Overview
- Provides the first extensive treatment of the notion of epistemic blameworthiness, a notion central to many philosophical concerns
- Brings together for the first time important legal case material, meta-ethical theory and state-of-the-art epistemology
- Presents a wide array of topics in contemporary philosophy, on which much interesting work is sure to be done in the near future
- Provides the reader with an up-to-date breath of outlook over the complex debates concerning the issues of criminal negligence, culpable ignorance, epistemic responsibility, foresight and doxastic control
Part of the book series: Synthese Library (SYLI, volume 338)
Access this book
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Other ways to access
About this book
Believing the wrong thing may sometimes have drastic consequences. The question as to when a person is not only ill-guided, but genuinely at fault for holding a particular belief is an important one: It touches upon the roots of our understanding of such notions as criminal negligence and moral responsibility.
The answer to this question may influence the extent to which we are willing to submit each other to punishments ranging from mild resentment to harsh prison terms.
This book presents an extensive effort to shed light on the conditions under which we may appropriately deem someone blameworthy for holding a particular belief. It regiments and unifies several debates within contemporary epistemology, ethics and legal scholarship. Finally, the book brings a new philosophical look on issues like our power to control beliefs and the extent and nature of foresight.
Similar content being viewed by others
Keywords
Table of contents (15 chapters)
-
Front Matter
-
Back Matter
Reviews
“I can only strongly recommend Nikolaj Nottelmann’s book ‘Blameworthy Belief’. It is the first book-length in-depth study of epistemic deontologism and develops a conceptually rich, concise and inspiring theory of epistemic blameworthiness.” (Andrea Kruse, Erkenntnis, Vol. 80, 2015)
"Nikolaj Nottelmann's Blameworthy Belief is unique in being an up-to-date monograph devoted entirely to the problem of a moral appraisal of beliefs and the closely related problem of deciding to believe (doxastic voluntarism and anti-voluntarism). It is argued that rational agents may be appropriate objects of deontic attitudes, in particular blameworthiness. Nottelmann thereby offers an original and in depth defence of the deontological conception of epistemic justification. Blameworthy Belief is bound to become a highly influential work and is of great interest not only to epistemologists, but also to philosophers of law and moral philosophers." Heinrich Wansing, Professor of Philosophy of Science and Logic, Dresden University of Technology, Germany
"Nottelmann has nicely managed to weave accounts of competing views into his discussion, and so this book provides an excellent survey of the literature en route to the development of a sensible account of how we could be said to be responsible for believing various things, even though belief formation is not under our voluntary control." John Heil, Professor of Philosophy, Washington University in St. Louis, U.S.A., and Monash University, Australia
Authors and Affiliations
Bibliographic Information
Book Title: Blameworthy Belief
Book Subtitle: A Study in Epistemic Deontologism
Authors: Nikolaj Nottelmann
Series Title: Synthese Library
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-5961-2
Publisher: Springer Dordrecht
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and Law, Philosophy and Religion (R0)
Copyright Information: Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007
Hardcover ISBN: 978-1-4020-5960-5Published: 20 June 2007
Softcover ISBN: 978-90-481-7489-8Published: 11 November 2010
eBook ISBN: 978-1-4020-5961-2Published: 18 July 2007
Series ISSN: 0166-6991
Series E-ISSN: 2542-8292
Edition Number: 1
Number of Pages: XII, 282
Topics: Epistemology, Ethics, Philosophy of Law, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Education, Philosophy, general