Buch, Englisch, 236 Seiten, Format (B × H): 157 mm x 235 mm, Gewicht: 501 g
A Philosophical Account
Buch, Englisch, 236 Seiten, Format (B × H): 157 mm x 235 mm, Gewicht: 501 g
Reihe: Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy
ISBN: 978-1-032-00316-0
Verlag: Routledge
While much of the existing philosophical work on autonomy focuses on threats that come from outside the agent, this book addresses how inner conflict, instability of character, or motivational issues can disrupt agency. In the first half of the book, the author conceptualizes what it means to be self-governing and to exercise autonomous agency. In the second half, she investigates the extent to which agents with various forms of mental disorder are capable of exercising autonomy. In her view, many forms of mental disorder involve disruptions to self-governance, so that agents lack sufficient control over their intentional behavior or are unable to formulate and execute coherent action plans. However, this does not mean that they are utterly incapable of autonomous agency; rather, their ability to exercise this capacity is compromised in important respects. Understanding these agential impairments can help to deepen our understanding of what it means to exercise autonomy, and also devise more effective treatments that restore subjects’ agency.
Autonomy, Enactivism, and Mental Disorder will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in philosophy of mind, philosophy of action, philosophy of psychiatry, and feminist philosophy.
Zielgruppe
Postgraduate and Undergraduate Advanced
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
Weitere Infos & Material
1. Autonomous Agency: Conditions for an Adequate Account
2. An Enactivist Conception of Autonomous Agency
3. Enactivism Meets Frankfurt: Embracing, Resisting, and Reconfiguring Habits
4. Ambivalence and Agency in Dissociative Identity Disorder
5. "Getting Stuck" in Mood Disorders
6. One-Dimensional Selfhood in Psychopathy
7. Further Implications: Responsibility and Treatment