
11.24;Writing and Publishing;347
11.25;Project Organization;348
11.26;1. Define the Scope of Work;348
11.26.1;Physical Area/Equipment Covered;349
11.26.2;Users;349
11.26.3;Types of Procedure;349
11.26.4;Job Task Analysis;349
11.26.5;Design of the Manual;350
11.26.6;Regulations/Standards;350
11.26.7;Writer’s Guide;350
11.27;2. Create the Team;350
11.27.1;Steering Committee;350
11.27.2;Project Manager;351
11.27.3;Project Lead;351
11.27.4;Technicians;351
11.27.5;Technology Expert;352
11.27.6;Interviewer-Writers;352
11.27.7;Publisher/Webmaster;352
11.28;3. Develop a Detailed Plan;352
11.28.1;Schedule and Progress Metric;353
11.28.2;Budget;354
11.28.3;Prepare the SOPs;355
11.29;4. Collect Information;355
11.29.1;Operator Interviews;355
11.29.2;Existing Procedures/Vendor Manuals;355
11.29.3;Logbooks;356
11.30;5. Write the Procedures;356
11.30.1;Draft Releases;356
11.30.2;Plan to Throw One Away—You Will Anyway;357
11.31;6. Review and Sign;357
11.32;7. Publish;357
11.33;Potential Difficulties;358
11.33.1;Poorly Defined Goals;358
11.33.2;Too Many People;358
11.33.3;Extended Review Cycle;358
11.33.4;Lack of Signatures;359
11.34;Maintaining the Procedures;359
11.34.1;Procedures Modification Process;361
11.34.2;Organization;361
11.35;Writing Guidelines;362
11.36;Vigorous Writing;363
11.36.1;Minimalist Writing;363
11.36.2;Short, Pithy Instructions;364
11.36.3;Avoid Repetition of Instructions;364
11.36.4;Omit Needless Words;364
11.36.5;Omit Adverbs;364
11.36.6;Short and Old Words;365
11.36.7;Avoid Wordy Phrases and Padded Syllables;366
11.37;Writing Style;366
11.37.1;Imperative Tense;367
11.37.2;Active Voice;367
11.37.3;Reading Grade Level;368
11.37.4;List Instructions Singly;369
11.37.5;Implied Instructions;369
11.37.6;Bulleted Lists;369
11.37.7;Conditional Instructions;369
11.37.8;Positive/Negative Instructions;370
11.38;Vocabulary;370
11.38.1;Identification of Equipment;371
11.38.2;Consistency;371
11.38.3;Should/Would/Could;371
11.38.4;The Word “You”;372
11.38.5;The Word “This”;372
11.38.6;Arabic Numerals;372
11.38.7;Adverbs and Adjectives;372
11.38.8;Articles;373
11.38.9;Humor;373
11.38.10;Spelling;373
11.38.11;Latinate Abbreviations;374
11.38.12;Apostrophes;375
11.38.13;Ambiguous Words;375
11.39;Repetition of Messages;376
11.39.1;Danger, Warning, Caution, Note;376
11.39.2;Proofreader Marks;377
11.40;Illustrations;377
11.40.1;Photographs;378
11.40.2;P&IDs;378
11.40.3;Iconic Flow Diagrams/Schematics;378
11.40.4;Maps/Plot Plans;379
11.41;Publishing;380
11.41.1;Color;380
11.41.2;White Space;381
11.41.3;Fonts;381
11.41.4;Paragraph Formatting;381
11.41.5;Emphasis Techniques;382
11.41.6;Heading;382
11.41.7;Page Numbering;383
11.41.8;Single-Sided Versus Double-Sided Printing;383
11.41.9;Indexing;383
11.41.10;Glossary;383
11.41.11;The Binder;383
11.42;Multiple Languages;384
12;7 Training and Competence;385
12.1;Introduction;385
12.2;Levels of Competence;386
12.2.1;Level 1—Basic Skills;386
12.2.2;Level 2—Certification;386
12.2.3;Level 3—Master Technician;387
12.3;Elements of a Training Program;387
12.3.1;Orientation;387
12.3.2;Initial/Basic Training;388
12.3.3;Site Training;389
12.3.4;Abnormal Situation Management;389
12.3.5;Refresher Training;389
12.4;SEMS (BSEE);390
12.5;PSM (OSHA);390
12.6;Procedures and Training;394
12.7;Management of a Training Program;395
12.7.1;Training Matrix;396
12.7.2;Budget Allocation;396
12.7.3;Measuring Progress;397
12.8;Economics of Training;398
12.9;Process Simulators and Emulators;399
12.9.1;Features;399
12.9.2;Benefits;399
12.9.3;Simulator Design;400
12.10;Testing and Certification;402
12.11;SafeGulf;403
12.12;Pipeline Operator Training;404
13;8 Prestartup Reviews;405
13.1;Introduction;405
13.2;What the Review Is Not;406
13.3;Regulations;407
13.3.1;OSHA’s PSM;407
13.3.1.1;(i) Construction and equipment;407
13.3.1.2;(ii) Procedures;408
13.3.1.3;(iii) New/modified facilities;408
13.3.2;SEMS;408
13.4;Types of Review;409
13.4.1;Review Not Required;409
13.4.2;Small Projects/Engineering Changes;409
13.4.3;Medium Size;409
13.4.4;Large Projects;409
13.5;Restart Reviews;410
13.6;Organizational Responsibility;410
13.6.1;Time Required;411
13.6.2;Team Structure;411
13.7;Using the Elements of PSM;411
13.7.1;Knowledge Management;411
13.7.2;Operating Procedures;412
13.7.3;Asset Integrity/Reliability;412
13.7.4;Training/Performance;412
14;9 Asset Integrity;413
14.1;Introduction;413
14.2;Engineering Standards;413
14.3;Inherent Safety;414
14.3.1;Eliminate;414
14.3.1.1;Remove equipment;415
14.3.1.2;Remove people;415
14.3.2;Minimize;416
14.3.3;Substitute;416
14.3.4;Moderate;416
14.3.4.1;Equipment modification;417
14.3.4.2;Spacing;417
14.3.4.3;Underground location;417
14.3.5;Simplify;417
14.3.6;Applying Inherent Safety;418
14.3.7;Law of Unintended Consequences;419
14.3.7.1;Serendipity;419
14.3.7.2;Undesirable outcome;420
14.3.7.3;Original situation worse;420
14.3.8;Passive Safety Systems;420
14.3.9;Active Safety Systems;420
14.3.10;Administrative Safety Systems;421
