Philip | The Human Rights Discourse between Liberty and Welfare | E-Book | sack.de
E-Book

E-Book, Englisch, Band 3, 492 Seiten, Format (B × H): 153 mm x 227 mm

Reihe: Ethik in den Sozialwissenschaften

Philip The Human Rights Discourse between Liberty and Welfare


A Dialogue with Jacques Maritain and Amartya Sen

E-Book, Englisch, Band 3, 492 Seiten, Format (B × H): 153 mm x 227 mm

Reihe: Ethik in den Sozialwissenschaften

ISBN: 978-3-8452-8449-1
Verlag: Nomos
Format: PDF
 Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

Given the fact that the prevalent political debates about the status and significance of liberty and welfare are almost polarised, this book defends both of them as essential to human dignity and well-being. Amartya Sen’s capability approach is the result of his constructive criticism of John Rawls’ political liberalism. Though Jacques Maritain is often regarded as the forerunner of Rawls, he has not yet been discussed in relation to Sen’s capability approach. Despite Maritain’s pioneering contributions to human rights discourse in the twentieth century, his personalism only insufficiently reflects and explains the demands of welfare rights. In view of this shared deficit in liberal traditions, this book argues that Sen’s human rights discourse, with its “goal rights system”, persuasively integrates both liberty and welfare rights. In addition, it merges both human rights and human development discourses, consequently laying a solid foundation for a rights-based approach to development.
Philip The Human Rights Discourse between Liberty and Welfare jetzt bestellen!

Autoren/Hrsg.

