E-Book, Deutsch, 141 Seiten, eBook
Reihe: Markt- und Unternehmensentwicklung Markets and Organisations
E-Book, Deutsch, 141 Seiten, eBook
Reihe: Markt- und Unternehmensentwicklung Markets and Organisations
ISBN: 978-3-8350-5429-5
Verlag: Deutscher Universitätsverlag
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark
Dr. Stephan Nüesch war Assistent von Prof. Dr. Egon Franck am Lehrstuhl für Unternehmensführung und -politik der Universität Zürich. Dort ist er jetzt als Oberassistent tätig.
Zielgruppe
Research
Weitere Infos & Material
1;Foreword;6
2;Preface;8
3;Contents;10
4;Tables;14
5;Figures;14
6;1 Introduction;15
6.1;1.1 The Economics of Superstars;17
6.2;1.2 The Economics of Celebrities;23
6.3;1.3 Overview of the Thesis;27
7;2 Talent, Past Consumption and/or Popularity – Are Outstanding German Soccer Players Rosen or Adler Stars?;31
7.1;2.1 Introduction;31
7.2;2.2 Theories of Superstar Formation;32
7.3;2.3 Related Literature;35
7.4;2.4 Hypothesis;37
7.5;2.5 Data and Stylized Facts on German Soccer;38
7.6;2.6 Empirical Framework;40
7.6.1;2.6.1 Dependent Variables;40
7.6.2;2.6.2 Independent Variables;41
7.6.3;2.6.3 Results;47
7.7;2.7 Conclusion;52
8;3 Local Heroes and Superstars – An Empirical Analysis of Star Attraction in German Soccer;55
8.1;3.1 Introduction;55
8.2;3.2 Related Literature;56
8.3;3.3 Stylized Facts on German Soccer;58
8.4;3.4 Star Attraction;61
8.4.1;3.4.1 Star Performance;61
8.4.2;3.4.2 Star Popularity;62
8.5;3.5 Econometric Framework;63
8.5.1;3.5.1 Data and Dependent Variable;63
8.5.2;3.5.2 Controls;64
8.5.3;3.5.3 Estimation Approach;66
8.5.4;3.5.4 Results;68
8.6;3.6 Robustness Analysis;71
8.6.1;3.6.1 Increasing the Number of Superstars and Local Heroes;71
8.6.2;3.6.2 Alternative Measures for Star Performance;75
8.7;3.7 Conclusion;77
9;4 Superstar Earnings in Soccer – Are Voluntary Salary Cap Agreements Self-Enforcing?;79
9.1;4.1 Introduction;79
9.2;4.2 Related Literature on Salary Cap Agreements;82
9.3;4.3 The Model;84
9.4;4.4 Discussion;89
9.5;4.5 Conclusion;91
9.6;4.6 Appendix 1: Nash Equilibrium in a One-Shot Interaction;92
9.7;4.7 Appendix 2: Asymmetric Clubs;93
10;5 Superstars versus Celebrities – Big Man or Big Name?;97
10.1;5.1 Introduction;97
10.2;5.2 Superstar Emergence;98
10.2.1;5.2.1 Economic Superstar Theories;98
10.2.2;5.2.2 A Simple Model of Superstars;102
10.3;5.3 Celebrity Emergence;104
10.3.1;5.3.1 “Gossip Consumption”;105
10.3.2;5.3.2 The Role of Media in Celebrity Emergence;106
10.3.3;5.3.3 A Simple Model of Celebrities;108
10.4;5.4 Conclusion;109
11;6 Different Star Strategies in the Media – Why “ Manufactured” Celebrities are More Lucrative than “ Self- Made” Superstars;111
11.1;6.1 Introduction;111
11.2;6.2 Pop Idol – An Example of “Manufacturing” Celebrities;114
11.3;6.3 A Strategy Framework of Star Attraction in the Media;121
11.3.1;6.3.1 The Rosen Explanation for the Viewer Drawing Capability of Superstars;122
11.3.2;6.3.2 The Adler Explanation for the Viewer Drawing Capability of Superstars;124
11.3.3;6.3.3 Bargaining Power of Superstars;125
11.4;6.4 „Manufactured“ Celebrities;126
11.4.1;6.4.1 Viewer Drawing Capability of “Manufactured” Celebrities;128
11.4.2;6.4.2 Bargaining Power of “Manufactured” Celebrities;129
11.4.3;6.4.3 Market Segmentation;130
11.5;6.5 Conclusion;130
12;7 Summary and Outlook;133
13;8 References;139
14;9 Index;153
Talent, Past Consumption and/or Popularity — Are Outstanding German Soccer Players Rosen or Adler Stars?.- Local Heroes and Superstars — An Empirical Analysis of Star Attraction in German Soccer.- Superstar Earnings in Soccer — Are Voluntary Salary Cap Agreements Self-Enforcing?.- Superstars versus Celebrities — Big Man or Big Name?.- Different Star Strategies in the Media — Why “Manufactured” Celebrities are More Lucrative than “Self-Made” Superstars.- Summary and Outlook.
2 Talent, Past Consumption and/or Popularity – Are Outstanding German Soccer Players Rosen or Adler Stars? (p. 17)
2.1 Introduction
While clubs overbid each other and pay enormous transfer fees and salaries for socalled superstars, other players receive comparably low remuneration. But what makes a soccer player a superstar? In the literature there are basically two competing theories of superstar formation proposed by Rosen (1981) and Adler (1985). Whereas Rosen (1981) stresses clearly observable talent superiority in order to explain the emergence of superstars, Adler (1985) maintains that besides talent, also past consumption and popularity influence stardom.
The question to be addressed in this chapter is: Are outstanding soccer players Rosen or Adler stars? Using data on individual market values and a set of personal characteristics of all soccer players appearing in the first German league in the 2004/05 season for more than half an hour, I differentiate between Rosen’s and Adler’s theory of superstar formation. Running quantile regressions I find empirical evidence that variables associated to Adler’s theory contribute to the explanation of market value differentials in German soccer. Thus, not only investments in physical talent but also the cultivation of popularity is an adequate strategy for becoming a superstar.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 illustrates the two alternative theories of superstar formation. Section 2.3 presents the related literature. In section 2.4 the hypothesis is motivated. Subsequently, I explain the main features of the data and give some stylized facts on German soccer. The variables and the method used as well as the results are presented in section 2.6. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Theories of Superstar Formation
Theories of superstar formation agree that superstars emerge in the provision of certain services where large economies of scale on the supply side are combined with high appreciation on the demand side. The technology of soccer games facilitates the reproduction of the service at low cost. The cost of production is largely independent of the size of the audience (Lucifora &, Simmons, 2003).
Since most of the costs are up-front, average costs decrease with consumed output. Large soccer stadiums and various media allow many paying spectators to observe a soccer game simultaneously, while at the same time enabling teams to exclude non-paying customers. Thus, there are no issues of free riding due to non-exclusion. The World Cup, the European Championship or even just a game of the German Bundesliga can attract a remarkably large audience all over the world by television broadcast.
As a result of these large economies of scale, only few sellers are needed to serve the whole market. However, large economies of scale do not guarantee high salaries for a restricted number of players. In addition, these players have to be perceived as very scarce so that demand becomes highly concentrated on their services (Rosen &, Sanderson, 2001). While on the supply side both Rosen (1981) and Adler (1985) agree on the necessity of large economies of scale, their explanation of the demand for superstar services is different.