14.3.11;Safety Critical Items;421
14.3.11.1;Priority 1;421
14.3.11.2;Priority 2;422
14.3.11.3;Priority 3;422
14.4;RAGAGEP;422
15;10 Management of Change;423
15.1;Introduction;423
15.2;Benefits of MOC;424
15.2.1;Increased Production, Productivity, and Quality;424
15.2.2;Maintenance Expense and Safety;424
15.2.3;Environmental Performance;424
15.2.4;Personal Reputation;425
15.3;Definition of MOC;425
15.3.1;Deviation Beyond Limits;426
15.3.2;Impact on Other Process Safety Elements;426
15.3.3;Critical Changes;426
15.4;In-Kind/Not-In-Kind Change;427
15.4.1;Same Specification;427
15.4.2;Same Service and Materials of Construction;428
15.4.3;Same Storage and Handling Process;428
15.4.4;Procedural Replacement;428
15.4.5;Process Chemistry;428
15.4.6;Instrumentation and Control Systems;429
15.5;Types of Change;429
15.5.1;Initiated Equipment Change;429
15.5.1.1;Large and small changes;430
15.5.1.2;Turnarounds;430
15.5.1.3;Field change;430
15.5.2;Noninitiated Equipment Change;430
15.5.2.1;Overt change;431
15.5.2.2;Covert change;431
15.5.3;Temporary Changes;432
15.5.4;Emergency Changes;433
15.5.5;Administrative and Organizational Change;434
15.5.5.1;Reorganization;435
15.5.5.2;Management by contractors;435
15.6;Informal Aspects of MOC;435
15.7;The MOC Process;437
15.8;Section A—Initiator Request;437
15.8.1;Initiator;438
15.8.1.1;Personal recognition;438
15.8.1.2;Company loyalty;438
15.8.1.3;Safety;438
15.8.2;Sponsor;439
15.8.3;Request Process;439
15.8.3.1;Step 1—problem/opportunity identified;440
15.8.3.2;Step 2—need for change;440
15.8.3.3;Step 3—corrective action;440
15.8.3.4;Step 4—system change;441
15.8.4;MOC Form—Section A;441
15.8.4.1;Name of the Sponsor/Initiator(s)/date;441
15.8.4.2;Description of problem and its consequences;441
15.8.4.3;Proposed change;441
15.8.4.4;Justification;443
15.8.4.5;Emergency change/temporary change;443
15.8.4.6;Previous actions taken;443
15.9;Section B—First Review;444
15.9.1;In-Kind/Not-In-Kind Change;445
15.9.2;Selecting the First Reviewers;445
15.9.3;MOC Form—Section B;446
15.9.3.1;Name/date;446
15.9.3.2;Discussion;446
15.9.3.3;Suggested modifications;446
15.10;Section C—Detailed Evaluation;447
15.10.1;Review Process;447
15.10.1.1;Information only;447
15.10.1.2;Approval;447
15.10.1.3;Modify the document;447
15.10.2;MOC Coordinator;449
15.10.3;Review Team;449
15.10.3.1;Process manager;449
15.10.3.2;Engineering manager;449
15.10.3.3;Operations manager;450
15.10.4;Builders;450
15.10.5;Project Team;450
15.10.6;Software;451
15.10.7;Reviewers;451
15.10.7.1;1. Confirm the problem;451
15.10.7.2;2. Problem analysis;451
15.10.7.3;3. Identify possible solutions;451
15.10.8;Qualifications;451
15.10.8.1;Experience;452
15.10.8.2;Technical knowledge;452
15.10.8.3;Feasibility;452
15.10.8.4;“Out-of-the-Box” thinking;452
15.10.9;Recommendations;453
15.10.10;MOC Form—Section C;453
15.11;Section D—Formal Approval;453
15.11.1;MOC Committee;453
15.11.1.1;Operations;455
15.11.1.2;Maintenance;455
15.11.1.3;Technical;455
15.11.1.4;Engineering/construction;455
15.11.2;Process Hazards Analysis;455
15.11.3;Variance Procedures;456
15.12;Section E—New Limits/Process Safety Update;456
15.13;Section F—Notification;457
15.14;Section G—Implementation;458
15.15;Section H—Follow-Up;458
16;11 Incident Investigation and Root Cause Analysis;460
16.1;Introduction;460
16.2;Management Level;461
16.2.1;Line Supervision;462
16.2.2;Facility Management;462
16.2.3;Executive Management;462
16.2.4;Industry Regulations and Standards;463
16.3;Incident Investigation and Analysis Philosophy;463
16.3.1;Trust and Candor;464
16.3.2;Listen to the Facts;465
16.3.3;Technical Expertise;465
16.3.4;Root Cause Analysis;465
16.3.4.1;Difficulties with “root cause”;466
16.3.4.2;Ockham’s Razor;467
16.3.5;Project Management;468
16.3.6;Attorney–Client Privilege;468
16.4;Blame and Fault Finding;468
16.4.1;Management Trust;469
16.4.2;Early Reporting of Bad News;469
16.4.3;Management Pressure;469
16.4.4;Safety as a Cause of Incidents;470
16.5;Communications;470
16.5.1;Technicians;470
16.5.2;Mid-Level Managers;471
16.5.3;Senior Managers;471
16.6;Definitions;471
16.6.1;Incident;471
16.6.2;Accident;472
16.6.3;Near Miss/Hit;472
16.6.4;Potential Incident;472
16.6.5;High Potential Incident;473
16.7;Incident Investigation Steps;473
16.7.1;Step 1—Initial Investigation;474
16.7.2;Step 2—Evaluation and Team Formation;474
16.7.3;Step 3—Information Gathering;475
16.7.4;Step 4—Timeline Development;476
16.7.5;Step 5—Root Cause Analysis;476
16.7.6;Step 6—Report and Recommendations;476
16.8;Step 1. Initial Investigation;476
16.8.1;The “Go Team”;476
16.8.1.1;Immediate actions;477
16.8.1.2;Team preparation;477
16.8.2;Drug and Alcohol Testing;478
16.8.3;Incident Report Form;478
16.8.3.1;Incident number;478
16.8.3.2;Title;479
16.8.3.3;Location, date, and time of event;480
16.8.3.4;Duration of event;480
16.8.3.5;Date and time of report;480
16.8.3.6;How observed;480
16.8.3.7;Person(s) reporting;480
16.8.3.8;Preliminary ranking;480
16.8.3.9;Incident type;480
