Couto Liberal Perfectionism

A Prima Facie Argument for Political Perfectionism
1. Auflage 2014
ISBN: 978-3-11-033695-5
Verlag: De Gruyter
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

E-Book, Englisch, Band 19, 230 Seiten

Reihe: Practical Philosophy

Much of the recent literature on political perfectionism has focused on dealing with objections to this view. This book adopts a different approach: It attempts to highlight the intuitive appeal of liberal perfectionism by presenting a positive prima facie argument in its favour. The book starts by clarifying the relation between political perfectionism — a conception of politics — and prudential perfectionism and ethical perfectionism — a conception of the good life, and a type of ethical theory. It is crucial to start by selecting a plausible form of ethical perfectionism, as it makes an important difference to the plausibility of the political conception based upon it. Once appropriate distinctions are drawn and a plausible form of liberal perfectionism is endorsed, many of the standard objections to perfectionism are shown to fail to reach their target. Different arguments in favour of liberal perfectionism are then proposed and critically examined, but the resilience of some pragmatic arguments against liberal perfectionism is conceded. The book ends by showing that perfectionism can be surprisingly relevant for discussions of social justice and proceeds to draw a sketch of the perfectionist implications for questions of distributive justice.

Zielgruppe

Academics, institutes, libraries

Autoren/Hrsg.

