Mackie / Hamilton Affect, Cognition and Stereotyping

Interactive Processes in Group Perception
1. Auflage 2014
ISBN: 978-0-08-088579-7
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: EPUB
Kopierschutz: 6 - ePub Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 389 Seiten

This volume presents a collection of chapters exploring the interface of cognitive and affective processes in stereotyping. Stereotypes and prejudice have long been topics of interest in social psychology, but early literature and research in this area focused on affect alone, while later studies focused primarily on cognitive factors associated with information processing strategies. This volume integrates the roles of both affect and cognition with regard to the formation, representation, and modification of stereotypes and the implications of these processes for the escalation or amelioration of intergroup tensions. - Reviewed Development, maintenance, and change of stereotypes and prejudice - Interaction of affective and cognitive processes as antecendents of stereotyping and prejudice - Affect and cognitive consequences of group categorization, preception, and interaction - The interaction of cognitive and affective processes in social perception - Award Winning Chapter 'The Esses et al', was the 1992 winner of the Otto Klineberg award given by the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, which cited the chapter as having offered, 'a substantial advance in our understanding of basic psychological processes, underlying racism, stereotyping, and prejudice.'

Zielgruppe

Academic/professional/technical: Undergraduate. Academic/professional/technical: Postgraduate. Academic/professional/technical: Research and professional

Autoren/Hrsg.

Mackie, Diane M.