16.8.3.10;Incident flags;480
16.8.3.11;First description of event;480
16.8.3.12;Immediate corrective actions taken;481
16.8.3.13;Witnesses;481
16.8.3.14;Contractor involvement;481
16.8.3.15;Detailed location;481
16.8.3.16;Consequences;481
16.8.3.17;Emergency response;482
16.8.3.18;Security issues;482
16.8.3.19;System alert;482
16.8.3.20;Incident owner/department;482
16.8.3.21;Notes and attachments;482
16.8.4;First Management Report;482
16.9;Step 2. Evaluation and Team Formation;483
16.9.1;Evaluation;483
16.9.2;Team Formation;484
16.9.3;Outside Investigators;484
16.9.4;Corporate Support;485
16.9.5;Team Members;485
16.9.5.1;Sponsor;485
16.9.5.2;Incident owner;485
16.9.5.3;Facility manager;485
16.9.5.4;Lead investigator;486
16.9.5.5;Administrator;486
16.9.5.6;Area supervisor;486
16.9.5.7;HSE representative;487
16.9.5.8;PSM coordinator;487
16.9.5.9;Employee representative;487
16.9.5.10;Process/facilities engineer;487
16.9.5.11;Maintenance technicians;487
16.9.5.12;Subject matter experts;487
16.9.5.13;Contractors/vendors;487
16.9.5.14;Emergency response specialists;487
16.9.5.15;Attorneys;488
16.9.6;Charter/Terms of Reference;488
16.9.7;Team Member Qualifications;488
16.9.7.1;Objectivity;488
16.9.7.2;Common sense;488
16.9.7.3;Jumping to conclusions;489
16.9.7.4;Haughtiness and empathy;489
16.9.7.5;Understand incident investigation methodology;490
16.9.7.6;You do know what you don’t know;490
16.9.7.7;Understand process systems;490
16.9.7.8;Logical thinking/painstaking;490
16.10;Step 3. Information Gathering;490
16.10.1;Interviews;491
16.10.2;Interview Guidelines;492
16.10.3;Regulatory/Legal Interviews;494
16.10.4;Witness Interviews;495
16.10.5;Interviewer Attributes;496
16.10.5.1;Rapport and trust;496
16.10.5.2;Technical skills;497
16.10.5.3;Critical factors recognition;497
16.10.5.4;Objective;497
16.10.5.5;Effective note taking;497
16.10.5.6;Management interviews;497
16.10.6;Documentation;497
16.10.7;Engineering Information;498
16.10.8;Operating Information;498
16.10.8.1;Instrument records;498
16.10.8.2;Log books, maintenance records, and JSAs;498
16.10.8.3;Hazards analysis reports;498
16.10.8.4;MOC records;498
16.10.8.5;Operating manuals/procedures;498
16.10.8.6;Incident investigations and audits;499
16.10.9;Vendor Data;499
16.10.10;Field Information;499
16.10.11;Damage Assessment;499
16.10.12;Photographs and DVDs;499
16.10.13;Closed Circuit Television;500
16.10.14;Instrument Records;500
16.10.15;Testing/Lab Analysis;500
16.11;Step 4. Timeline Development;500
16.11.1;Timeline Steps;501
16.11.1.1;Section 1—Events prior to the incident;501
16.11.1.2;Section 2—The incident;501
16.11.1.3;Section 3—Postincident response;501
16.11.2;Timeline Construction;502
16.11.3;Conditions;503
16.11.4;Multiple Timelines;503
16.11.5;Timeline Table;505
16.11.6;Background Information;506
16.12;Step 5. Root Cause Analysis;506
16.12.1;Levels of Root Cause;507
16.12.1.1;Single incidents;508
16.12.1.2;Multiple incidents;508
16.12.2;Types of Root Cause Analysis;509
16.12.3;Argument by Analogy: Story Telling;509
16.12.3.1;False extrapolation;510
16.12.3.2;Linearity;510
16.12.3.3;World views;510
16.12.4;Safeguards;511
16.12.5;Management Action;511
16.12.6;Categorization;512
16.12.6.1;Equipment failure;512
16.12.6.2;Human error as a root cause;513
16.12.6.3;Process systems failure;513
16.12.7;System Analysis;513
16.12.8;Why Trees;513
16.12.8.1;Single chain of events;514
16.12.8.2;Wrong chain;514
16.12.9;Fault Tree Analysis;515
16.12.10;Linkage of Fault Trees to the Timeline;518
16.12.11;Common Cause Events;518
16.13;Step 6. Report and Recommendations;519
16.13.1;Levels of Recommendation;520
16.13.1.1;Short-term recommendations;520
16.13.1.2;Intermediate recommendations;520
16.13.1.3;Long-term recommendations;521
16.13.1.4;Industry guidance;521
16.13.2;Report Structure;521
16.13.2.1;Executive summary;521
16.13.2.2;What happened?;522
16.13.2.3;What could have happened?;522
16.13.2.4;What was the cause?;522
16.13.2.5;What actions should be taken?;522
16.13.2.6;Recognition;523
16.13.2.7;Terms of reference;523
16.13.2.8;Reason for selection;523
16.13.2.9;Sequence of events;523
16.13.2.10;Consequences;523
16.13.2.11;Root causes;524
16.13.2.12;Other hazards;524
16.13.2.13;Recommendations;524
16.13.2.14;Attachments;524
16.13.2.15;Attachment A—Regulations and standards;524
16.13.2.16;Attachment B—Root cause analysis;524
16.13.2.17;Attachment C—Organization chart;524
16.13.2.18;Attachment D—Review of similar events;524
16.13.2.19;Attachment E—Investigation team;525
16.13.2.20;Attachment F—Review of modern designs;525
16.13.2.21;Attachment G—Index to pictures and documents;525
16.13.2.22;Attachment H—Detailed timeline;525
16.13.3;Issuing the Report;525
16.13.3.1;Writing the report;525
16.13.3.2;Presenting the report;525
16.13.3.3;Follow-up and recommendations tracking;526
16.13.3.4;Legal issues;526
16.14;Information Security and Chain of Custody;527
16.14.1;Record Retention;527
16.14.2;Removing Evidence;527
