Riesenfeld The Rei(g)n of ‘Rule’

1. Auflage 2013
ISBN: 978-3-11-032186-9
Verlag: De Gruyter
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

E-Book, Englisch, Band 2, 132 Seiten

Reihe: AporiaISSN

The Rei(g)n of Rule is a study of rules and their role in language. Rules have dominated the philosophical arena as a fundamental philosophical concept. Little progress, however, has been made in reaching an accepted definition of rules. This fact is not coincidental. The concept of rule is expected to perform various, at times conflicting, tasks. Analyzing key debates and rule related discussions in the philosophy of language I show that typically rules are perceived and defined either as norms or as conventions. As norms, rules perform the evaluative task of distinguishing between correct and incorrect actions. As conventions, rules describe how certain actions are actually undertaken. As normative and conventional requirements do not necessarily coincide, the concept of rule cannot simultaneously accommodate both. The impossibility to consistently define ‘rule’ has gone unnoticed by philosophers, and it is in this sense that ‘rule’ has also blocked philosophical attempts to explain language in terms of rules.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Riesenfeld, Dana

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Sprachphilosophie
• Geisteswissenschaften Sprachwissenschaft Sprachwissenschaften Sprachphilosophie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;I
. Rules, Norms and Conventions;8
1.1;1. Why norms are not conventions and conventions are not norms;18
1.1.1;1.1 The tension of normativity;18
1.1.2;1.2 Two concepts of arbitrariness: Saussure and Lewis;20
1.1.3;1.3 Can conventions become norms?;29
1.1.4;1.4 Rules;32
1.2;2. Cavell on normative necessity: The philosopher, the baker, and the pantomime of caution;36
1.2.1;2.1 “I am less interested now in the “mean” than I am in the “must””;36
1.2.2;2.2 “Here the pantomime of caution concludes”;38
1.2.3;2.3 “…the hopelessness of speaking, in a general way, about the “normativeness” of expressions”;40
2;II. Rules as conventions vs. rules as norms in the rule-following debates;46
2.1;3. What is a rule and what ought it to be;46
2.1.1;3.1 The reduction of rules to conventions vs. the reduction of rules to norms;46
2.1.2;3.2 Kripke: The reduction of rules to conventions1;47
2.1.3;3.3 Baker and Hacker: The reduction of rules to norms;59
2.1.4;3.4 Meredith Williams on normative necessity;70
2.1.5;3.5 Cora Diamond: Rules and their right place;82
3;III. Twisted Language;90
3.1;4. Davidson on rules, conventions and norms;90
3.1.1;4.1. Normativity without conventionality;90
3.1.2;4.2 Communication without rules or conventions;90
3.1.3;4.3 “The second person” vs. the community view;97
3.1.4;4.4 The two kinds of normativity;100
3.1.5;4.5 The unpacking of ‘ought’18;106
3.1.6;4.6 Normativity without norms;109
3.2;5. Searle on rules (of rationality, conversation and speech acts);116
3.2.1;5.1 The shortcut argument against rule;116
3.2.2;5.2 Is language a rule governed form of behavior or is it not?;117
3.2.3;5.3 (No) Rules of conversation;118
3.2.4;5.4 Background brought to the foreground;123
4;Conclusion;126