Hamilton, David L.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Front Cover;1
2;Affect, Cognition, and Stereotyping: Interactive Processes in Group Perception;4
3;Copyright Page;5
4;Table of Contents;6
5;Contributors;12
6;Preface;14
7;Chapter 1. Cognitive and Affective Processes in
Intergroup Perception: The Developing Interface;16
7.1;Introduction;16
7.2;Two Components of the Conceptual Backdrop;17
7.3;The Developing Interface;19
7.4;Chapter Previews;20
7.5;Acknowledgments;25
7.6;References;25
8;Chapter 2. Emotions, Arousal, and Stereotypie Judgments: A Heuristic Model of Affect and Stereotyping;28
8.1;Introduction;28
8.2;Stereotyping in Social Judgment: Stereotypes as Judgmental Heuristics;30
8.3;Emotional Arousal and Processing Capacity;31
8.4;Emotion and Cognitive Motivation;36
8.5;Empirical Studies of Emotion and Stereotyping;40
8.6;Issues for Future Research;44
8.7;Conclusion;47
8.8;Acknowledgments;48
8.9;References;48
9;Chapter 3. The Influence of Affect on Stereotyping:
The Case of Illusory Correlations;54
9.1;Introduction;54
9.2;Influence of Affect on Cognitive Processing;56
9.3;Illusory Correlations in Intergroup Perception;59
9.4;Affect and Distinctiveness-Based Illusory Correlations;60
9.5;Affect and Expectancy-Based Illusory Correlations;66
9.6;Summary and Implications;70
9.7;Acknowledgments;73
9.8;References;73
10;Chapter 4. Affect and Perceived Group Variability: Implications for Stereotyping and Prejudice;78
10.1;Introduction;78
10.2;Perceived Variability and Stereotyping;79
10.3;How Do People Judge Group Variability?;81
10.4;How Might Affect Influence Judgments of Group Variability?;82
10.5;Affect and the Contact Hypothesis: Implications for Stereotype Change;94
10.6;Acknowledgments;98
10.7;References;98
11;Chapter 5. The Role of Anxiety in Facilitating Stereotypie Judgments of Outgroup Behavior;102
11.1;Introduction;102
11.2;Stereotype Usage;103
11.3;Affect, Arousal, and Stereotyping;105
11.4;Anxiety and Stereotyping;106
11.5;Anxiety and the Impact of Counterstereotypic Information;108
11.6;Assimilation or Contrast;115
11.7;Working Propositions;117
11.8;Applications and Discussion;118
11.9;References;121
12;Chapter 6. Cognition and Affect in Stereotyping:
Parallel Interactive Networks;126
12.1;Introduction;126
12.2;A Network Model of Stereotype-Related Cognitions;127
12.3;A Network Model of Affect and Cognition;132
12.4;Stereotypes and Prejudice: An Empirical Study;140
12.5;Conclusion;147
12.6;Acknowledgments;147
12.7;References;147
13;Chapter 7. Values, Stereotypes, and Emotions as Determinants of
lntergroup Attitudes;152
13.1;Introduction;152
13.2;Framework and Terminology;153
13.3;Affect and Intergroup Attitudes;155
13.4;Cognition and Intergroup Attitudes;156
13.5;The Interplay of Affect and Cognition;163
13.6;Future Research Directions;175
13.7;Conclusions;177
13.8;References;178
14;Chapter 8.
Stereotypes and Evaluative Intergroup Bias;182
14.1;Introduction;182
14.2;Is Ingroup–Outgroup Categorization Sufficientto Activate Category-Based Affect?;184
14.3;Can Cognitive and Affective Components in Category-Based Impression Formation Be Independent?;194
14.4;Do Deliberative Considerations Modify Spontaneous Expressions of Impressions?;201