16.14.3;File Systems;527
16.14.4;Incident/Risk Register;529
16.15;Feedback;530
16.16;Incident Databases;530
16.16.1;National Response Center;531
16.16.2;Accidental Release Information Program (ARIP) Database;531
16.16.3;Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI);532
16.16.4;Major Accident Reporting System (MARS);532
16.16.5;Marsh and McLENNAN Reviews;533
16.16.6;Annual Loss Prevention Symposia;533
16.16.7;Process Safety Beacon;533
16.16.8;Government Agencies;533
17;12 Emergency Management;534
17.1;Introduction;534
17.2;Abnormal Situation Management;535
17.3;Human Response;536
17.3.1;Human Error Rate;536
17.3.2;Fixation;536
17.3.3;Heroism and Buddy Loyalty;537
17.4;Troubleshooting;537
17.5;Levels of Emergency;538
17.5.1;Cause of Emergency;538
17.5.2;Emergency Operations;539
17.5.3;Local Emergency Response;540
17.5.4;General Emergency Response;540
17.5.5;Recovery Operations;541
17.5.6;Investigation and Follow-Up;541
17.6;Emergency Planning;541
17.6.1;Organization and Personnel;541
17.6.2;Emergency Response Manual;541
17.6.3;Emergency Procedures;543
17.6.4;Emergency Response Training;543
17.6.5;Communications;544
17.7;Emergency Shutdown;545
17.7.1;ESD Hierarchy;545
17.7.2;Shutdown Zones;545
17.7.3;System Reset;546
17.8;Fire and Gas Detection;547
17.8.1;Fire Detection;547
17.8.2;Fire Eyes/Flame Detectors;547
17.8.3;Smoke Detectors;548
17.8.4;Heat Detectors;549
17.8.5;Fusible Links;549
17.8.6;Low Oxygen Detectors;549
17.8.7;Combustible Gas Detectors;549
17.8.8;Manual Call Points;550
17.8.9;Toxic Gas Releases;550
17.9;Escape Routes;550
17.10;Firefighting;551
17.10.1;Single Fire Concept;551
17.10.2;Deluge Systems;551
17.10.3;Fire Zones;551
18;13 Audits and Assessments;553
18.1;Introduction;553
18.2;Formal Audits;555
18.2.1;Reasons for Audits;556
18.2.1.1;Accident follow-up;556
18.2.1.2;Regulatory/standards compliance;556
18.2.1.3;Stakeholder outreach;556
18.2.1.4;Voluntary check;556
18.2.1.5;Insurance and business security;557
18.2.2;Audit Standards;557
18.2.2.1;Regulations;557
18.2.2.2;Reporting requirements;557
18.2.2.3;Industry standards;558
18.2.2.4;Internal standards;558
18.2.3;Audit Frequency;558
18.2.4;Audit Personnel;558
18.2.4.1;Outside auditors;559
18.2.4.2;Internal auditors;559
18.2.4.3;Team composition;560
18.2.5;Auditor Attributes;560
18.2.5.1;Audit service providers;560
18.2.5.2;Interview skills;561
18.2.5.3;Technical knowledge;561
18.2.5.4;Writing skills;561
18.2.5.5;Demeanor;561
18.2.6;The Host Company;562
18.2.6.1;First impressions;562
18.2.6.2;Employees;563
18.2.7;Planning the Audit;563
18.2.7.1;Goals;563
18.2.7.2;Determine the audit standard;564
18.2.7.3;Scope;564
18.2.7.4;Budget;565
18.2.7.5;Schedule;565
18.2.7.6;One-point contact;566
18.2.7.7;Preaudit activities;566
18.2.8;Audit Forms;566
18.2.9;Conducting the Audit;567
18.2.9.1;Auditor preparation;568
18.2.9.2;Kick-off meeting;568
18.2.9.3;Plant tour;569
18.2.9.4;Information collection;569
18.2.9.5;Role of personnel;569
18.2.9.6;Interviews;569
18.2.9.7;On-site inspection;570
18.2.9.8;Closeout meeting;571
18.2.10;Report;571
18.2.10.1;Draft report;571
18.2.10.2;Generalities;572
18.2.10.3;Report distribution;572
18.2.10.4;Letter of certification;572
18.2.10.5;Audit verification;572
18.2.10.6;Positive findings;573
18.2.10.7;Report retention;573
18.2.11;Findings;574
18.2.12;Follow-Up;574
18.2.13;Unannounced Audits;574
18.3;The SEMS Audit Rule;575
18.4;SEMS II;582
18.4.1;Audit Requirements;582
18.4.2;Independent Third-Party Auditors;584
18.4.3;I3P Qualifications;584
18.5;National Emphasis Program;585
18.6;Reviews and Expert Assessments;585
18.6.1;Review Issues;586
18.6.1.1;Management systems effectiveness;586
18.6.1.2;Workforce involvement;587
18.6.1.3;Real-world usefulness;587
18.6.1.4;“Learned to live with it” problems;587
18.6.1.5;Lessons learned;587
18.6.2;Reviewer Attributes;587
18.7;Management Elements Assessment;588
18.7.1;Level 1: Risk Management;589
18.7.2;Level 2: Management Element Spreadsheet;589
18.7.3;Level 3: Detailed Questions;591
18.7.4;Scoring Template;592
18.7.5;Guidance;593
18.7.6;Benefits of the Elements Assessment Approach;593
18.7.6.1;Independent of events;593
18.7.6.2;Handling abstraction;594
18.7.6.3;Smoothing of results;594
18.7.6.4;Objectivity;594
19;14 Consequence Analysis;595
19.1;Introduction;595
19.2;Range of Consequences;596
19.2.1;Safety;597
19.2.2;Health;598
19.2.3;Environmental;598
19.2.4;Economic;598
19.2.5;Effect of a Release;598
19.3;Hole Size;599
19.4;Fires;599
19.4.1;Flammable Range;599
19.4.2;Ignition Temperature/Energy;600
19.4.3;Spontaneous Combustion;601
19.4.4;Ignition Sources;602
19.4.4.1;Vacuum trucks;602
19.4.4.2;Radiant heat;602
19.4.4.3;Static electricity;602
19.4.4.4;Lightning;603
19.4.4.5;Pyrophorics/iron sulfide;604
19.4.5;Flammability Hazard Ranking;604
19.4.6;Passive Fire Protection/Fireproofing;604
19.5;Explosions;605
19.5.1;Physical Explosions;606
19.5.2;Vapor Cloud Explosions;606
19.5.3;Deflagrations and Detonations;606
19.5.4;Blast Effects;607
