Bös / Bliss / Intriligator Public Enterprise Economics

Theory and Application
2. Auflage 2014
ISBN: 978-1-4831-9323-6
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, Band Volume 23, 480 Seiten, Web PDF

Reihe: Advanced Textbooks in Economics

Advanced Textbooks in Economics, Volume 23: Public Enterprise Economics: Theory and Application focuses on economics, mathematical economics, and econometrics, including microeconomics, marginal-cost pricing, taxes, and income effects. The manuscript takes a look at the essential parts of public sector pricing models, normative optimum theory, and normative piecemeal theory. Discussions focus on welfare improvements with non-tight constraints, welfare -improving increases of public inefficiency, conditions for optimal prices and quantities, compensating for income effects, and conditions for optimal quality. The book then ponders on marginal-cost pricing, Ramsey pricing, rate of return regulation, and pricing with distributional aims. Topics include comparing distributional and allocative pricing, prices versus taxes, optimum Ramsey policy, influence of Ramsey prices on allocation, distribution, and stabilization, and consequences for allocation, distribution, and stabilization. The publication examines bus and underground services in London, economic theory and empirical analysis, and different approaches towards optimal quality, including empirical studies on bus and underground demand, organizational and political history, and microeconomics of the representative consumer. The book is a valuable source of data for researchers interested in public enterprise economics.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Bös, Dieter

Bliss, C. J.