Philip, Jiji

Fachgebiete

Weitere Infos & Material

1;Cover;1
2; GENERAL INTRODUCTION;15
2.1; 1. The Context: Increasing Inequality in a Prospering World;15
2.2; 2. The Problem: The Question of Liberty Rights and Welfare Rights;16
2.3; 3. The Objective: Mutual Enforcement of Human Rights and Human Development;18
2.4; 4. The Relevance of the Comparative Study;21
2.4.1; 4.1. The Interplay of the Maritain-Rawls-Sen Triad;21
2.4.2; 4.2. The Genesis of Human Rights;24
2.4.3; 4.3. The Justification of Human Rights;27
2.4.3.1; 4.3.1. A comparative approach to a practical agreement on principles of action: liberty;27
2.4.3.2; 4.3.2. A realization-focused approach: welfare;28
2.4.4; 4.4. Towards the Major Argument of the Book;28
2.5; 5. Some General Information about the Structure and Style of the Book;30
2.5.1; 5.1. Scope, Delimitation and Methodology;30
2.5.2; 5.2. The Structure of the Book;31
2.5.3; 5.3. The Language;31
2.5.4; 5.4. Sen’s Name, Editions and Bibliography;32
3; A. MARITAIN’S HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE;33
3.1; I. The Shaping of a Political Philosopher;33
3.1.1; 1. Socialist Influences: The Young Maritain;33
3.1.2; 2. Conversion to Metaphysics: Henri Bergson;34
3.1.3; 3. Conversion to the Catholic Faith: Léon Bloy;37
3.1.4; 4. The Socialist and Nationalist: Charles Péguy;38
3.1.5; 5. To the Right: Maurras and Action Française;40
3.1.6; 6. To the Left: Emmanuel Mounier and Personalism;43
3.1.7; 7. The Political Philosopher and Diplomat: The Later Maritain;46
3.1.8; Conclusion;48
3.2; II. The Founding Principles of Maritain’s Political Philosophy;49
3.2.1; 1. The Human Being;50
3.2.1.1; 1.1. Individuality;50
3.2.1.2; 1.2. Personality;52
3.2.1.2.1; The extrinsic;52
3.2.1.2.2; The intrinsic;53
3.2.1.3; 1.3. A Precarious Unity;54
3.2.2; 2. The Social Being;56
3.2.2.1; Communion in virtue of dignity;57
3.2.2.2; Communion in virtue of needs and deficiencies;58
3.2.2.2.1; 2.1. The Common Good;59
3.2.2.2.1.1; 2.1.1. Relationship to Society as an Individual;59
3.2.2.2.1.2; 2.1.2. Relationship to Society as a Person;60
3.2.2.2.1.3; 2.1.3. The Dialectical Tension;61
3.2.2.2.1.4; 2.1.4. Three Characteristics of the Common Good;62
3.2.2.2.1.4.1; a. Redistribution;62
3.2.2.2.1.4.2; b. Intrinsic Morality;63
3.2.2.2.1.4.3; c. Authority;64
3.2.2.2.2; 2.2. A Global Governance for the Global Common Good;66
3.2.2.2.3; 2.3. Democracy;68
3.2.3; 3. The Knowing Being;72
3.2.4; In lieu of a Conclusion: Towards a Personalist Political Theory;77
3.3; III. The Idea of Human Rights;78
3.3.1; 1. Maritain’s Conversion to Human Rights;79
3.3.1.1; 1.1. Anti-modernism of the Church;79
3.3.1.2; 1.2. Anti-Thomism of the Modernity;81
3.3.1.3; 1.3. Maritain, the Philosopher of Human Rights;84
3.3.1.3.1; 1.3.1. The Historical Oddity;84
3.3.1.3.2; 1.3.2. The Philosophical Curiosity;88
3.3.2; 2. Natural Law: The Rational Foundation of Human Rights;89
3.3.2.1; 2.1. The Ontological Element of Natural Law;91
3.3.2.2; 2.2. The Gnoseological Element of Natural Law;93
3.3.3; 3. Maritain’s Characterization of Human Rights;96
3.3.3.1; 3.1. The Pre-Political Status of Human Rights;97
3.3.3.2; 3.2. Three Types of Law;99
3.3.3.2.1; 3.2.1. Natural Law;100
3.3.3.2.2; 3.2.2. The Law of Nations;101
3.3.3.2.3; 3.2.3. Positive Law;103
3.3.3.3; 3.3. The Hierarchy of Human Rights;104
3.3.3.3.1; 3.3.1. The Rights of the Human Person;104
3.3.3.3.2; 3.3.2. The Rights of the Civic Person;106
3.3.3.3.3; 3.3.3. The Rights of the Working Person;108
3.3.3.4; 3.4. The Limitations of Human Rights;110