Couto, Alexandra

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Angewandte Philosophie, Philosophische Praxis & Beratung
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Sozialphilosophie, Politische Philosophie
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politikwissenschaft Allgemein Politische Theorie, Politische Philosophie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;0 Introduction;13
1.1;0.1 The Rejection of Neutrality;14
1.2;0.2 Why the Rejection of Neutrality is not Enough;15
1.3;0.3 Basic Features and Definitions of Perfectionism;17
1.4;0.4 Re-conceptualisation of the Differences between Neutralist and Perfectionist Liberals;19
1.5;0.5 Summary of the Argument of the Book;22
2;1 Perfectionism: Some Basic Distinctions;28
2.1;1.1 Defining Ethical Perfectionism, Prudential Perfectionism and Political Perfectionism;29
2.2;1.2 Why Political Perfectionism Requires an Account of Ethical Perfectionism;32
2.3;1.3 Prudential Perfectionism and Objective Goods;35
2.4;1.4 Arguments for the Objective List Conception of Well-Being;38
2.5;1.5 The Step from Prudential Perfectionism to Ethical Perfectionism;41
2.6;1.6 The Step from Ethical Perfectionism to Political Perfectionism;44
2.7;1.7 Conclusion;48
3;2 Perfectionist Goods;49
3.1;2.1 Basic Terminology;49
3.2;2.2 What Should we include in our List of Objective Goods?;50
3.2.1;2.2.1 Too Sparse;50
3.2.2;2.2.2 Refer to goods that are not fundamental;51
3.2.3;2.2.3 Contain too many goods;54
3.2.4;2.2.4 A Plausible List of Objective Goods;55
3.3;2.3 Realizing Goods vs. Opportunities;56
3.4;2.4 Agency and Good;59
3.5;2.5 Bringing Back Perspective for a Perfectionist Renaissance;62
3.5.1;2.5.1 There is Something about Perspective;62
3.5.2;2.5.2 Endorsement Distinctions;64
3.5.3;2.5.3 Well-being;65
3.6;2.6 Does Perfectionism require a Unifying Account of the Good?;66
3.7;2.7 Could Perfectionism be based on Cultural Norms or on an Overlapping Consensus?;72
3.8;2.8 Is the Lack of Unifying Account Damaging for Political Perfectionism?;76
3.9;2.9 Conclusion;79
4;3 Ethical Perfectionism: Distinctions and Objections;80
4.1;3.1 Ethical Perfectionism as a Family of Theories;81
4.1.1;3.1.1 Exclusive vs. Non-exclusive Perfectionism;82
4.1.2;3.1.2 Pluralist vs. Monist Perfectionism;83
4.1.3;3.1.3 Broad vs. Narrow Perfectionism;84
4.1.4;3.1.4 Satisficing vs. Maximising Perfectionism;87
4.1.5;3.1.5 Absolute vs. Relative Perfectionism;92
4.2;3.2 Consequentialist, Virtue Ethics and Deontological Perfectionism;93
4.3;3.3 Is Perfectionism too Self-indulgent?;97
4.4;3.4 Praise and Blame;102
4.5;3.5 Perfectionism and Positive Value;104
4.6;3.6 Conclusion;108
5;4 The Reasons that Goodness Gives;110
5.1;4.1 Prima Facie Arguments;112
5.2;4.2 Well-Being and the Function of the State: The Crude Argument;113
5.3;4.3 The Service and Well-Being Argument;117
5.4;4.4 Is the Humanistic Principle necessary for the Service and Well-Being Argument?;120
5.5;4.5 An Objection to the Social Forms Thesis;122
5.6;4.6 The Service and Practical Reason Argument: The Explicit Version;124
5.7;4.7 An Objection to the Service and Practical Reason Argument: Agentneutral vs Agent-relative Reasons;130
5.7.1;4.7.1 The Objection;130
5.7.2;4.7.2 Agent-relative Reasons in our Lives;133
5.8;4.8 The Revised Service and Practical Reason Argument;135
5.9;4.9 A Meta-ethical Objection;136
5.10;4.10 An Objection to the Service Conception of Authority;137
5.11;4.11 Conclusion;138
6;5 The Consistency Argument;140
6.1;5.1 Introduction;140
6.2;5.2 Charles Taylor’s Argument;142
6.3;5.3 Vinit Haksar’s Argument;145
6.4;5.4 The Consistency Argument;148
6.5;5.5 The Protection of Individual Rights and Interests;150
6.5.1;5.5.1 In favour of the Interest Theory;151
6.5.2;5.5.2 Is the Second Premise Really Necessary for the Consistency Argument?;152
6.6;5.6 From Protection to Promotion;153
6.6.1;5.6.1 The Consistency Argument;153
6.6.2;5.6.2 Caveats;156
6.6.3;5.6.3 Interpretation of Protection and Promotion;157
6.6.4;5.6.4 The Normative Arbitrariness of the Distinction between Protection and Promotion of Interests;164
6.6.5;5.6.5 In favour of the Consistency Argument;168
6.6.6;5.6.6 Relation to Consequentialism;169
6.7;5.7 Conclusion;171
7;6 The Location of Unfairness;173
7.1;6.1 Introduction;173
7.1.1;6.1.1 The Luck Egalitarian Location of Unfairness;175
7.1.2;6.1.2 The Luck Egalitarian Aim;176
7.2;6.2 Location of Unfairness;180
7.2.1;6.2.1 A Dilemma for the Basic Luck Egalitarian Intuition;180
7.2.2;6.2.2 How can the Fundamentalist Luck Egalitarian attempt to Justify her Position?;182
7.2.3;6.2.3 How the Existing Literature accounts for the Two Forms of luck Egalitarianism;183
7.2.4;6.2.4 Practical Implications;186
7.3;6.3 Same Destination, Different Routes;187
7.3.1;6.3.1 The Same Destination, Different Routes Argument;188
7.3.2;6.3.2 Other Instrumental Benefits of Minimising Luck;188
7.3.3;6.3.3 Is Redistribution instrumental to the Promotion of Responsibility?;191
7.4;6.4 The Luck Egalitarian Response;192
7.4.1;6.4.1 Attempting an Account of the BLEI;192
7.4.2;6.4.2 The Impact on one’s Level of Advantages;193
7.4.3;6.4.3 The Normative Distinction between Negative and Positive Value;193
7.5;6.5 The Location of Unfairness;195
7.5.1;6.5.1 Inconsistency;195
7.5.2;6.5.2 What Justice Requires: Promoting the Conditions for Responsibility;197
7.5.3;6.5.3 Justice Requires Structural Changes;201
7.5.4;6.5.4 An Account of Responsibility;203
7.5.5;6.5.5 The Practice of Responsibility Promotion;204
7.6;6.6 The Luck Egalitarian Response;205
7.6.1;6.6.1 The Good Luck Objection;205
7.6.2;6.6.2 The Feasibility Objection;206
7.7;6.7 Responsibility;207
7.7.1;6.7.1 Two thought experiments;207
7.7.2;6.7.2 ‘She did it her way’ or the Prudential Value of Responsibility;209
7.8;6.8 Conclusion;211
8;7 Conclusion;214
8.1;7.1 Three Distinctive Features;214
8.1.1;7.1.1 Ethical Perfectionism;214
8.1.2;7.1.2 Positive Arguments;215
8.1.3;7.1.3 Luck Egalitarianism;216
8.2;7.2 Objections;216
8.2.1;7.2.1 Autonomy;216
8.2.2;7.2.2 Moral Equality;217
8.2.3;7.2.3 Pragmatic Objections;220
8.3;7.3 Final Thoughts;223
9;Bibliography;225

Über Autor(innen)

Alexandra Couto, University of Oslo, Norway.