E-Book, Englisch, Band 40, 156 Seiten, E-Book, Format (B × H): 127 mm x 203 mm
Melloni Market Without Economy
1. Auflage 2007
ISBN: 978-3-8382-5407-4
Verlag: ibidem
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark
The 1998 Russian Financial Crisis
E-Book, Englisch, Band 40, 156 Seiten, E-Book, Format (B × H): 127 mm x 203 mm
Reihe: Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society
ISBN: 978-3-8382-5407-4
Verlag: ibidem
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark
The 1998 financial crisis in Russia was one of the most dramatic economic breakdowns and symbolized the failure of the transition process as it had been conducted since the end of the Soviet Union. There is no general agreement on the nature of the rouble collapse; a number of contradictory interpretations have been discussed among economists. This book argues that the Russian 1998 financial turmoil is best predicted by Krugman's and Sargent-Wallace's models. The currency collapse had its origins in the peculiar way in which the transition was managed. In particular, the Russian government became entrapped in the double constraint of a tight monetary policy imposed by the IMF on the one side, and a loose fiscal policy to support the private sector on the other. Those policies were inconsistent, and led to inflationary processes that were postponed through emission of a large amount of Treasury Bonds to finance the fiscal deficit. At the same time, a tight monetary policy retarded the recovery of the industrial sector. While the particular timing of the crisis was co-determined by other factors, such as the Asian financial crisis and the fall of the oil price, it was this incoherent monetary and financial policies mix that constituted the main cause of the rouble's spectacular collapse in August 1998. The book provides extensive coverage of a decade of Russian reforms. It critically analyzes neo-liberal ideology and the course of the transition process supported by the Washington Consensus.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
Weitere Infos & Material
List of Tables
List of Figures
Acknowledgements
Foreword by Eiji Furukawa
Introduction
1 The Russian Stabilisation Programme
2. Russian Default and Financial Crisis Theory
3. The Aftermath of the Crisis
Conclusions
Appendix
Bibliography