19.5.5;BLEVEs;607
19.5.6;Dust Explosions;608
19.6;Toxic Gas Releases;608
19.6.1;Gas Release Modeling;608
19.6.2;Effect of Toxic Gases;610
19.6.3;Probit Equations;611
19.6.4;Short-Term Exposure Limits;611
19.6.4.1;Emergency response planning guidelines;612
19.6.4.2;Immediately dangerous to life and health;613
19.6.4.3;Permissible exposure limits;613
19.6.4.4;Threshold limit values;614
19.6.4.5;Short-term exposure limit;614
19.6.4.6;Levels of concern (EPA);615
19.6.4.7;Acutely toxic concentration/levels (New Jersey/Delaware);615
19.6.4.8;Substance hazards index;615
19.6.5;Location of Monitors;616
20;15 Frequency Analysis;617
20.1;Introduction;617
20.2;The Pareto Principle;618
20.3;Importance Ranking;618
20.4;Fault Tree Analysis;619
20.4.1;Gates;621
20.4.1.1;OR Gate;621
20.4.1.2;AND Gate;622
20.4.1.3;VOTING Gate;626
20.4.2;Events;627
20.4.2.1;Top Event;627
20.4.2.2;Intermediate Events;628
20.4.2.3;Base Events;628
20.4.2.4;House Event;629
20.4.3;Top-Down Development of a Fault Tree;629
20.4.3.1;1. Define the Top Event;630
20.4.3.2;2. Build the Tree;630
20.4.3.3;3. Identify the Cut Sets;633
20.4.3.4;4. Eliminate Repeat Sets;637
20.4.3.5;5. Eliminate Repeat Events in a Set;638
20.4.3.6;6. Eliminate Redundant Events;638
20.4.3.7;7. Quantify the Risk;640
20.4.3.8;Mathematics of an OR Gate;640
20.4.3.9;Mathematics of an AND Gate;641
20.4.3.10;Mathematics of a Voting Gate;642
20.4.3.11;Cut Set quantification;642
20.4.3.12;8. Risk Rank;643
20.4.3.13;Event contribution;643
20.4.3.14;Important few;644
20.4.3.15;Unimportant many;644
20.4.3.16;Power of the AND Gate;645
20.4.3.17;Importance equalization;645
20.4.3.18;Cost–benefit analysis;645
20.4.4;Importance Ranking Using Cut Sets;645
20.4.4.1;Birnbaum factor method;645
20.4.4.2;Fussell–Vesely method;646
20.4.4.3;Perturbation method;646
20.4.5;Common Cause Events;646
20.4.6;Fukushima-Daiichi;647
20.4.7;Generic Fault Trees;648
20.4.7.1;Generic safety fault tree;649
20.4.7.2;Generic reliability fault tree;652
20.4.8;Discussion of the Fault Tree Method;652
20.4.9;Qualitative FTA;653
20.5;Event Tree Analysis;653
20.5.1;Quantification of an Event Tree;654
20.5.2;Scope of Event;657
20.5.3;Combining Event Trees and Fault Trees;657
20.5.4;Short Sequence of Events;658
20.5.5;Many Events;658
20.5.6;Partial Success;659
20.6;Discrete Event Analysis;659
20.6.1;Nonlinearities and Complexities;659
20.6.2;Conveying Statistical Uncertainty;660
20.7;Monte Carlo Simulation;660
20.7.1;Random Number Generators;660
20.7.2;Seed Numbers;661
20.7.3;Speeding the Simulation;661
20.8;Markov Models;661
20.9;Top-Down/Bottom-Up Approach;664
20.9.1;Top-Down;664
20.9.2;Bottom-Up;664
20.9.3;Qualitative Insights;664
20.10;Limitations to Quantification;665
20.10.1;Mathematical Understanding;665
20.10.2;Value-Laden Assumptions;666
20.10.3;Lack of Exhaustivity;666
20.10.4;Human Behavior;666
20.10.5;Data Quality;666
20.11;Safeguards;667
20.11.1;Safeguard Level 1: Normal Operations;668
20.11.2;Safeguard Level 2: Procedural Safeguards;669
20.11.3;Safeguard Level 3: Safety Instrumented Systems;669
20.11.4;Safeguard Level 4: Mechanical Safeguards;670
20.11.5;Safeguard Level 5: Passive Safeguards;670
20.11.6;Safeguard Level 6: Emergency Response;670
20.12;Layer of Protection Analysis;670
20.12.1;The LOPA Process;671
20.12.2;Single Scenarios;672
20.12.3;IPLs;672
20.12.3.1;Specific;673
20.12.3.2;Independent;673
20.12.3.3;Dependable;673
20.12.3.4;Auditable;674
20.12.4;Human Response;674
20.12.5;Implementing LOPA;674
20.12.5.1;Team makeup;674
20.12.5.2;Timing;674
20.12.5.3;Tools;674
20.12.5.4;Procedures and inspections;674
20.12.5.5;Risk criteria;675
20.13;Failure Rate Data;675
20.14;Conditional Probability/Bayes’ Theorem;675
20.14.1;Evaluation of Tests;676
20.14.2;Sequential Observations;677
20.14.3;Combining Data Sources;677
21;16 Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability;682
21.1;Introduction;682
21.2;Benefits of a RAM Program;684
21.2.1;Increased Production and Profitability;684
21.2.2;Increased Productivity;685
21.2.3;Reduced Investment;685
21.2.4;Lower Maintenance Costs;686
21.2.5;Lower Inventories;686
21.2.6;Enhanced Customer Satisfaction;686
21.2.7;Personal Recognition;686
21.2.8;Personal Life;686
21.2.9;Improved Public Perception;686
21.3;Reliability and Safety;687
21.3.1;Hazardous Operations;687
21.3.2;Unsafe Process Conditions;687
21.3.3;Safety Bypasses;687
21.3.4;Transient Stresses;687
21.3.5;Reduced Chance of Catastrophic Losses;687
21.3.6;Increased Safety May Reduce Reliability;687
21.3.7;Loss of Experience;688
21.3.8;Engineering Practices;688
21.3.9;Daily Operations;688
21.4;Definitions;688
21.4.1;Reliability;688
21.4.2;Availability;689
21.4.3;Effectiveness;690
21.4.4;Maintainability;690
21.5;Failure Modes;691
21.5.1;Equipment Description;691
21.5.2;Primary, Secondary, and Command Failures;691
21.5.3;Catastrophic, Degraded, and Incipient Failures;692
21.5.4;Real Failures/Necessary Replacements;692
21.6;Failure Rates;692
