Formal Epistemology and Cartesian Skepticism

In Defense of Belief in the Natural World
1. Auflage 2020
ISBN: 978-0-367-59395-7
Verlag: Routledge

Buch, Englisch, 204 Seiten, Format (B × H): 152 mm x 229 mm, Gewicht: 304 g

Reihe: Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy

This book develops new techniques in formal epistemology and applies them to the challenge of Cartesian skepticism. It introduces two formats of epistemic evaluation that should be of interest to epistemologists and philosophers of science: the dual-component format, which evaluates a statement on the basis of its safety and informativeness, and the relative-divergence format, which evaluates a probabilistic model on the basis of its complexity and goodness of fit with data. Tomoji Shogenji shows that the former lends support to Cartesian skepticism, but the latter allows us to defeat Cartesian skepticism. Along the way, Shogenji addresses a number of related issues in epistemology and philosophy of science, including epistemic circularity, epistemic closure, and inductive skepticism.

Zielgruppe

Postgraduate and Undergraduate

Autoren/Hrsg.

Shogenji, Tomoji

Fachgebiete

• Interdisziplinäres Wissenschaften Wissenschaften Interdisziplinär Naturwissenschaften, Technik, Medizin
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Erkenntnistheorie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Introduction

1. Skepticism and the Method of Meliorative Epistemology

2. Truth as Correspondence

3.The Myth of Epistemic Circularity

4. Dual Components of Epistemic Evaluation

5. A Bayesian Case for Skepticism

6. Divergences from the Truth

7. Cartesian Skepticism Defeated

Über Autor(innen)

Tomoji Shogenji teaches philosophy at Rhode Island College. His main area of research is formal epistemology, and his publications include "Is coherence truth conducive?" (Analysis 1999) and "The Degree of epistemic justification and the conjunction fallacy" (Synthese 2012) among many others.