Intriligator, M. D.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Front Cover;1
2;Public Enterprise Economics: Theory and Application;4
3;Copyright Page;5
4;Table of Contents;10
5;INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES;6
6;PREFACE;8
7;TECHNICAL NOTE;9
8;CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION;20
8.1;1.1 NORMATIVE AND POSITIVE THEORY;20
8.2;1.2 THE PUBLIC ENTERPRISE;25
8.3;1.3 NATIONALIZATION OF ENTERPRISES;32
8.4;1.4 PRIVATIZATION: A SWELLING TIDE?;38
8.5;1.5 SOCIALIZATION OF COMMODITIES;42
8.6;1.6 OPTIMAL QUALITIES;44
8.7;1.7 OPTIMAL PRICE SCHEDULES;47
9;PART ONE: THE BASIC MODEL;50
9.1;CHAPTER 2. ESSENTIAL PARTS OF PUBLIC SECTOR PRICING MODELS;50
9.1.1;2.1 OBJECTIVES I: NORMATIVE THEORY;52
9.1.2;2.2 OBJECTIVES II: POSITIVE THEORY;68
9.1.3;2.3 CONSTRAINTS I: MARKETS;70
9.1.4;2.4 CONSTRAINTS II: PRODUCTION;74
9.1.5;2.5 CONSTRAINTS III: FINANCE;92
9.2;CHAPTER 3. NORMATIVE OPTIMUM THEORY;98
9.2.1;3.1 THE ACTORS AND THEIR INSTRUMENTS;98
9.2.2;3.2 SOLVING THE MODEL;101
9.2.3;3.3 THE CONDITIONS FOR OPTIMAL PRICES AND QUANTITIES;103
9.2.4;3.4 COMPENSATING FOR INCOME EFFECTS;110
9.2.5;3.5 THE CONDITIONS FOR OPTIMAL QUALITY;112
9.3;CHAPTER 4. POSITIVE OPTIMUM THEORY;124
9.4;CHAPTER 5. NORMATIVE PIECEMEAL THEORY;132
9.4.1;5.1 ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OPTIMUM AND PIECEMEAL POLICIES;132
9.4.2;5.2 WELFARE IMPROVEMENTS WITH NON-TIGHT CONSTRAINTS;134
9.4.3;5.3 WELFARE IMPROVEMENTS WITH TIGHT TECHNOLOGY CONSTRAINT;142
9.4.4;5.4 ON WELFARE -IMPROVING INCREASES OF PUBLIC INEFFICIENCY;145
9.4.5;5.5 PIECEMEAL POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS:GENERAL RULES FOR SOME SPECIAL CASES;150
9.5;CHAPTER 6. POSITIVE PIECEMEAL THEORY;155
9.5.1;6.1 IMPROVEMENTS WITH TIGHT AND NON-TIGHTCONSTRAINTS;155
9.5.2;6.2 THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN EFFICIENCY AND MARKET EQUILIBRIUM;157
10;PART TWO: PUBLIC PRICING POLICIES FORWELFARE MAXIMIZATION;168
10.1;A: BASIC RULES;168
10.2;CHAPTER 7. MARGINAL-COST PRICING;168
10.2.1;7.1 OPTIMUM POLICY;168
10.2.2;7.2 REGULATING MARGINAL-COST PRICES;176
10.2.3;7.3 CONSEQUENCES FOR ALLOCATION, DISTRIBUTION, AND STABILIZATION;187
10.2.4;7.4 PIECEMEAL POLICY;190
10.3;CHAPTER 8. RAMSEY PRICING;194
10.3.1;8.1 OPTIMUM RAMSEY POLICY;194
10.3.2;8.2. REGULATING RAMSEY PRICES;201
10.3.3;8.3 INFLUENCE OF RAMSEY PRICES ON ALLOCATION, DISTRIBUTION, AND STABILIZATION;207
10.3.4;8.4 A PIECEMEAL-POLICY INTERPRETATION OF THERAMSEY OPTIMUM;208
10.4;CHAPTER 9. RATE OF RETURN REGULATION;211
10.4.1;9.1 AN INTUITIVE INTRODUCTION;211
10.4.2;9.2 A MORE RIGOROUS TREATMENT;213
10.4.3;9.3 WELFARE VERSUS PROFIT MAXIMIZATION:THE AVERCH-JOHNSON EFFECT;215
10.5;CHAPTER 10. PRICING WITH DISTRIBUTIONAL AIMS;219
10.5.1;10.1 PRICES VERSUS TAXES;219
10.5.2;10.2 FELDSTEIN PRICING;221
10.5.3;10.3 COMPARING DISTRIBUTIONAL AND ALLOCATIVE PRICING;225
10.6;B: INTERDEPENDENCES WITH THE PRIVATE ECONOMY;232
10.7;CHAPTER 11. ADJUSTMENT TO MONOPOLISTIC PRICING IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR;232
10.7.1;11.1 THE SECOND–BEST ISSUE: ADJUSTMENT TO,VERSUS INTERFERENCE IN, THE PRIVATE ECONOMY;232
10.7.2;11.2 A MODEL FOR PUBLIC PRICES IN AN IMPERFECT MARKET ECONOMY;234
10.7.3;11.3 A DUOPOLY MODEL FOR PUBLIC PRICES;238
10.8;CHAPTER 12. ADJUSTMENT TO RATIONED MARKETS;248
10.8.1;12.1 RATIONED LABOR MARKET;248
10.8.2;12.2 CAPACITY LIMITS OF PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION;257
10.9;C: TIME-DEPENDENT PRICING;265
10.10;CHAPTER 13. PRICING THROUGH TIME AND ADJUSTMENT CLAUSES;265
10.11;CHAPTER 14 PEAK-LOAD PRICING;268
10.11.1;14.1 SETTING THE PROBLEM;268
10.11.2;14.2 A MODEL WITH EXCESS DEMAND AND RATIONING;271
10.12;D: PUBLIC PRICING WHEN QUALITY MATTERS;282
10.13;CHAPTER 15. DIFFERENT APPROACHES TOWARDS OPTIMALQUALITY;282
10.13.1;15.1 QUALITY I: DISTINGUISHING DIFFERENT GOODS;282
10.13.2;15.2 QUALITY II: USING CONTINUOUS QUALITY INDICATORS;284
11;PART THREE: POSITIVE THEORY: PUBLIC PRICINGPOLICIES TO ACHIEVE POLITICIANS'AND MANAGERS' AIMS;291
11.1;A: POLITICIANS AND BUREAUCRATS;291
11.2;CHAPTER 16 WINNING VOTES;291
11.3;CHAPTER 17 MAXIMIZING BUDGETS;300
11.4;B: MANAGERS OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES AND UNIONS;304
11.5;CHAPTER 18. MAXIMIZING OUTPUT OR REVENUE,MINIMIZING ENERGY INPUTS;304
11.6;CHAPTER 19. MINIMIZING PRICE INDICES;308
11.7;CHAPTER 20. THE INFLUENCE OF UNIONS;311
11.8;CHAPTER 21. QUALITY IN POSITIVE THEORY MODELS;315
11.9;CHAPTER 22. A SET OF AXIOMS FOR PRICESTO ACHIEVE A FAIR ALLOCATION OF COSTS;318
12;PART FOUR: APPLICATION OF THE THEORETICAL RESULTS:THE EXAMPLE OF LONDON TRANSPORT;324
12.1;CHAPTER 23. ECONOMIC THEORY AND EMPIRICALANALYSIS (I): SPECIFYING DEMAND;324
12.1.1;23.1 MICROECONOMICS OF THE REPRESENTATIVE CONSUMER;324
12.1.2;23.2 SOME BASIC PRINCIPLES FOR ESTIMATING SYSTEMS OFDEMAND FUNCTIONS;328
12.1.3;23.3 DESIRABLE PROPERTIES OF A DEMAND SYSTEM;331
12.1.4;23.4 THE ALMOST IDEAL DEMAND SYSTEM;335
12.2;CHAPTER 24. ECONOMIC THEORY AND EMPIRICALANALYSIS (II): SPECIFYING TECHNOLOGY;342
12.2.1;24.1 DUALITY;342
12.2.2;24.2 SOME BASIC PRINCIPLES OF ESTIMATING TECHNOLOGY;344
12.2.3;24.3 DESIRABLE PROPERTIES OF THE FIRM'S TECHNOLOGY REPRESENTATION;345
12.2.4;24.4 LONG-RUN VERSUS SHORT-RUN MARGINAL COSTS;347
12.3;CHAPTER 25. BUS AND UNDERGROUND SERVICES IN LONDON;352
12.3.1;25.1 RECENT ORGANIZATIONAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY;352
12.3.2;25.2 RECENT ECONOMIC HISTORY;356
12.3.3;25.3 EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON BUS AND UNDERGROUND DEMAND;372
12.3.4;25.4 EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON BUS AND UNDERGROUND COSTS;381
12.4;CHAPTER 26. ESTIMATING NORMATIVE AND POSITIVEPRICES FOR BUS AND UNDERGROUND IN LONDON;385
12.4.1;26.1 THE AIDS SPECIFICATION OF DEMAND;385
12.4.2;26.2 THE TRANSLOG SPECIFICATION OF FACTOR DEMAND FUNCTIONS;401
12.4.3;26.3 OPTIMAL PRICES FOR LONDON BUS AND UNDERGROUND SERVICES;413
13;APPENDICES;431
13.1;APPENDIX 1 THE SIZE OF THE PUBLIC ENTERPRISE SECTORIN EUROPE;431
13.2;APPENDIX 2 THE SIZE OF THE GOVERNMENTAND REGULATED ENTERPRISE SECTOR IN THE UNITED STATES;438
14;LIST OF SYMBOLS;442
15;REFERENCES;448
16;INDEX;471