Pfänder Logic

1. Auflage 2013
ISBN: 978-3-11-032915-5
Verlag: De Gruyter
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

E-Book, Englisch, Band 3, 422 Seiten

Reihe: Realistische Phänomenologie / Realist Phenomenology

Alexander Pfänder's classical phenomenological logic, a masterwork of unmatched clarity, is presented here for the first time in English. The book unfolds the general essence of logic, its object, not acts of thinking but objective "thoughts", meanings and higher unities formed by them: the nature and kinds (1) of judgments (propositions) and their truth and truth claims, (2) of concepts, and (3) of inferences; (4) the first foundational principles of logic (the principles of identity, contradiction, excluded middle, and sufficient reason) and of valid inferences, their foundation in ontological principles, as well as the valid forms of reasoning recognized in traditional logic and the reasons of their validity. Being a new phenomenological exposition of traditional logic, it reduces the symbolic language used to a minimum in order to concentrate on the logical meanings and laws themselves for which these symbols are signs.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Pfänder, Alexander

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Philosophische Logik, Argumentationstheorie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;CONTENTS;5
2;In Memoriam Dr. Don Ferrari;11
3;Translator’s Introduction;13
4;Introduction;33
4.1;1. Object and Purpose of Logic;33
4.2;2. Traditional Logic;50
4.3;3. Psychologism;52
4.4;4. Logic and Epistemology;57
4.5;5. Logic and Phenomenology;59
4.6;6. Overview of the Following;61
5;Part OneThe Theory of the Judgment;63
5.1;FIRST CHAPTER Preliminary Considerations;63
5.1.1;1. The Judgment and the Sentence;63
5.1.2;2. The Difference between Sentence and Judgment;65
5.1.3;3. The Relationship between the Judgment and the Assertive Sentence;66
5.1.4;4. The Judgment and the State of Affairs;67
5.1.5;5. The Supposition of the Sentence;69
5.2;SECOND CHAPTER
Essence and Structure of the Judgment;71
5.2.1;1. Essential Components of the Judgment;71
5.2.2;2. The Copula-Function;75
5.3;THIRD CHAPTER Objects, States of Affairs, and Judgments;79
5.3.1;1. The Judgment and the Domain of Objects;79
5.3.2;2. Division of Judgments According to the Kinds of States of AffairsPosited;79
5.4;FOURTH CHAPTER Existential and Impersonal Judgments;85
5.4.1;1. The Existential Judgment;85
5.4.2;2. The So–Called Impersonal or Subjectless Sentences;96
5.5;FIFTH CHAPTER The Judgment and Its Claim to Truth;105
5.6;SIXTH CHAPTER The So-Called Quality of the Judgment;121
5.7;SEVENTH CHAPTER The So-Called Modality of the Judgment;131
5.8;EIGHTH CHAPTER The So-Called Relation of the Judgment;141
5.9;NINTH CHAPTER The So-Called Quantity of the Judgment and the Possible Forms of theJudgment;153
5.10;TENTH CHAPTERTemporal Determination in the Judgment and the ComprehensiveDefinition of the Judgment;169
5.10.1;1. Temporal Determination in the Judgment.;169
5.10.2;2. Comprehensive General Definition of the Judgment;170
6;Part TwoThe Theory of the Concept;173
6.1;[General Remarks];173
6.2;FIRST CHAPTER Concepts, Words, Objects;175
6.3;SECOND CHAPTER Content of a Concept;179
6.4;THIRD CHAPTER Individual-, Species-, and Genus-Concepts;185
6.5;FOURTH CHAPTER General Concepts;191
6.6;FIFTH CHAPTER The Extension of a Concept — Content and Extension;195
6.6.1;Content and Extension of a Concept;198
6.7;SIXTH CHAPTER Concrete and Abstract Concepts;201
6.8;SEVENTH CHAPTER The Definition of Concepts;203
6.9;EIGHTH CHAPTER Purely Functioning Concepts;209
