Blinder / Friedman Natural Resources, Uncertainty, and General Equilibrium Systems

Essays in Memory of Rafael Lusky
1. Auflage 2013
ISBN: 978-1-4832-6483-7
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 272 Seiten, Web PDF

Natural Resources, Uncertainty, and General Equilibrium Systems: Essays in Memory of Rafael Lusky compiles a collection of works by economists who had been friends and colleagues of Rafael Lusky, a teacher in the University of Florida and contributor to theoretical resource economics. This book is divided into four sections- natural resources, uncertainty, general equilibrium systems, and policy and applications. In these sections, this text specifically discusses the resource depletion with technological uncertainty and the Rawlsian fairness principle; monopoly, uncertainty, and exploration; and price discrimination under uncertainty. The insurance theoretic aspects of workers' compensation; adverse selection and optimum insurance policies; and difficulty with Keynesian models of aggregate demand are also elaborated. This compilation likewise deliberates the exchange model of bilateral trade; optimal taxes on foreign lending; and extended linear permanent expenditure system (ELPES). This publication is a useful reference for economists and students concerned with theoretical resource economics.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Blinder, Alan S.

Friedman, Philip

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Front Cover;1
2;Natural Resources, Uncertainty, and General Equilibrium Systems: Essays in Memory of Rafael Lusky;4
3;Copyright Page;5
4;Table of Contents;8
5;RAFAEL LUSKY (1939-1976);6
6;LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS;14
7;PREFACE;16
8;PART I:
NATURAL RESOURCES;18
8.1;Chapter 1. Resource depletion with technological uncertainty and the Rawlsian Fairness Principle;20
8.1.1;1. INTRODUCTION;20
8.1.2;2. THE STRUCTURE OF THE MODEL AND OTHER PRELIMINARIES;24
8.1.3;3. THE JUST RATE OF RESOURCE DEPLETION;27
8.1.4;4. CONCLUDING REMARK;32
8.1.5;REFERENCES;33
8.2;Chapter 2.
Monopoly, uncertainty, and exploration;34
8.2.1;1. INTRODUCTION;34
8.2.2;2. SOCIAL OPTIMALITY IN A TWO-PERIOD MODEL;35
8.2.3;3. SOCIAL OPTIMALITY: AN ALTERNATIVE FORMULATION;37
8.2.4;4. MONOPOLY;38
8.2.5;5. THE CASE OF CERTAINTY;40
8.2.6;6. THE CASE OF CERTAINTY (ALTERNATIVE FORMULATION);43
8.2.7;7. THE IMPACT OF UNCERTAINTY;45
8.2.8;8. UNCERTAINTY CONTINUED;47
8.2.9;9. GENERAL REMARKS;48
9;PART 2:
UNCERTAINTY;50
9.1;Chapter 3. Leverage, bankruptcy, and the cost of capital;52
9.1.1;1. INTRODUCTION;52
9.1.2;2. STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE ANALYSIS;53
9.1.3;3. ANALYSIS WITH A LINEAR UTILITY FUNCTION;60
9.1.4;4. CONCLUDING REMARKS;67
9.1.5;REFERENCES;68
9.2;Chapter 4.
Price discrimination under uncertainty;70
9.2.1;1. INTRODUCTION;70
9.2.2;2. THE NONSTOCHASTIC CASE;71
9.2.3;3. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE FIRM UNDER UNCERTAINTY;72
9.2.4;4. FIRST-ORDER CONDITIONS;74
9.2.5;5. SOME RESULTS FOR AN EXPONENTIAL UTILITY FUNCTION;78
9.2.6;6. IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL ANALYSIS;80
9.2.7;7. CONCLUSION;81
9.2.8;REFERENCES;81
9.3;Chapter 5. Insurance theoretic aspects of workers' compensation;84
9.3.1;1. INTRODUCTION;84
9.3.2;2. ACCIDENTS AND FULL EFFICIENCY;85
9.3.3;3. IDEAL INSURANCE;87
9.3.4;4. LESS-THAN-IDEAL INSURANCE;89
9.3.5;5. THE PRESENT WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAM;91
9.3.6;6. VOLUNTARY INSURANCE;92
9.3.7;7. WAGE BARGAINS AND WORKER MISPERCEPTIONS;94
9.3.8;8. CHOICE OF TECHNOLOGY;97
9.3.9;9. VARIATION AMONG WORKERS;98
9.3.10;10. ON-THE-JOB SAFETY;100
9.3.11;11. CONCLUDING REMARKS;105
9.3.12;REFERENCES;106
9.4;Chapter 6. Multiperiod stochastic dominance with one-period parameters, liquidity preference, and equilibriumin the log-normal case;108