14.5;Summary and Implications;202
14.6;Acknowledgments;205
14.7;References;205
15;Chapter 9. Mere Exposure Effects with
Outgroup Stimuli;210
15.1;Introduction;210
15.2;Processes Underlying the Mere Exposure Effect;213
15.3;Exposure Effects Involving Outgroup Stimuli;216
15.4;The Relative Magnitudes of Ingroup and Outgroup Mere Exposure Effects;219
15.5;Exposure Effects with Outgroup Stimuli: Theoretical and Practical Implications;220
15.6;Conclusions;223
15.7;References;225
16;Chapter 10. Applications of Emotion Theory and Research to Stereotyping and
Intergroup Relations;228
16.1;Introduction;228
16.2;Emotion Theory and Methodology: A Brief Primer;231
16.3;Cognition Causing Emotions;235
16.4;Emotion Causing Cognitions;243
16.5;Consequences for Behavior;244
16.6;Conclusions;246
16.7;Acknowledgments;247
16.8;References;247
17;Chapter 11. Negative Interdependence and Prejudice: Whence the Affect?;254
17.1;Introduction;254
17.2;A Theoretical Gap;255
17.3;Interdependence as a Source of Emotion;258
17.4;Mere Membership;262
17.5;Presumed Blockage by Outgroup Members;267
17.6;Reducing Negative Affect: Avoidance versus Contact?;271
17.7;Contact;274
17.8;Conclusions;276
17.9;Acknowledgments;279
17.10;References;279
18;Chapter 12. Stereotyping and Affect in Discourse: Interpreting the Meaning of Elderly, Painful Self-Disclosure;284
18.1;Introduction;284
18.2;Stereotype Research: Past and Present Perspectives;285
18.3;The Management and Meaning of Sequences of Elderly, Painful Self-Disclosure: Introduction to an Interpretive Analysis of Some Discourse Data;291
18.4;The Invoking of Stereotypes and Other Themes in Accounts of Elderly, Painful Self-Disclosure;296
18.5;Concluding Remarks;306
18.6;Acknowledgment;307
18.7;References;308
19;Chapter 13. Social Identity and Social Emotions: Toward New Conceptualizations of Prejudice;312
19.1;Introduction;312
19.2;Prejudice as Attitude;313
19.3;Prejudice as Emotion;316
19.4;Implications and Unresolved Issues;321
19.5;Acknowledgment;328
19.6;References;328
20;Chapter 14. The Role of Discrepancy-Associated Affect in Prejudice Reduction;332
20.1;Introduction;332
20.2;Renouncing Prejudice: New versus Old Ways
of Responding
;333
20.3;Affective Consequences of Coexisting, Conflicting Reactions;335
20.4;The Functional Significance of Discrepancy-Associated Affect;341
20.5;A Model of Prejudice Reduction;349
20.6;Concluding Remarks;353
20.7;Acknowledgments;356
20.8;References;356
21;Chapter 15. Social Stigma: The Consequences of
Attributional Ambiguity;360
21.1;Introduction;360
21.2;The Attributional Ambiguity of Stigma;362
21.3;Implications of Attributional Ambiguity;366
21.4;Alternative Sources of Attributional Ambiguity;379
21.5;Conclusions and Directions;381
21.6;Acknowledgment;382
21.7;References;382
22;Chapter 16.
Affect, Cognition, and Stereotyping: Concluding Comments;386
22.1;Developing the Interface: Affect and Cognition in Constant Interaction;386
22.2;Changing Conceptualizations of Stereotype and Prejudice;389
22.3;From Individual to Intergroup Concepts of Cognition and Emotion;391
22.4;Further Difficulties for the Contact Hypothesis;393
22.5;An Opportunity for Social Change?;395
22.6;References;397
23;Index;400