21.6.1;Constant/Exponential Distribution;694
21.6.2;Lognormal Distribution;694
21.6.3;Bathtub Curve;694
21.6.3.1;Early failures;695
21.6.3.2;Constant failure rate;695
21.6.3.3;Wear-out failures;696
21.6.4;Reliability Block Diagrams;696
21.6.5;Active/Standby Redundancy;698
21.6.6;Quantification of Block Diagrams;698
21.7;Human Reliability;700
21.7.1;Types of Human Error;701
21.7.1.1;Errors of intent;701
21.7.1.2;Mistakes;701
21.7.1.3;Slips;701
21.7.1.4;Fixation;702
21.7.1.5;Error in an emergency;702
21.7.1.6;Incorrect response;702
21.7.2;Human Reliability Analysis;702
21.7.3;THERP;703
22;17 Managing a Risk Program;704
22.1;Introduction;704
22.2;Clients/Customers;704
22.2.1;Senior Management;704
22.2.2;Facility Managers;705
22.2.3;Project Managers and Design Engineers;705
22.2.4;Regulators/Auditors;705
22.3;Program Organization;705
22.3.1;Step 1—Determine the Objectives;706
22.3.2;Step 2—Set Up an Organization;706
22.3.2.1;Management;706
22.3.2.2;Steering committee;706
22.3.2.3;Coordinator;707
22.3.2.4;Subcommittees;708
22.3.2.5;Operating binders;708
22.3.3;Step 3—Create the Metrics and Baseline;710
22.3.4;Step 4—Develop a Plan;711
22.3.4.1;Goals;712
22.3.4.2;Resources needed;712
22.3.4.3;Develop a schedule;712
22.3.4.4;Reviews and signatures;713
22.3.5;Step 5—Implement the Plan;713
22.3.6;Step 6—Audit/Improve;714
23;18 Project Management;715
23.1;Introduction;715
23.2;Phase/Gate System;715
23.3;Hazards Analysis on Projects;716
23.4;Phase I—Concept Selection;718
23.4.1;Documents;719
23.4.2;Hazards Analysis;719
23.5;Phase II—Preliminary Design (FEED);720
23.5.1;Documents;720
23.5.2;Hazards Analysis;721
23.6;Phase III—Detailed Engineering;722
23.6.1;Documents;722
23.6.2;Hazards Analysis;722
23.7;Phase IV—Fabrication and Construction;722
23.7.1;Precommissioning;723
23.7.2;Punch lists;723
23.7.3;Transfer of Care, Custody, and Control;724
23.7.4;Documents;724
23.7.4.1;Turnover packages;724
23.7.4.2;Procedures;727
23.7.5;Hazards Analysis;727
23.8;Phase V—Commissioning and Start-Up;727
23.8.1;Commissioning;727
23.8.2;Operational Readiness Review;727
23.8.3;Start-up and Line Out;728
23.8.4;Documents;729
23.8.4.1;Start-up procedures;729
23.8.4.2;Acceptance test;729
23.8.4.3;Warranty;729
23.8.5;Hazards Analysis;729
23.9;Project Organization;729
24;19 Contractors;731
24.1;Introduction;731
24.2;Regulations and Standards;733
24.2.1;OSHA PSM Standard;733
24.2.2;OSHA PSM Guidance;734
24.2.2.1;Application;735
24.2.2.2;Employer responsibilities;735
24.2.3;BSEE SEMS;735
24.2.4;API RP 76;736
24.3;Types of Contractor;736
24.3.1;Contract Companies;738
24.3.1.1;Selecting a contract company;738
24.3.1.2;Contractor HSE program;739
24.3.2;Design Companies;740
24.3.3;Subcontractors;740
24.3.4;Contract Workers;740
24.3.5;Maintenance Contractors;741
24.3.6;Visitors/Consultants;741
24.4;Bridging Documents;741
24.4.1;Operator/Contractor Bridging Document;741
24.4.2;Bridging Through a Regulation;742
24.5;Contractor Management;743
24.5.1;Contractor Selection;743
24.5.2;Record Keeping;744
24.5.3;Contractor Training;744
24.5.4;Safety Meetings;744
24.5.5;USE OF Equipment;745
24.5.6;Contractor Evaluation;745
24.5.7;Infractions;746
24.5.8;Contractor Training;746
24.5.9;Safety Meetings;746
25;20 The Risk Management Professional;748
25.1;Introduction;748
25.2;Attributes;749
25.2.1;Education and Certification;749
25.2.2;Technical Knowledge;749
25.2.3;Holistic;749
25.2.4;Numerate;750
25.2.5;Communication Skills;750
25.2.6;Industrial Experience;750
25.2.7;Knowledge of Past Events;750
25.2.8;Professional Involvement;751
25.2.9;Network;751
25.2.10;The Resumé/CV;751
25.2.10.1;Level of detail;751
25.2.10.2;Publications;752
25.2.10.3;Gaps/negative facts;752
25.2.10.4;Multiple resumés;752
25.2.10.5;Declining experience;752
25.2.11;Professional Engineer;752
25.3;Consultants;753
25.3.1;True Expertise;753
25.3.2;The Consultant as Outsider;753
25.3.3;Consultants—Not Contractors;754
25.3.4;Cuts Gordian Knots;755
25.3.5;Quick Study;755
25.3.6;Role of the Client;755
25.3.7;Response to Criticism;756
25.3.8;Marketing;756
25.4;Communicating with Management/Clients;756
25.4.1;Presentations;756
25.4.2;Meetings;757
25.5;Report Writing;757
25.5.1;Draft Report;758
25.5.2;Language of the Report;759
25.5.3;Completeness/Thoroughness;759
25.5.4;Personal Information;759
25.5.5;Writing Style;759
25.5.5.1;Nonemotional language;760
25.5.5.2;Minimalist writing—Make every word tell;760
25.5.5.3;Omit needless words/tautologies;760
25.5.5.4;Short, simple words;760
25.5.5.5;Minimize “soft” materials;761
25.5.5.6;Eschew obfuscation;761
25.5.5.7;Develop a theme;761
25.5.5.8;Modifiers;762
25.5.5.9;No typos;763
25.5.5.10;Date format;763
25.5.5.11;Active/passive voice;763
25.5.5.12;He/she;763
25.5.5.13;You/I;764
25.5.5.14;Choice of words;764
25.5.5.15;Use of humor;764
25.5.6;Copyright;765
25.5.7;Responsible Document Creation;765
25.6;Anecdotes/Storytelling;766
25.6.1;Stories;767
25.6.2;Elements of a Story;767
25.6.2.1;Characters;767
25.6.2.2;Setting;767
25.6.2.3;Plot;767