9.4.1;1. INTRODUCTION;108
9.4.2;2. ASSUMPTIONS AND NOTATIONS;109
9.4.3;3. COMPARISON OF THE NORMAL AND THE LOG-NORMAL EFFICIENCY FRONTIERS;114
9.4.4;4. EQUILIBRIUM AND LOG-NORMAL EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS WITH ONE-PERIOD PARAMETERS;118
9.4.5;5. CONCLUDING REMARKS;126
9.4.6;REFERENCES;127
9.5;Chapter 7. Adverse selection and optimum insurance policies;130
9.5.1;1. INTRODUCTION;130
9.5.2;2. THE GENERAL PROBLEM;131
9.5.3;3. THE OPTIMUM LINEAR POLICY WITH A CEILING;133
9.5.4;4. COMPARISON WITH THE SOCIALLY OPTIMAL POLICY;135
9.5.5;5. A NONLINEAR EXAMPLE;137
9.5.6;REFERENCES;139
10;PART 3:
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM SYSTEMS: STABILITY, OPTIMALITY, AND DISTRIBUTION;140
10.1;Chapter 8. A difficulty with Keynesian models of aggregate demand;142
10.1.1;1. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM;142
10.1.2;2. THE CONVENTIONAL KEYNESIAN MODEL;143
10.1.3;3. AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL OF OUTPUT ADJUSTMENT DECISIONS;145
10.1.4;4. A MODEL OF OUTPUT LEVEL DECISIONS;146
10.1.5;5. DYNAMIC PROPERTIES OF THE PREFERRED MODEL;148
10.1.6;6. RECAPITULATION;151
10.1.7;REFERENCES;152
10.2;Chapter 9. Continuously dated commodities and nont.tonnement with production and consumption;154
10.2.1;1. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF DATED COMMODITIES;154
10.2.2;2. THE HAHN PROCESS AND MONEY;156
10.2.3;3. TOPOLOGICAL ISSUES;157
10.2.4;4. BEHAVIOR OF HOUSEHOLDS;160
10.2.5;5. BEHAVIOR OF FIRMS;165
10.2.6;6. CLOSURE EQUATIONS AND WALRAS' LAW;168
10.2.7;7. THE PRESENT ACTION POSTULATE;168
10.2.8;8. THE HAHN PROCESS AND TRADING RULES;170
10.2.9;9. PRICE ADJUSTMENT;171
10.2.10;10. DECLINE OF TARGET PROFITS;172
10.2.11;11. DECLINE OF TARGET UTILITIES;174
10.2.12;12. PROPERTIES OF EQUILIBRIUM;175
10.2.13;13. BOUNDEDNESS;177
10.2.14;14. COMPACTNESS AND QUASI-STABILITY;178
10.2.15;15. GLOBAL STABILITY;180
10.2.16;REFERENCES;183
10.3;Chapter 10.
An exchange model of bilateral trade;186
10.3.1;1. INTRODUCTION;186
10.3.2;2. A GENERAL MODEL OF BILATERALISM;187
10.3.3;3. CONCLUSION;190
10.3.4;REFERENCES;190
10.4;Chapter 11. When it is ethically optimal to allocate money income in stipulated fractional shares;192
10.4.1;1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY;192
10.4.2;2 SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTIONS;193
10.4.3;3. CONSTANCY OF RELATIVE RISK AVERSION;196
10.4.4;4. OPTIMALITY CONDITIONS;200
10.4.5;5. SYMMETRY SITUATIONS AND GENERALIZATIONS;206
10.4.6;6. QUALIFICATIONS;210
10.4.7;REFERENCES;210
11;PART 4:
POLICY AND APPLICATIONS;214
11.1;Chapter 12.
Optimal taxes on foreign lending;216
11.1.1;1. INTRODUCTION;216
11.1.2;2. THE OPTIMUM TAX: SIMPLE CASE;217
11.1.3;3. THE MANY-GOOD, MANY-PERIOD CASE;219
11.1.4;4. OPTIMUM TAXES ON EXCHANGE: GENERAL CASE;221
11.1.5;5. RELATED APPROACHES;222
11.1.6;6. SUMMARY;224
11.1.7;REFERENCES;224
11.2;Chapter 13. Monopoly regulation, waiting lines, and investment in service capacity;226
11.2.1;1. INTRODUCTION;226
11.2.2;2. THE MODEL;227
11.2.3;3. COMPARISON BETWEEN MONOPOLY AND THE SOCIAL OPTIMAL CASE;230
11.2.4;4. REGULATION OF MONOPOLY;233
11.2.5;REFERENCE;235
11.3;Chapter 14.
Identification and estimation problemsin limited dependent variable models;236
11.3.1;1. INTRODUCTION;236
11.3.2;2. THE SIMPLE PROBIT MODEL;236
11.3.3;3. THE TOBIT MODEL;238
11.3.4;4. SIMPLE EXTENSIONS OF THE TOBIT MODEL;240
11.3.5;5. STOCHASTIC THRESHOLD MODELS;242
11.3.6;6. SIMULTANEOUS EQUATIONS MODELS;248
11.3.7;7. CONCLUSIONS;254
11.3.8;REFERENCES;255
11.4;Chapter 15. An extended linear permanent expenditure system (ELPES);258
11.4.1;1. INTRODUCTION;258
11.4.2;2. PERMANENT-INCOME APPROACHES;261
11.4.3;3. FORMULATION OF THE ELPES;263
11.4.4;4. ESTIMATION OF PARAMETERS;266
11.4.5;5. STANDARD ERRORS;268
11.4.6;6. CONCLUDING REMARKS;270
11.4.7;REFERENCES;271