3.3.3.4.1; 3.4.1. Possession and Exercise of Human Rights;111
3.3.3.4.2; 3.4.2. Obligations;113
3.3.3.4.3; 3.4.3. Trade-offs and Dynamic Unity;115
3.3.4; Conclusion;117
3.4; IV. An Appraisal of Maritain’s Human Rights Discourse;118
3.4.1; 1. A Practical, Secular and Plural Approach to Human Rights;119
3.4.1.1; 1.1. Practical;119
3.4.1.2; 1.2. Secular and Plural;123
3.4.1.3; 1.3. Criticisms;129
3.4.2; 2. The Concept of Progression;132
3.4.2.1; 2.1. Human Dignity in Evolution;133
3.4.2.2; 2.2. History in Evolution;134
3.4.2.3; 2.3. Human Knowledge in Evolution;135
3.4.2.4; 2.4. Human Rights in Evolution;137
3.4.3; 3. The Elevation of the Human;139
3.4.3.1; 3.1. Maritain’s Reclaiming of the Person;141
3.4.3.2; 3.2. The Notion of Subjective Rights;142
3.4.3.3; 3.3. The ‘Deification’ of the Human Being;143
3.4.3.4; 3.4. Democracy – Collective Autonomy;145
3.4.3.5; 3.5. Criticisms;146
3.4.4; 4. An Enormously Influential Approach to Human Rights;147
3.4.4.1; 4.1. The Reception in the Secular World;148
3.4.4.1.1; 4.1.1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights;148
3.4.4.1.2; 4.1.2. Influences in the Politics;152
3.4.4.2; 4.2. The Reception in the Church;156
3.4.4.2.1; 4.2.1. Dignitatis Humanae: The Affirmation of the Person;158
3.4.4.2.2; 4.2.2. Gaudium et Spes: The Affirmation of the Secular;160
3.4.5; Conclusion;163
3.5; V. Some Limitations of Maritain’s Treatment of Human Rights;164
3.5.1; 1. Spiritualism;164
3.5.2; 2. Liberalism;169
3.5.2.1; 2.1. Early Criticism of Capitalism;169
3.5.2.2; 2.2. A Proponent of Liberalism: The American Spirit;174
3.5.2.3; 2.3. Liberal Politics and Liberal Human Rights;177
3.5.2.4; 2.4. A Moral Politics and an Amoral Economics;178
3.5.3; Conclusion;180
4; B. AN INTERIM APPRAISAL: From Maritain to Sen;182
4.1; 1. The Legacy of Scholastic Economics and Sen’s Rediscovery of the Tradition of Political Economy;182
4.2; 2. From Integral Humanism to Integral Development;188
5; C. SEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE;196
5.1; I. The Entanglement of Biography and Philosophy;196
5.1.1; 1. Two Anamnestic Moments;197
5.1.1.1; 1.1. The Great Famine of Bengal: The Question of Welfare;198
5.1.1.2; 1.2. The Partition of India: The Question of Freedom;202
5.1.2; 2. The Idea of Justice and the Question of Welfare and Liberty;207
5.1.2.1; 2.1. The Fact of Injustices and the Task of Bettering the World: A Direct Interest in Welfare;208
5.1.2.2; 2.2. A Comparative Approach to Justice: Attention on Liberty;211
5.1.3; Conclusion;216
5.2; II. Sen’s Twin-Motif of Liberty and Welfare;217
5.2.1; 1. The ‘Possibility’ of Liberty and Welfare;217
5.2.1.1; 1.1. The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal and the Possibility of Liberty;217
5.2.1.2; 1.2. Impossibility Theorems and the Possibility of Welfare Economics;219
5.2.1.3; Conclusion;221
5.2.2; 2. Liberty: Sen’s Critique of Economics;222
5.2.2.1; 2.1. Critique of Economic Rationality;223
5.2.2.1.1; 2.1.1. Rationality as Consistency: The Internal Correspondence;224
5.2.2.1.2; 2.1.2. Self-interest and Rational Behaviour: The External Correspondence;227
5.2.2.2; 2.2. Human Beings between Egoism and Altruism;229
5.2.2.3; 2.3. Meta-ranking as an Apparatus to Overcome the Rationality-Morality Dichotomy;234
5.2.2.4; Conclusion;237
5.2.3; 3. Welfare: Sen’s Critique of Prevalent Currencies of Welfare;239
5.2.3.1; 3.1. Critique of Utilitarianism;239
5.2.3.1.1; 3.1.1. Welfarism;240
5.2.3.1.2; 3.1.2. Sum-ranking;241
5.2.3.1.3; 3.1.3. Consequentialism;242
5.2.3.2; 3.2. Critique of Libertarianism and Rawls’ Primacy of Liberty;244
