Buch, Englisch, 192 Seiten, Format (B × H): 142 mm x 218 mm, Gewicht: 340 g
Buch, Englisch, 192 Seiten, Format (B × H): 142 mm x 218 mm, Gewicht: 340 g
ISBN: 978-0-19-882696-5
Verlag: Oxford University Press
After some therapy a man might stop being irascible and he might lose the disposition to become angry at the slightest provocation. If he does then he will have lost the disposition after an "internal" change. Can someone lose, or gain, a disposition merely as a result of a change in its external
circumstances?
Facts about the structure of society can, it seems, explain other facts. But how do they do it? Are there different kinds of structural explanations? Many things are said to be causes: a rock, when we say that the rock caused the window to break, and an event, when we say that the striking of the window caused its breakage. Which kind of causation - causation by events, or causation by things - is more basic? In Causation, Explanation, and the Metaphysics of Aspect, Bradford Skow
defends answers to these questions. His answers rely on a pair of connected distinctions: first is the distinction between acting, or doing something, and not acting; second is the distinction between situations in which an event happens, and situations in which instead something is in some state. The first
distinction is used to draw the second: an event happens if and only if something does something.