25.6.2.4;Conflict;768
25.6.2.5;Resolution;768
25.6.3;Sensitivity;768
25.7;Communicating with the Public;768
25.7.1;The Community;769
25.7.2;Other Businesses;770
25.7.3;The Media;770
25.7.4;Regulators/Nongovernmental Organizations;770
25.7.5;Types of Public Communication;770
25.7.6;Developing a Risk Communication Program;771
25.7.7;Communicating New Paradigms;771
25.8;Trade Secrets (OSHA);771
25.9;Litigation Support;775
25.9.1;Use of Legal Services;775
25.9.2;Types of Litigation;776
25.9.3;The Participants;776
25.9.4;Timeline/Story Line;776
25.9.5;Documentation;776
25.9.6;The Discovery Process;777
25.9.7;Depositions;777
25.9.8;Witnesses to Fact;778
25.10;The Expert Witness;778
25.10.1;Acceptance by the Court;779
25.10.2;Daubert and Frye Rules;780
25.10.3;Prior Testimony;780
25.10.4;Timeline/Story Line;780
25.10.5;The Report;780
25.10.6;Attributes of an Expert Witness;781
25.10.6.1;To thine own self be true;781
25.10.6.2;Be prepared;781
25.10.6.3;Be a true expert;781
25.10.6.4;Be a teacher;781
25.10.6.5;“Reasonable” risk;782
25.10.7;Privilege;782
26;References;784
27;Index;788

Leseproben

Chapter 2 Compliance and Standards
Process Safety Management (PSM) programs are mostly performance-based and non-prescriptive. They aim to help managers achieve high levels of safety, environmental performance and profitability. However there are also many PSM regulations. This chapter describes some of these regulations and discusses how compliance can be achieved. Keywords
Codes; Standards; Regulations; OSHA; EPA; BSEE; Safety Case; Process Safety Management; PSM; 29 CFR 1910.119 Chapter Outline Introduction 66 Regulations 66 Codes and Standards 70 Company Standards 78 Industry Information 79 Commercial Information 80 Analysis 80 United States Federal Regulations 80 The Occupational Safety & Health Administration 83 The OSHA PSM Standard 93 The EPA 100 The EPA Risk Management Program—40 CFR 68 100 BSEE 102 State Regulations 103 The Safety Case Regime 104 International Agencies 110 Elements of PSM 110 This chapter discusses regulations and standards. Detailed information to do with industry standards from organizations such as the American Petroleum Institute (API), the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). The application of these standards to specific design is discussed in the book Plant Design and Operations. Introduction
In Chapter 1, it was noted that the Process Safety Management (PSM) regulations are oriented toward helping managers achieve high levels of safety, environmental performance, and profitability—in other words, they are performance based. Nevertheless PSM regulations do exist, and they have to be addressed. This chapter outlines general regulatory and compliance issues to do with PSM, particularly with regard to the United States OSHA (Occupational Safety & Health Administration) standard. In principle, there should be no need for external rules and regulations—managers should strive to achieve process safety goals because they provide their own inherent reward. In practice, regulations are needed. Concerns to do with liability do influence behavior. Even in those facilities where management has the best of intentions, there is always the temptation to put off safety and environmental work “until we have time.” A regulation will management’s feet to fire. If a plant has been running safely for many years, it is tempting to defer the rectification of hazards on the grounds that they have never been a problem in the past. Expenditures to correct these hazards do not lead to an immediate return on investment—they merely make an already low probability number even lower. Regulations put all companies and facilities on the same basis—those companies which have traditionally invested heavily in safety and environmental improvement are no longer at a short-term financial disadvantage. Regulations also provide a justification for mid-level managers and PSM professionals to carry out those activities that they had always wanted to do, but for which they had had trouble finding the necessary funding. For example, an operations manager may have always wished to increase the amount of training that his operators receive but may have had trouble in justifying the expense. However, if a regulation requires that operator training be carried out, that manager can demand that the training program be funded because it is now a legal requirement. From a technical point of view, the requirements of various process safety regulations are generally quite similar; if a company develops a PSM program to meet one standard, it is likely that it has gone most of the way toward addressing the others. However, in the regulatory world, there can be very substantial differences between standards in nontechnical areas such as community communication, reporting procedures, and the lists of covered chemicals. For example, the original OSHA and EPA (Environmental Protection Agency) regulations to do with process safety have basically the same technical structure. However, the coverage and reporting requirements vary considerably from one another. Figure 2.1 shows how regulations, codes, standards, and guidance link to one another. They are shown in descending order of priority: regulations carry more authority than codes, which in turn have more authority than industry consensus standards and professional guidance.