Leseproben

Chapter 2 Emotions, Arousal, and Stereotypic Judgments: A Heuristic Model of Affect and Stereotyping
GALEN V. BODENHAUSEN,     Department of Psychology, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan Publisher Summary
The heuristic view of stereotyping emphasizes that people use their oversimplified beliefs about social groups as a basis for responding to the members of those groups whenever they lack the desire or the ability to engage in more extensive thought about the individuals. The lack of such desire and/or ability may be common enough under most everyday life circumstances, and it appears that conditions of heightened emotional experience—in particular, anger, anxiety, and happiness—only serve to further reduce the motivation and/or processing capacity. This chapter presents the task of specifying the motivational and cognitive consequences of affective states for information processing. Drawing on the neurological, physiological, and cognitive literatures, Galen V. Bodenhausen develops the hypothesis that some affective states, but not others, produce simplified information processing. He draws out and tests the processing implications of a range of affective states for the use of stereotypic, rather than individuating, information in social perception tasks. The theoretical integration of affective and cognitive processes promises to yield important advances in social psychology generally, but no topic of study seems likely to profit from this reunification more than the study of stereotyping and discrimination. Introduction
After decades of disrepute, research on emotion is flourishing in contemporary psychology. Indeed, so much progress has been made in understanding the origins and consequences of emotional experience that Frijda (1988) felt sufficiently confident to enumerate a collection of empirical “laws” of emotion, describing well-validated empirical phenomena associated with emotion. Researchers have proposed numerous general theories of emotion (see, e.g., Scherer & Ekman, 1984), providing rich insights into the nature of affect. To be sure, a number of theoretical controversies continue to stir debate among emotion researchers. These debates focus on issues such as the relative importance and temporal priority of cognitive versus somatovisceral aspects of emotional experience (see Frijda, 1986), the number and nature of “basic” emotions, if such exist (see Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988), and the degree to which different emotional states are characterized by unique patterns of autonomic arousal (see Ekman, Levenson, & Friesen, 1983; Schachter & Singer, 1962). Whether or not such debates are ever definitively resolved, it is clear that research inspired by controversies such as these has significantly advanced our understanding of a previously neglected domain of human nature. The interface of the affective and cognitive domains of human nature has been explored with particular enthusiasm in recent years. The theoretical integration of affective and cognitive processes promises to yield important advances in social psychology generally, but no topic of study seems likely to profit from this reunification more than the study of stereotyping and discrimination. Earlier in this century, these topics were viewed in largely motivational and affective terms derived from Freudian and Marxist thought. More recently, motivational approaches have been supplanted by a cognitive analysis focusing on common information-processing mechanisms (Hamilton, 1981). Although this cognitive analysis has been fruitful, it has become increasingly obvious that emotion is far too central a component of intergroup relations to be discarded by those who would understand intergroup phenomena. The major goal of this chapter is to present a general cognitive model of the processes involved in stereotype-based discrimination and to explore some of the principal means by which emotion affects these processes. Before commencing with this objective, it is useful to consider the nature of emotions that characterize intergroup situations, which for the present purposes include situations in which one is thinking about members of other social groups, regardless of whether they are physically present or not. First, there is integral affect, or the emotion(s) elicited by the social group itself and the usual conditions and contexts with which the group is associated. For many stereotyped groups, the affect that is integral to situations involving them is decidedly negative, often involving anxiety, irritation, disgust, and other negative feelings (Dijker, 1987; Jackson & Sullivan, 1988; McConahay, 1986; Stephan & Stephan, 1985; Wilder & Shapiro, 1989). The degree, and therefore the impact, of this sort of affect should be substantially greater in actual interaction settings as opposed to situations in which one is merely thinking about outgroup members. Intergroup perceptions may also be influenced by incidental affect, or emotion(s) elicited by situations unrelated to the intergroup context. One of the major themes in the affect and cognition literature is the extent to which affect elicited in one context can affect memory and judgments in many other contexts (e.g., Forgas & Bower, 1988; Isen, 1987; Schwarz & Clore, 1988; Wyer & Srull, 1989). If emotion and mood can have pervasive effects on social information processing, they may affect the propensity to stereotype members of a social group even when they arise for reasons having nothing to do with the group or its members. In the remainder of this chapter, I will explore a few of the general processes whereby integral and incidental affect impinge upon social judgments of the members of outgroups. In doing so, I will endeavor to go beyond the global distinction between positive and negative affect and consider how qualitatively different emotional states (specifically, happiness, sadness, anger, and anxiety) are related to stereotyping. I will first describe a heuristic model of the stereotyping process that is compatible with several more specific theoretical accounts. Then I will summarize evidence bearing on some of the ways that different emotional states might affect each stage of processing. Finally, I will consider several of the most interesting issues that remain for future research. Stereotyping in Social Judgment: Stereotypes as Judgmental Heuristics
Although stereotyping is generally considered to be a simplification strategy employed by the social perceiver to facilitate her interactions with a complex social environment, a complete theoretical account of stereotyping and discrimination would have to be fairly complex. Such an account is beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead, only a few of the most central components involved in stereotyping will be examined. When confronted with an intergroup situation, broadly defined, the social perceiver must first activate stereotypic input in long-term memory if the stereotypes are to have any impact on her social judgments. Devine (1989) has provided evidence that common stereotypes are activated automatically when members of the stereotyped group are encountered. When such input is perceived as relevant to a judgment to be made, it provides the initial basis for a discriminatory judgment. However, in most situations there is other information relevant to the judgment, so the next stage is to achieve some sort of integration of abstract (stereotypic) and concrete evidence. Two extreme patterns of response can be identified at this stage. First, the social perceiver may choose to rely primarily or exclusively on the stereotypic input in rendering a judgment, termed a heuristic strategy (Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989). When this “top-down” strategy is dominant, other available information may be only superficially and selectively processed in an effort to find corroboration for the stereotypic judgment (Bodenhausen, 1988). At the other extreme, the social perceiver may choose to rely primarily or exclusively on the concrete, factual data at hand, carefully assessing and integrating its implications to form a judgment. This “bottom-up” strategy (or “systematic,” in the terminology of Chaiken, 1980) would tend to minimize the impact of stereotypic inputs. Many contemporary theorists envision a continuum of social information processing strategies defined by similar extremes (cf. Chaiken et al., 1989; Fazio, 1990; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). The pioneers of cognitive psychology determined that systematic, data-driven processing is limited in two fundamental ways. First, it requires effort that people are often not willing to expend. Simon (1967) aptly characterized humans as “satisficers” rather than optimizers. Given appropriate motivation, people may rely less on stereotypes and seek a more data-based judgment (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990), but that may not be a dominant tendency. A second important limitation involves the finite capacity of working memory. Miller (1956) set that capacity at about seven chunks of information under normal conditions. Even highly motivated individuals may...