5.2.3.2.1; 3.2.1. Nozick and the Complete Priority of Liberty;244
5.2.3.2.2; 3.2.2. Rawls and the Predominance of Liberty;245
5.2.3.2.2.1; a. Overwhelming Precedence of Personal Liberties;246
5.2.3.2.2.2; b. Conversion Problems;247
5.2.3.3; 3.3. Sen’s Alternative Metric of Capability;249
5.2.4; Conclusion;255
5.3; III. The Idea of Human Rights;256
5.3.1; 1. The Nature and Content of Human Rights;256
5.3.1.1; 1.1. The Nature: Human Rights as Ethical Claims;257
5.3.1.1.1; 1.1.1. Beyond the Legislative Route;259
5.3.1.1.2; 1.1.2. Limitations of the Legal Route;261
5.3.1.1.2.1; a. Not all rights can be legislated;261
5.3.1.1.2.2; b. Law cannot be a guide to moral obligations;262
5.3.1.1.2.3; c. Universality of human rights;262
5.3.1.1.2.4; d. Existence of law does not guarantee the realization of human rights;263
5.3.1.1.3; 1.1.3. Interactive and Interrelated Means of Enhancing Human Rights;264
5.3.1.2; 1.2. The Content: Human Rights as Freedoms;266
5.3.1.2.1; 1.2.1. Human Rights: From Minimal Liberty to Real Opportunities;267
5.3.1.2.2; 1.2.2. Process and Opportunity Freedom;269
5.3.1.2.3; 1.2.3. A Multidimensional Notion of Freedom;272
5.3.1.2.4; 1.2.4. The Threshold Conditions: Not all Freedoms Are Human Rights;273
5.3.1.3; Conclusion;275
5.3.2; 2. Universality and Viability of Human Rights;276
5.3.2.1; 2.1. Universality Based on Our Shared Humanity;277
5.3.2.2; 2.2. Viability Based on Survivability in Reasoned Discussion;285
5.3.2.3; Conclusion;292
5.3.3; 3. Obligations;293
5.3.3.1; 3.1. Scepticism about the Obligations Arising from Welfare Rights;293
5.3.3.2; 3.2. Sen’s Formulation of Perfect and Imperfect Obligations;295
5.3.3.3; 3.3. Obligation of Effective Power;300
5.3.3.4; Conclusion;302
5.3.4; 4. Human Rights as Social Goals;303
5.3.4.1; 4.1. Goal Rights System: A Synthesis of Deontology and Consequentialism;306
5.3.4.2; 4.2. Relaxations and Affirmations;309
5.3.4.2.1; 4.2.1. Relaxation 1: Welfarist Instrumentalism;310
5.3.4.2.2; 4.2.2. Affirmation 1: Intrinsic Value and Agent-weighted Approach of Deontology;312
5.3.4.2.2.1; a. The intrinsic value of rights;312
5.3.4.2.2.2; b. Agent-weighted approach;312
5.3.4.2.3; 4.2.3. Relaxation 2: Constraint-based Deontology;314
5.3.4.2.4; 4.2.4. Affirmation 2: Instrumental and Interdependent Sensitivity of Consequentialism;320
5.3.4.3; Conclusion;323
5.3.5; 5. The Indivisibility and Interdependence of Human Rights;324
5.3.5.1; 5.1. The Plausibility of Economic and Social Rights;325
5.3.5.1.1; 5.1.1. Institutionalization Critique;327
5.3.5.1.2; 5.1.2. Feasibility Critique;329
5.3.5.1.3; 5.1.3. Metarights;331
5.3.5.2; 5.2. The Relevance of Political and Civil Rights;334
5.3.5.2.1; 5.2.1. Political Freedom a Luxury for the Poor and Foreign to Culture?;334
5.3.5.2.2; 5.2.2. The Inevitability of the Political;336
5.3.5.2.3; 5.2.3. Three Important Roles of Political Freedom;339
5.3.5.2.3.1; a. Intrinsic;340
5.3.5.2.3.2; b. Instrumental;342
5.3.5.2.3.3; c. Constructive;344
5.3.6; Conclusion;347
5.4; IV. An Appraisal of Sen’s Human Rights Discourse;349
5.4.1; 1. A Paradigm Shift in the Conceptualization of Development and Human Rights;350
5.4.2; 2. The Integration of Human Development and Human Rights;352
5.4.3; 3. The Right to Development as a Vector of Rights and Processes: Sengupta;355
5.4.3.1; 3.1. The Nature and Content of RtD;355
5.4.3.1.1; 3.1.1. The Prevailing Scepticism;356
5.4.3.1.1.1; Human rights are individual rights;356
5.4.3.1.1.2; Justifiability;357
5.4.3.1.1.3; Coherence critique;357
5.4.3.1.2; 3.1.2. RtD as a Human Right;358
