Buch, Englisch, 311 Seiten, Format (B × H): 140 mm x 216 mm, Gewicht: 531 g
Buch, Englisch, 311 Seiten, Format (B × H): 140 mm x 216 mm, Gewicht: 531 g
Reihe: Executive Politics and Governance
ISBN: 978-1-137-55627-1
Verlag: Palgrave MacMillan UK
To a large extent, elite politicians, bureaucrats, and businessmen hold the fortunes of their societies in their hands. This edited volume describes how formal and informal institutions affect elite behaviour, which in turn affects corruption and the quality of government.
Zielgruppe
Research
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
- Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politische Kultur Politische Kommunikation und Partizipation
- Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politische Systeme Politische Führung
- Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Regierungspolitik
- Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politische Kultur Politische Soziologie und Psychologie
Weitere Infos & Material
List of illustrations
Abbreviations
Preface
PART I: INTRODUCTION
1. How institutions constrain elites from destructive behavior; Carl Dahlström and Lena Wängnerud
2. Good Societies Need Good Leaders on a Leash; Sören Holmberg and Bo Rothstein
3. Are Corrupt Elites Necessary for Corrupt Countries?; Susan Rose-Ackerman
4. Prestige, Immunity and Diplomats: Understanding Sexual Corruption; Ann Towns
PART II: HISTORY AND STATE-BUILDING
5. The Political and Historical Origins of Good Government: How Social Contracts Shape Elite Behavior; Anna Persson and Martin Sjöstedt
6. Political Leadership and Quality of Government: Restraining Elites at Nascent Statehood; Ulrika Möller and Isabell Schierenbeck
7. Rulers and their Elite Rivals: How Democratization has Increased Incentives for Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa; Michelle D'Arcy
8. Stability and Stagnation; Anders Sundell
PART III: POWER-SHARING
9. Democratic and Professional Accountability; Carl Dahlström and Victor Lapuente
10. Property Rights without Democracy: The Role of Elites' Rotation and Asset Ownership; Leonid Polishchuk and Georgiy Syunyaev
11. Dynamic Economic Growth as a Constraint on Elite Behavior; Petrus Olander
12. Political Control of Bureaucracies as an Incentive for Party Behavior; Agnes Cornell and Marcia Grimes
PART IV: POLITICAL PARTIES
13. Political Parties and the Politics of The Quality Of Government; Philip Keefer
14. Why Women In Encompassing Welfare States Punish Corrupt Political Parties; Helena Stensöta, Lena Wängnerud and Mattias Agerberg
15. Anti-Corruption Parties and Good Government; Andreas Bågenholm and Nicholas Charron
16. Can Elections Combat Corruption? Accountability and Partisanship; Georgios Xezonakis, Spyros Kosmidis and Stefan Dahberg
Index