Figure 2.1 Rules/codes/guidance. The boundaries between the categories shown in Figure 2.1 are fuzzy—a good deal of overlap exists between them. For example, some regulations incorporate codes and industry standards into their language, thus effectively giving those “voluntary” standards the force of law. Regulations
The first level in Figure 2.1 is “Regulations.” The different types of regulatory strategy are discussed below. Information to do with specific process safety regulations is provided later in this chapter. Figure 2.2 outlines the types of regulatory and compliance strategies that are used in the process industries, along with examples of that particular approach. (In practice, all regulations contain elements of both approaches—however, a sharp distinction between them is made here in order to illustrate the concepts being discussed.)
Figure 2.2 Regulatory strategies. Regulations are sometimes supplemented by guidance and/or by examples provided by the pertinent regulatory authority. Regulatory guidance does not possess the authority of a regulation or rule; guidance does not have to be followed. In practice, the guidance provided by regulators is often too general in nature to be of much practical benefit in day-to-day situations. Rule-Based Approach
The left-hand column of Figure 2.2 shows the rule-based approach, which is similar to the prescriptive strategies discussed in Chapter 1. The regulatory agency provides explicit instructions as to what has to be done; then inspectors from the agency check that the rule is being followed. An example of this approach is the American Petroleum Institute (API)’s Recommended Practice (RP) 14C as adopted into law by the Minerals Management Service (MMS) for offshore oil and gas production facilities. Many environmental regulations are rule based. They define exactly how much of a certain chemical can be discharged to the atmosphere or ground water over a certain period of time. The great advantage of a rule-based system is its simplicity. Everyone involved—the facility’s managers, the auditors, and the regulators—knows what is to be done and can readily check to see if it is being done. For example, a rule may require that handrails must “not be more than 37 in. (94 cm) high nor less than 30 in. (76 cm) from the upper surface of the handrail to the surface of the tread.” It is then quite simple to check all the handrails in the facility to ensure that they meet this rule. Compliance can also be relatively speedy and economical because the company will often purchase off-the-shelf solutions to address its operational and engineering issues. Goal-Driven Approach
In the 1970s to the 1980s, it became increasingly evident that the rule-based approach to industrial safety possessed a number of serious limitations. In particular, as industrial processes became increasingly complex, sophisticated regulators find that they lack the knowledge and insights to write and enforce rules that were pertinent to the new technology. Therefore, there was a move toward goal-driven or performance-based standards. Such standards are nonprescriptive in nature. Nonprescriptive standards provide few specific details as to how a facility is to be designed or operated. These standards rely on management and the company professionals taking the right actions to ensure that process safety goals are met. Such an approach is particularly appropriate when the facility is complex, possesses unique technology, or uses very sophisticated processes. In a nonprescriptive environment, each facility or company develops its own standard for its own operations. The only measure of success is success. If the facility operates cleanly, safely, and profitably, then the standards are effective and vice versa. Unlike detailed rule-based rules, goal-driven regulations tend to be nonspecific. For example, OSHA’s PSM standard to do with Mechanical Integrity procedures merely states “The employer shall establish and implement written procedures to maintain the ongoing integrity of process equipment.” There are no specific requirements regarding the amount of detail or the content of those procedures. An important benefit of a performance-based approach is that an industry can immediately capture what has been found by experience or test to work well—there is no need for the regulators to catch up with the latest technology (which will have moved on by the time they have done so). Figure 2.2 shows that a goal-driven approach can be...