6.10;NINTH CHAPTER Logically Distinct Kinds of Object-Concepts;217
6.10.1;1. Nominative or Substantive Concepts;217
6.10.2;2. Supplemental Concepts;219
6.11;TENTH CHAPTER Relational Concepts;225
6.12;ELEVENTH CHAPTER SummaryLaws for the Formation of Concepts and Judgmentsand The Special Function of Concepts in the Judgment;229
6.12.1;The Laws for the Composition of the Concept and the Judgment;229
6.12.2;Possible and Necessary Components of the Judgment;233
6.12.3;The Special Function of Concepts in the Judgment;234
7;PART THREE The First Principles of Logic;237
7.1;[General Remarks];237
7.2;FIRST CHAPTER The Principle of Identity;239
7.2.1;1. The Logical Sense of the Principle of Identity;239
7.2.2;2. The Broadening of the Principle of Identity and Analytical Judgments;249
7.3;SECOND CHAPTER The Principle of Contradiction;255
7.3.1;1. The General Principle of Contradiction;255
7.3.2;2. The Special Principle of Contradiction;267
7.4;THIRD CHAPTER The Principle of Excluded Middle;273
7.4.1;The Principle of Contradictory Disjunction;279
7.5;FOURTH CHAPTER The Principle of Sufficient Reason;281
7.5.1;Special Form of the Principle of Sufficient Reason;293
7.6;FIFTH CHAPTERThe First Principles of Logic as Principles about the Truth and Falsityof Judgments;299
8;PART FOUR The Theory of Inferences;307
8.1;Remarks Concerning Inferences in General;307
8.2;A. THE THEORY OF IMMEDIATE INFERENCES;315
8.2.1;[General Remarks];315
8.2.2;FIRST CHAPTER Immediate Inferences Involving Judgments of Different Quantity;317
8.2.2.1;1. Inferences between Single and Plural Judgments;317
8.2.2.2;2. Inferences between Singular, Particular, and Universal Judgments:Subalternation;318
8.2.2.3;3. Inferences between Individual and Species Judgments;320
8.2.2.4;4. Inferences between Solitary and Collective Judgments;323
8.2.3;SECOND CHAPTER Immediate Inferences Involving Judgments of Different Quality:Opposition;325
8.2.4;THIRD CHAPTER Immediate Inferences Involving Judgments of Different Modality:Inferences of Modal Consequence;331
8.2.5;FOURTH CHAPTER Immediate Inferences Involving Judgments of Different Relation:Inferences Involving Change of Relation;335
8.2.6;FIFTH CHAPTER Immediate Inferences by Reversal of Judgments:Conversion and Contraposition;341
8.2.7;SIXTH CHAPTER Immediate Inferences of Equipollence;349
8.2.8;SEVENTH CHAPTER Materially Conditioned or Nonformal Immediate Inferences;351
8.2.9;EIGHTH CHAPTER Immediate Inferences through the Drawing Out of Judgments Impliedin a Judgment;357
8.3;B. THE THEORY OF INDIRECT INFERENCES;359
8.3.1;General Remarks;359
8.3.2;FIRST CHAPTER The Traditional Theory of the Syllogism;361
8.3.3;SECOND CHAPTER The Shortcoming of Traditional Syllogistic Theory;395
8.3.4;THIRD CHAPTER The Drawing of Indirect Inferences from Two Categorical Premises;401
8.3.5;FOURTH CHAPTER The Structure of Categorical Syllogisms;409
8.3.5.1;1. The “Generality” of the Major Premises in the First Two Figures;409
8.3.5.2;2. The Syllogism as the Logical Grounding, and the Mere TruthCorrelation, of Judgments;410
8.3.5.3;3. The Relationship of the Truth and Falsity of the Premises to the Truthand Falsity of the Conclusion;413
8.3.5.4;4. Some Inferential Mistakes;414
8.3.5.5;5. Compound Categorical Inferences;415
8.3.6;FIFTH CHAPTER Indirect Inferences Using Hypothetical and Disjunctive Judgments;417
8.3.6.1;A. Hypothetical Syllogisms;417
8.3.6.2;B. Disjunctive Inferences;419
8.3.7;SIXTH CHAPTER The Modality of Indirect Inferences;423
8.3.8;SEVENTH CHAPTER Deductive and Inductive Inferences;427
8.3.9;EIGHTH CHAPTER The Analogical Inference;437
8.3.10;NINTH CHAPTER Materially Conditioned or Nonformal Indirect Inferences;439
9;INDEX;445