5.4.3.1.3; 3.1.3. RtD as a Right to Process of Development;361
5.4.3.2; 3.2. Value Addition;364
5.4.3.2.1; 3.2.1. The Objective of Development: What Is Achieved?;365
5.4.3.2.2; 3.2.2. The Process of Development: How Is It Achieved?;367
5.4.3.2.2.1; Planned process focusing on the worst-off;368
5.4.3.2.2.2; Interrelatedness of Ends and Means;370
5.4.3.3; Conclusion;373
5.4.4; 4. The Integration of Human Rights and Human Development: Sen;374
5.4.4.1; 4.1. What Human Rights Add to Human Development;375
5.4.4.1.1; The notion of duties to the fore;376
5.4.4.1.2; How development is brought about – Process justice;377
5.4.4.1.3; Enriching the assessments of social progress;377
5.4.4.2; 4.2. What Human Development Adds to Human Rights;378
5.4.4.2.1; Concreteness to human rights analysis;378
5.4.4.2.2; Assessment of the policies;378
5.4.4.2.3; Creating an enabling social environment for the fulfilment of human rights;379
5.4.4.2.4; The dynamism of the notion of development;379
5.4.5; Conclusion;380
5.5; V. Some Limitations of Sen’s Human Rights Discourse;381
5.5.1; 1. The Overestimation of animal rationale;381
5.5.2; 2. The Insufficient Treatment of Structural Causes of Injustices;386
5.5.3; 3. The Insufficient Treatment of Group Rights;391
5.5.4; 4. The Insufficient Treatment of Ecological Issues;396
5.5.5; 5. The Absolutization of Political Freedom;401
5.5.6; 6. The Risks of Total Non-Essentialism;404
5.5.7; Conclusion;407
6; D. A COMPARISON OF MARITAIN’S PERSONALISM AND SEN’S HUMANISM;408
6.1; I. Some Common Characteristics;408
6.1.1; 1. Old Answers to New Questions;408
6.1.1.1; 1.1. Maritain and Aquinas;408
6.1.1.2; 1.2. Sen and Smith;413
6.1.2; 2. A Broad Anthropology;415
6.1.2.1; Rationality;419
6.1.2.2; Humanistic or theological?;421
6.1.2.3; Conclusion;424
6.1.3; 3. A Synthetic Approach;424
6.1.3.1; 3.1. Maritain;425
6.1.3.2; 3.2. Sen;426
6.1.3.2.1; Conclusion;430
6.1.4; 4. The Methodology: Realization-focused Comparative Approach;430
6.1.4.1; 4.1. The Possibility of a Practical Agreement on Principles of Action;431
6.1.4.1.1; Maritain’s endorsement of a practical agreement;431
6.1.4.1.2; Sen’s comparative justice;433
6.1.4.1.3; Conclusion;437
6.1.4.2; 4.2. The Possibility of Praxis;438
6.2; II. Some Commonalities in the Human Rights Discourses;442
6.2.1; 1. Human Rights as Ethical Claims;442
6.2.2; 2. The Universality of Human Rights;446
6.2.3; 3. The Indivisibility of Human Rights;449
6.2.4; Conclusion;451
7; GENERAL CONCLUSION: The Contours of an Effective Social Ethics;452
7.1; 1. Liberty;453
7.1.1; 1.1. Confidence in the Human Moral Agents;453
7.1.2; 1.2. Relevance of a Discursive Process;455
7.2; 2. Welfare;458
7.2.1; 2.1. A Sense of Injustice as the Starting Point of Social Ethics;458
7.2.2; 2.2. A Realization-focused Framework;459
7.3; Conclusion;461
8; Bibliography;463
8.1; Primary Sources;463
8.1.1; Jacques Maritain;463
8.1.2; Amartya Sen;464
8.2; Secondary Literature;471

Ihre Fragen, Wünsche oder Anmerkungen
Vorname*
Nachname*
Ihre E-Mail-Adresse*
Kundennr.
Ihre Nachricht*
Lediglich mit * gekennzeichnete Felder sind Pflichtfelder.
Wenn Sie die im Kontaktformular eingegebenen Daten durch Klick auf den nachfolgenden Button übersenden, erklären Sie sich damit einverstanden, dass wir Ihr Angaben für die Beantwortung Ihrer Anfrage verwenden. Selbstverständlich werden Ihre Daten vertraulich behandelt und nicht an Dritte weitergegeben. Sie können der Verwendung Ihrer Daten jederzeit widersprechen. Das Datenhandling bei Sack Fachmedien erklären wir Ihnen in unserer Datenschutzerklärung.