Rollinger Austrian Phenomenology

Brentano, Husserl, Meinong, and Others on Mind and Object
1. Auflage 2013
ISBN: 978-3-11-032548-5
Verlag: De Gruyter
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

E-Book, Englisch, 326 Seiten

Reihe: ISSN

While many of the phenomenological currents in philosophy allegedly utilize a peculiar method, the type under consideration here is characterized by Franz Brentano’s ambition to make philosophy scientific by adopting no other method but that of natural science. Brentano became particularly influential in teaching his students (such as Carl Stumpf, Anton Marty, Alexius Meinong, and Edmund Husserl) his descriptive psychology, which is concerned with mind as intentionally directed at objects. As Brentano and his students continued in their investigations in descriptive psychology, another side of Austrian phenomenology, namely object theory, became more and more prominent. The philosophical orientation under consideration in this collection of essays is accordingly a two-sided discipline, concerned with both mind and objects, and applicable to various areas of philosophy such as epistemology, philosophy of language, value theory, and ontology.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Rollinger, Robin D.

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Geschichte der Westlichen Philosophie Westliche Philosophie: 20./21. Jahrhundert
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Moderne Philosophische Disziplinen Phänomenologie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;INTRODUCTION;13
1.1;1. The Subject Matter of Austrian Phenomenology;14
1.2;2. The Method of Austrian Phenomenology;23
1.3;3. Austrian Phenomenology and Philosophy;30
1.4;4. Major Figures of Austrian Phenomenology;34
2;BRENTANO AND HUSSERL ON IMAGINATION;41
2.1;1. Introduction;41
2.2;2. Brentano on Imagination;42
2.3;3. Husserl on Imagination;49
2.3.1;3.1. Methodological Considerations;50
2.3.2;3.2. Presentations;51
2.3.3;3.3. Sensations and Phantasms;55
2.3.4;3.4. The Phantasy Image;56
2.3.5;3.5. Phantasy Presentations as Intuitive;58
2.3.6;3.6. Critique of the Doctrine of Original Association;59
2.4;4. Conclusion;60
3;NAMES, STATEMENTS, AND MIND-FUNCTIONS IN HUSSERL'S LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS;63
3.1;1. Introduction;63
3.2;2. Manifestation, Meaning, and Reference;64
3.3;3. Positing Names and Non-Positing Statements;70
3.4;4. Excursus: Inner Perception in the Logical Investigations;74
3.5;5. Fulfillment of Names and Statements;76
3.6;6. Concluding Remarks;84
4;MARTY ON LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS AND MIND-FUNCTIONS;85
4.1;1. Introduction;85
4.2;2. Ontological Requirements;85
4.3;3. Mind-Functions in Correlation with Linguistic Expressions;89
4.4;4. Mentalism and Introspectionism;94
4.5;5. Conclusion;98
5;HUSSERL'S ELEMENTARY LOGIC: THE 1896 LECTURES IN THEIR NINETEENTH CENTURY CONTEXT;99
5.1;1. Introduction;99
5.2;3. Logic as Theory of Science;101
5.3;3. Concepts;105
5.4;4. Propositions;110
5.5;5. Inferences;116
5.6;6. Conclusion;119
6;MEINONG ON THE OBJECTS OF SENSATION;121
6.1;1. Introduction;121
6.2;2. Brentano on Sensory Contents;124
6.3;3. From Physical Phenomena to Objects of Sensation;127
6.4;4. Sensory Objects of Higher Order;131
6.5;5. The Nonexistence of Sensory Objects;132
6.6;6. A Priori Knowledge about Sensory Objects;136
6.7;7. Comparison with Stumpf;142
6.8;8. Comparison with Husserl;146
6.9;9. Conclusion;148
7;STUMPF ON PHENOMENA AND PHENOMENOLOGY;151
7.1;1. Introduction;151
7.2;2. Phenomena;152
7.3;3. Phenomenology;158
7.4;4. Conclusion;167
8;BRENTANO AND MEINONG;169
8.1;1. Introduction;169
8.2;2. Points of Divergence;171
8.2.1;2.1. Theory of Relations;172
8.2.2;2.2. Intensity;175
8.2.3;2.3. Immediate Evidence of Surmise;175
8.2.4;2.4. Feeling and Desire;178
8.2.5;2.5. Content and Object;179
8.2.6;2.6. Judgments;179
8.2.7;2.7. Presentations;181
8.2.8;2.8. Time-Consciousness;182
8.2.9;2.9. Assumptions;183
8.2.10;2.10. Object Theory;185
8.2.11;2.11. Value Theory;191
8.2.12;2.12. Phenomena and Consciousness;192
8.3;3. Philosophical Affinity;193
9;HUSSERL AND CORNELIUS: PHENOMENOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND EPISTEMOLOGY;201
9.1;1. Introduction;201
9.2;2. Hans Cornelius (1863-1947);202
9.3;3. Husserl's Critique of Attempt at a Theory of Existential Judgments;204
9.3.1;3.1 Various Types of Problems concerning Judgments;205
9.3.2;3.2 Perceiving and Distinguishing;206
9.3.3;3.3 Content, Object, and Meaning;207
9.3.4;3.4 Phantasms and Sensations;209
9.3.5;3.5 Memory Images;209
9.3.6;3.6. Negation;210
9.4;4. Husserl's Critique of Psychology as an Experiential Science;211
9.4.1;4.1 The Principle of Thought Economy;212
9.4.2;4.2 Abstraction and General Ideas;214
9.4.3;4.3 The Experiential Origin of Universally Valid Judgments;217
9.5;5. Cornelius' Reply and Correspondence with Husserl;218
9.5.1;5.1 Psychology and Epistemology;219
9.5.2;5.2 Correspondence;221
9.6;5.3. The Subject Matter of Phenomenology;226
9.7;6. Conclusion;231
10;MEINONG ON PERCEPTION AND OBJECTIVES;233
11;AUSTRIAN THEORIES OF JUDGMENT: BOLZANO, BRENTANO, MEINONG, AND HUSSERL;245
11.1;1. Introduction;245
11.2;2. Bolzano;245
11.3;3. Brentano;254
11.4;4. Meinong;260
11.5;5. Husserl;266
11.6;6. Concluding Remarks;273
12;THE CONCEPT OF CAUSALITY IN STUMPF'S EPISTEMOLOGY;275
12.1;1. Introduction;275
12.2;2. Stumpf’s Epistemology;276
12.3;3. The Concept of Causality in British Empiricism;281
12.4;4. Inwardly Perceived Causality;283
12.5;5. Necessity in Natural Causal Laws;287
12.6;6. The External World and Causality;291
12.7;7. Causality in Inorganic Nature;294
12.8;8. Causality in Organic Nature;299
12.9;9. Psycho-Physical Causality;302
12.10;10. Psychical Causality;308
12.11;11. Conclusion;310
13;BIBLIOGRAPHY;313